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Modern Maritime Neutrality Law

James Farrant*
INTRODUCTION

L
I

ike Mark Twain, rumors of the law of neutrality’s demise are an exaggeration.1 The rumors surfaced forcefully after the U.N. Charter was
adopted in 1945. There are still those who occasionally perpetrate them.2
Yet national law of armed conflict manuals and several recent non-State
manuals rely heavily on traditional maritime neutrality law. It has particular
contemporary relevance as the U.S. pivots to the maritime Asia-Pacific, and
is no less relevant to European States, which remain reliant on critical sea
lines of communication through the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Principles of neutrality law are also asserted in relatively new areas of legal regulation, such as air and missile operations and cyber warfare. 3
Neutrality’s traditional “mustiness” has been superseded by a new vibrancy,

* Lieutenant Commander James Farrant, Barrister UK Royal Navy, is a faculty member at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law in the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the UK Ministry of Defence or the UK government.
1. Frank M. White, Mark Twain Amused, NEW YORK JOURNAL (June 2, 1897) (quoting
Mark Twain “The report of my death was an exaggeration” following the publication of
newspaper reports that he had died).
2. See, e.g., Kevin J. Heller, The Law of Neutrality Does Not Apply to the Conflict with AlQaeda and It’s a Good Thing, Too: A Response to Chang, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL 115, 136 (2011).
3. See PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009) [hereinafter AMW MANUAL]; TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013).
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which makes a detailed understanding of the rules and the principles they
defend ever more important.4
Commentators have long observed that the law of maritime neutrality
has rarely been settled: not only were the rules alleged to be musty, but also
murky.5 The most recent significant treaties governing neutrality law,
Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V)6 and Hague Convention
XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War
(Hague XIII)7 were agreed in 1907. The latter Convention, in particular,
was a far from comprehensive statement of the law. It included no provisions on the law of blockade, contraband, prize law or belligerent visit and
search rights. This was a consequence of irremediable disagreement between States at the Second Hague Peace Conference.8 A more detailed attempt at codification of the law of naval warfare and maritime neutrality
was made at the London Conference of 1909. The resulting Declaration of
London was intended to be a code for application in an international prize
court. Looming war in Europe and hostility to the Declaration in, ironically, London meant that it would never be ratified and the international prize
court never became a reality.9 Throughout this article, the law up to the
1909 Declaration of London will be referred to as the traditional law.
Before examining the substantive rules of maritime neutrality, this Introduction must set some parameters. It therefore briefly defines the three
broad principles of neutrality law, which inform the substantive rules of
maritime neutrality. Next, it assesses when and to whom the law of neutrality
applies. The Introduction then describes some of the sources relied upon
throughout this article.
4. Detlev F. Vagts, The Traditional Concept of Neutrality in a Changing Environment, 14
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 83, 84 (1998) (“neutrality has a
slightly musty quality”).
5. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 383–99 (Ronald Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 1921) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM VOL. II].
6. Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague V].
7. Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415 [hereinafter Hague XIII].
8. See, e.g., the remarks of Mr. Martens on September 24, 1907 in respect of contraband. 3 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 1111 (James B. Scott
ed., 1921) [hereinafter HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. III].
9. STEPHEN C. NEFF, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS—A GENERAL HISTORY 141–42 (2000).
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Given how much has changed in the 105 years since the Declaration of
London was drafted, it is perhaps surprising that the three broad principles
which underpinned its provisions governing the conduct of neutrals are
still reflected in modern military manuals. First, as between belligerent and
neutral States, prima facie, the law of peace is applicable.10 Second and third,
the interrelated principles of impartiality and abstention guide the neutral’s
conduct towards the belligerents. The duty of impartiality is one more of
form than substance. In the context of trade, for example: “‘Cash and carry’ policies are legitimate even if one of the warring powers cannot get together the cash or is prevented by geography from doing any carrying.” 11
The duty of abstention requires neutral States not to involve themselves in
the hostilities. When resort to war was a question of policy unfettered by
legal restraint, this duty made little sense because the neutral State always
had the right to “throw up neutrality” and join the war.12 However, it is
unquestionably a relevant duty since the establishment of the prohibition
on the use of force.13 This prohibition, widely recognized as jus cogens, forbids a neutral State from abandoning neutrality and joining the conflict.
Accordingly, the duty of abstention is arguably stronger now than it was in
1909.
While the U.N. Charter reinforces the neutral duty of abstention, other
rights and duties of neutral States may be displaced if the Security Council
takes action under Chapter VII. Article 25 requires Member States to accept and carry out Security Council decisions. Article 103 provides that
where there is a conflict between a State’s Charter obligations and its obligations under any other international agreement its Charter obligations
prevail.14 During the First Gulf War in 1991, Switzerland felt compelled to
take part in economic sanctions against Iraq, even though not yet a member of the U.N. and officially neutral.15 Should the Security Council make a
determination under Article 39 that an act of aggression by one State
10. Committee on Maritime Neutrality, International Law Association, Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality, in 68 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION REPORT OF
THE 68TH CONFERENCE, TAIPEI, 1998, at 496, princ. 1.3 (1998) [hereinafter Helsinki Principles].
11. Vagts, supra note 4, 93 (1998).
12. OPPENHEIM VOL. II, supra note 5, at 421.
13. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
14. Id., art. 103.
15. Dietrich Schindler, Neutrality and Morality: Developments in Switzerland and in the International Community, 14 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 155, 162
(1998).
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against another has taken place, it is likely that the combined effect of Articles 25 and 103 is to exclude rights and duties under the law of neutrality
altogether.16 As the Security Council has yet to make such a determination,
this remains a purely theoretical position. It goes too far to say, as one recent commentator has, that “the adoption of the UN Charter has rendered
the law of neutrality’s rules governing the use of force essentially obsolete.”17
Having observed the broad principles, the next issue is when the law
applies. Some have argued that the law of neutrality operates only in time
of war and that during international hostilities which fall short of war, neutrality law does not apply.18 However, the better view is that the threshold
for applicability of neutrality law is the same as that for the existence of an
armed conflict. This reflects the views of States in the national manuals
consulted throughout this article, which are listed presently.
The last introductory question is to whom the law applies. The rules of
maritime neutrality primarily address measures and controls which belligerents may enforce against merchant vessels of neutral character. These must
be distinguished from vessels of friendly character, that is, vessels of the
same nationality as the enforcing belligerent. The relationship between belligerent warships and vessels of the same nationality is a matter for the
domestic law of that State. Vessels of neutral character must also be distinguished from vessels of enemy character. The law of naval warfare allows a
belligerent to capture enemy merchant vessels as of right.19 Neutral merchant vessels, however, may only be subject to belligerent interference
where the law of neutrality provides a specific justification. Historically,
there were two approaches to distinguishing between enemy and neutral
vessels. The Anglo-American focused on the domicile of the owner,
whereas continental European States preferred to use the owner’s nationality as the defining criterion.20 The dichotomy has never been resolved as a

16. Id. at 165.
17. Heller, supra note 2, at 136.
18. Michael Bothe argues that neutrality only applies in armed conflicts of “significant
scope.” Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 549, ¶ 1106 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2008).
19. See infra Part Five.
20. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare:
Part I, The Traditional Law, 29 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283, 291
(1991) [hereinafter Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture: Part I].
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matter of international law and as late as 1950 domestic prize courts grappled with which was correct.21
In the Parts assessing the substantive rules of maritime neutrality, this
article will routinely refer to four national law of armed conflict manuals,
which have been chosen to provide as broad a perspective as possible:
Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004) (UK Manual)22;
the United States’ The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (2007) (NWP 1-14M)23; the German Rechtsgrundlagen für den
Einsatz von Seestreitkräften (Commander’s Handbook – Legal Bases for
the Operations of Naval Forces) (2002) (German Commander’s Handbook)24; and the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) Operational Law Handbook (2006) (Chinese Manual).25
Three other sources will regularly be cited and warrant explanation.
The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea26 published in 1995 is a restatement of the law drafted by an
international group of experts convened by the International Institute of
Humanitarian Law.27 The Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality28 were published in 1998 by a group of experts convened by the In-

21. The Hoegh de Vries, a decision of the Egyptian Prize Court sitting at Alexandria,
summarized the two approaches before adopting the Anglo-American approach on the
grounds that even where an owner is neutral by nationality, if he resides in an enemy territory “the goods are a source of wealth to the enemy State.” The Court also concluded that
the Anglo-American approach was the “one most generally accepted.” The Hoegh de Vries,
17 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 447 ((Prize Ct. of Alexandria 1950) (Egypt)).
22. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL].
23. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 512.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS (2007) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M].
24. GERMAN NAVY, BUNDESSPRACHENAMT – REFERAT SM 3 AUFTRAGSNUMMER
2002U-01441, KOMMANDANTEN HANDBUCH – RECHTSGRUNDLAGEN FÜR DEN EINSATZ
VON SEESTREITKRÄFTEN (2002) [hereinafter GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK].
25. PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (NAVY), OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (2006)
[hereinafter CHINESE MANUAL]. The Chinese Manual provides an important perspective,
but treats some topics in less detail than the other manuals. Where footnotes in this article
contain references to all manuals except the Chinese, it is because the Chinese Manual
does not specifically address the issue under discussion.
26. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
27. Id. at 46–55.
28. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10.
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ternational Law Association.29 Third, a group of experts at Harvard University convened to assess the impact of belligerent conduct in the First World
War on the law of maritime and air neutrality. They wrote the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War
(Harvard Draft Convention) and lengthy commentary purporting to update
the 1909 Declaration of London after its abandonment during the First
World War.30 Published in 1939, it has been described as “the most comprehensive summation of the law of neutrality in the interwar period,”
which “remains unsurpassed to the present day.”31
The article will proceed in six Parts. The first will assess the rights and
duties of belligerent vessels in neutral territorial seas, and the rights and
duties of neutral coastal States. Part Two analyzes what use belligerent vessels may make of neutral port facilities—in particular, for resupply and repair. Part Three addresses the controls that belligerents may place upon
trade with their enemy, and how far these controls may be enforced against
neutral merchant vessels. Part Four examines a belligerent’s ability to deny
neutral merchant vessels use of areas of the sea by three devices of the law
of naval warfare: blockade, maritime zones and the right to exclude shipping from the vicinity of naval operations. Part Five considers “unneutral
service,” a catch-all collection of other ways in which a neutral vessel might
promote the cause of one belligerent over another. Finally, Part Six takes a
holistic look at the means by which belligerents enforce the rules of maritime neutrality.
PART ONE: PASSAGE RIGHTS IN TERRITORIAL SEAS
Article 3 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) provides: “Every State has the right to . . . territorial sea up to a
limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles.”32 The sovereignty of a coastal
State extends to the territorial sea, the airspaces above and the seabed and
subsoil below.33 Coastal State sovereignty is exercised subject to UNCLOS
29. Id. at 496.
30. Philip C. Jessup (Reporter), Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial
War, 33 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 167 (1939) [hereinafter Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary].
31. NEFF, supra note 9, at 174–77.
32. United Nations Law of the Sea Convention art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1144 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
33. Id., art. 2.
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and other rules of international law.34 One important limitation on the
coastal State’s sovereignty in its territorial sea is that vessels of all States
enjoy certain passage rights. Depending on the particular passage right, the
coastal State may have very little—or no—authority under international law
to impede or restrict it. After briefly examining the general rules governing
passage rights, this Part addresses to what extent belligerent States’ vessels
enjoy passage rights in neutral territorial seas, and to what extent neutral
States’ vessels enjoy them in belligerent territorial seas.
Four separate passage rights are exercisable in a coastal State’s territorial seas: innocent passage, transit passage, straits innocent passage 35 and archipelagic sea lanes passage. These are set out as a matter of treaty law in
UNCLOS. UNCLOS has 166 State parties which include—with one notable exception, the U.S.—the vast majority of coastal States.36 The U.S. considers all of the navigational provisions reflective of customary international law.37 Despite UNCLOS’ broad ratification, this position remains controversial. The more widely accepted view is that only innocent passage and
straits innocent passage are strictly applicable between non-parties to the
Convention.38

34. Id., art. 2(3).
35. There are several varieties of straits innocent passage, but they may be dealt with
together See NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 2.5.3.
36. Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to
the implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the implementation of the
provisions of the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and
highly migratory fish stocks, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf
(last visited Jan. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Status of UNCLOS]. The United States is the most
prominent non-party.
37. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 1.2.
38. See James Kraska, Legal Vortex in the Strait of Hormuz, VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2014); Nilufer Oral, Transit Passage Rights in the Strait of
Hormuz and Iran’s Threats to Block the Passage of Oil Tankers, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHTS (May 3, 2012), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue
/16/transit-passage-rights-strait-hormuz-and-iran%E2%80%99s-threats-block-passage.
Iran, a non-party to UNCLOS, considers that vessels from States that are parties to UNCLOS may exercise the right of transit passage in the Strait of Hormuz, but only because
it has granted them permission. The International Court of Justice decision in the Corfu
Channel case is also authority for the position that straits innocent passage is a customary
law right. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). See also ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & A. VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 110–13 (3d ed. 1999); YOSHIFURNI
TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 107 (2012).
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Innocent passage applies in every part of the territorial sea.39 It must be
exercised continuously and expeditiously for the purpose of traversing the
territorial seas or visiting a harbor or port facility of the coastal State. Innocent passage may not be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal State.40 This means, for example, that vessels may not launch or
recover aircraft or military devices, or compromise the coastal State’s customs, fiscal, immigration or sanity laws.41 Aircraft in flight do not enjoy the
right of innocent passage. The coastal State may suspend innocent passage
temporarily in specified parts of the territorial sea on a nondiscriminatory
basis, but only for reasons essential to its national security.42
There is dispute as to whether warships enjoy the right of innocent
passage. It seems clear as a matter of treaty construction that they do. First,
UNCLOS, Section 3, Subsection A (which contains the rules on innocent
passage) is entitled “Rules Applicable to all Ships,” which does not appear
to countenance any exceptions. Second, Article 19(2) specifically lists certain acts which, if carried out in the territorial sea, render passage not innocent. These include the threat or use of force against the coastal State, the
launching or recovery of aircraft and the launching or recovery of any military device.43 There would be little need specifically to prohibit these acts if
warships did not enjoy innocent passage in the first place. Nonetheless,
some States continue to assert that warships do not enjoy the right of innocent passage and demand prior notification or permission before foreign
warships enter their territorial sea.44
During an armed conflict, belligerent warships and auxiliaries do not
enjoy innocent passage in neutral territorial seas. Article 19(1) of UNCLOS
expressly subjects the right of innocent passage to “other rules of international law,” including the law of maritime neutrality. Under traditional maritime neutrality law, belligerents enjoy only the right of “mere” passage in
neutral territorial seas.45 This is the position of the San Remo Manual, the
39. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 17–19.
40. Id., arts. 18, 19(1).
41. Id., art. 19(2)(e)–(g).
42. Id., art. 25(3).
43. Id., art. 19(2)(a), (e)-(f).
44. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 2.5.2.4, asserts that warships “enjoy the right of innocent passage on an unimpeded and unannounced basis.” On the other hand, the CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 78, 87–88, acknowledges the debate, but states that “Foreign military vessels may not enter Chinese territorial waters without the permission of the
Chinese Government.”
45. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 10.
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Helsinki Principles and all of the modern military manuals surveyed.46 The
scope and nature of mere passage, and how, if it all, it differs from innocent passage, is examined below.
Transit passage is a right of maritime passage and aerial overflight.47
Like innocent passage, it must be exercised continuously and expeditiously.
The right applies only in straits which are (1) used for international navigation and (2) linking two parts of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone.48 The second criterion is simply a matter of geography, but the first is
less clear in its effect. It may amount to a threshold requirement that a particular strait is used regularly by vessels for international navigation before
the right may be granted, although this approach under pre-existing customary law was rejected by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
Corfu Channel case.49 Where the right of transit passage applies, it is a much
broader right than innocent passage. Vessels may exercise it in their normal
mode of continuous and expeditious transit.50 Many States maintain that
“normal” means, for example, that warships may launch and recover aircraft during transit passage.51 Transit passage may not be suspended or impeded by the coastal State.52
In straits which do not meet the two-limbed definition for transit passage, UNCLOS provides that there is a right of innocent passage which
may not be suspended.53 This is “straits innocent passage.” Some straits are
specifically excluded from the transit passage regime and thus subject to
46. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 19, ¶ 19.3; Helsinki Principles, supra note
10, princ. 2.3, cmt. at 503; UK MANUAL supra note 22, ¶ 13.9B; NWP 1-14M, supra note
23, ¶ 7.3.5. The GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 245, supports this
view, although later on it states that “mere” passage is to be exercised in accordance with
the UNCLOS rules on “innocent” passage. Id., ¶ 246. The CHINESE MANUAL supra note
25, at 262–63, is not explicit on the point, but its adoption of a traditional position in respect of belligerent use of neutral ports suggests a traditional view of passage rights. Many
pre-UNCLOS sources use the words “mere” and “innocent” interchangeably when referring to the passage right. See, e.g., ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 235 (1955) (Vol. 50, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies);
C.H.M. Waldock, The Release of the Altmark’s Prisoners, 24 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 216, 232 (1947).
47. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 37–44.
48. Id., arts. 38(2), 37. An example is the Strait of Gibraltar.
49. Corfu Channel, supra note 38, at 28–29.
50. UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 38(2).
51. See, e.g., NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 2.5.3.1.
52. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 38(1), 44.
53. Id., art. 45(2).
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straits innocent passage. One example is straits formed by an island of a
State bordering the strait and its mainland where there is a route of similar
convenience seaward of the island.54 Another is straits which link the high
seas or EEZ and the territorial sea of a third State.55
Archipelagic States (States composed entirely of islands) enjoy sovereignty over the waters within the archipelago, which are known as archipelagic waters.56 However, they may provide designated sea lanes through the
archipelago for foreign vessels. Where such lanes are designated, vessels
enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.57 Where it applies, archipelagic sea lanes passage is, for present purposes, identical in its terms to the
right of transit passage. Most importantly, it may not be suspended.58
For the purposes of this article, transit passage, straits innocent passage
and archipelagic sea lanes passage will be collectively referred to as the
non-suspendable passage rights. Whether and to what extent they remain
applicable during an armed conflict is assessed below.
A.

Belligerent Vessels’ Passage Rights in Neutral Territorial Seas
1. Mere Passage

Hague XIII, Article 10, provides, “The neutrality of a power is not affected
by the mere passage through its territorial waters of war-ships or prizes belonging to belligerents.” Article 10 permits, rather than obliges, neutral
States to allow belligerents mere passage. It is subject to qualification in
Article 9, which provides: “A neutral power must apply impartially to the
two belligerents the conditions, restrictions or prohibitions made by it in
regard to the admission into its ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters, of
belligerent war-ships and their prizes.”
Naturally enough, Hague XIII focused on the passage rights of belligerent warships.59 A warship, according to UNCLOS, is a ship belonging to
54. Id., arts. 38(1), 45(1)(a). An example is the Corfu Channel.
55. Id., art. 45(1)(b). An example is the Gulf of Aqaba.
56. Id., art. 49(1).
57. Id., art. 53(1)–(2). Where lanes are not designated, the right of archipelagic sea
lanes passage may be exercised through routes normally used for international navigation.
Id., art. 53(12).
58. See, e.g., id., arts. 53(3), 54.
59. No rule of law purports to limit—or allow neutral States to limit—the passage
rights of belligerent-flagged merchant vessels. None of the contemporary military manuals
surveyed asserts such a rule. The author is aware of no examples of neutral States purport209
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the armed forces of a State bearing the external markings distinguishing
such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the
appropriate service list . . . and manned by a crew which is under regular
armed forces discipline.60
The San Remo Manual and the Helsinki Principles expand the application of the Hague XIII passage rules to auxiliaries. An auxiliary is defined
in the San Remo Manual as “a vessel, other than a warship, that is owned
by or under the exclusive control of the armed forces of a State and used
for the time being on government non-commercial service.”61 The UK
Manual uses identical terms.62 The U.S. manual’s use of the term “belligerent forces” includes auxiliaries.63 The German and Chinese manuals adopt
the same view.64 This position is not, in fact, a new one and was considered
uncontroversial as far back as 1947.65 The extension of the Hague XIII regime to include auxiliaries reflects States’ views and is, it may be concluded,
customary law.
Hague XIII permits a neutral State to restrict the entry of belligerent
warships and auxiliaries into its territorial sea, if it does so evenhandedly.
For example, at the outbreak of the Second World War, Norway’s neutrality regulations provided for a defended area around Bergen which belligerent warships were forbidden to enter.66 The lack of protest at this enacting to control or limit the passage of belligerent merchant vessels. Accordingly, belligerent-flagged merchant vessels continue to enjoy territorial sea passage rights in accordance
with UNCLOS or equivalent customary law.
60. UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 29. On the face of it, the definition excludes unmanned underwater or surface vehicles as they may not satisfy the “command” or “crew”
requirements. Both NWP 1-14M and the German Commander’s Handbook consider that
unmanned vessels enjoy sovereign immunity; this seems uncontroversial. Only NWP 114M explicitly states that unmanned vessels enjoy navigational passage rights to the same
extent as manned vessels. This is more controversial, is not reflected in the other manuals
surveyed and remains unsettled as a matter of international law. See NWP 1-14M, supra
note 23, ¶¶ 2.3.4–2.3.6, 2.5.2.5; cf. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶
83.
61. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 13(h).
62. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.5.d.
63. See, e.g., NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.6.
64. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 245; CHINESE MANUAL,
supra note 25, at 262.
65. Waldock, supra note 46, at 216, 218.
66. Id. at 219. The relevant Norwegian Royal Decree is available at 32 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 154 (1938)
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ment might suggest it was considered lawful for a neutral State entirely to
prohibit belligerent passage in its territorial sea.67 However, the UK had
objected in strong terms to an earlier suggestion by Scandinavian countries
that they might do this.68 Similarly, in the First World War, Germany had
objected to a Dutch regulation which entirely forbade belligerent entry into
its territorial sea unless in circumstances of distress.69 However, the modern
German Commander’s Handbook, the U.K. Manual and the San Remo
Manual all assert that a neutral power can forbid passage to belligerent warships altogether.70 The balance of views appears to be that the law permits
neutral States completely to prohibit passage, especially as States (such as
the UK and Germany) which had once objected to this position now explicitly accept it.
Where granted, the right of mere passage is for navigational purposes
only and cannot permit extravagantly circuitous voyages intended to allow
a vessel to evade capture by enemy belligerent forces.71 Contrarily, it is also
true that “passage through neutral territorial waters, although undertaken
to avoid an enemy, does not diminish the privilege of using the territorial
waters for transit.”72 Reconciling these positions requires analysis of two
other important limitations on belligerent use of neutral territorial sea—the
rules forbidding belligerents from basing operations or seeking sanctuary in
neutral territorial sea. Hague XIII, Article 5, provides: “Belligerents are
forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations
against their adversaries, and in particular to erect wireless telegraphy stations or any apparatus for the purpose of communicating with the belligerent forces on land or sea.” The prohibition is broader than the text might
imply. Basing operations includes storing prizes or possibly even holding
enemy prisoners as the Altmark incident, examined presently, demon67. See, e.g., TUCKER, supra note 46, at 232–33 n.80; Harvard Draft Convention with
Commentary, supra note 30, cmt. at 422–24. Such a provision was specifically excluded
from Hague XIII, however. HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. III, supra note 8, at 629.
68. Waldock, supra note 46, at 230. This represented a policy shift. The UK had been
a leading proponent that Hague XIII should expressly allow neutral States to exclude belligerent warships from their territorial sea. HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. III, supra note 8, at
705–15.
69. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 232–33 n.80.
70. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 245; UK MANUAL, supra
note 22, ¶ 13.9B; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 19.
71. Waldock, supra note 46, at 232.
72. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 235. See also Edwin Borchard, Was Norway Delinquent in
the Case of the Altmark?, 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 289, 294 (1940).
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strates. The prohibition against seeking sanctuary in neutral territorial seas
is a customary law rule not reflected in Hague XIII. It prohibits belligerent
warships from sheltering in neutral territorial seas to prevent attack or capture by the enemy.73
The 1940 Altmark incident partially illustrates these rules. Altmark was
a German auxiliary en route back to Germany from the South Atlantic carrying three hundred captured British merchant seamen. As the English
Channel was barred by mines, she was obliged to transit to the north of the
UK. On February 14, 1940, she entered Norwegian territorial waters off
Trondheim, seemingly to evade capture by the UK Royal Navy. She remained in Norwegian waters for two days, travelling some four hundred
miles, including passage through the Bergen defensive area, in breach of
Norway’s domestic neutrality regulations. She was intercepted in the Norwegian territorial sea near the Joesing Fjord by a Royal Navy squadron
which forcibly released her prisoners.74 Norway and Germany objected that
the UK had breached Norwegian neutrality, but the British claimed they
were merely enforcing Norwegian neutrality in the face of Norwegian reluctance or inability to do so. The British did not contest Altmark’s entry
into the Norwegian territorial sea. The gravamen of the British objection to
her behavior was her use of the neutral territorial sea to shelter, not entry
per se.75
Accordingly, maritime neutrality law places no limits on belligerent
warships’ or auxiliaries’ entry into neutral territorial sea, but it does regulate
subsequent use. This seems an artificial division, but it is the only way of
reconciling the States’ positions in respect of the Altmark. It follows that
circuitous voyages with no discernible navigational purpose undertaken in
territorial seas will be in excess of mere passage and, accordingly, a breach
of the law. Such voyages would violate the prohibition on seeking sanctuary. On the other hand, use of the territorial sea in a manner which is compliant with a passage right lawfully exercisable by a belligerent will not be a
breach of the law, whatever the circumstances of entry.76
73. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 17; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.9A.
74. Waldock, supra note 46, at 218–19.
75. Id. at 233.
76. A more recent example of a belligerent abusing passage rights in neutral territorial
seas was the conduct of “maneuvers” by Iranian forces in Saudi Arabian territorial waters
during the Iran/Iraq War. This was a clear breach of the law apparently designed to deter
Saudi Arabia from clandestine support of Iraq. For a brief discussion of that incident, see
GEORGE K. WALKER, THE TANKER WAR 1980–88: LAW AND POLICY 268 (2000) (Vol.
74, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). Walker’s analysis assumes the Ira212
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The foregoing analysis allows for a comparison to be drawn between
innocent and mere passage. Figure 1 summarizes the salient features of
each right:
FIGURE 1

Innocent Passage

Mere Passage

Applicable at all times, exApplicable only during an
cept to belligerent warships and armed conflict, and only to
auxiliaries in neutral States’ ter- warships and auxiliaries of belritorial sea
ligerent States in neutral States’
territorial sea
When applicable, exercisaWhen applicable, exercisable by all vessels
ble only by belligerent warships
and auxiliaries
May be temporarily susMay be restricted at the
pended in specified parts of the discretion of the neutral coastal
territorial sea on a non- State so long as restrictions are
discriminatory basis to vessels applied impartially to belligerfrom all States for reasons of ent States, or it may be prohibnational security
ited altogether
May not be prejudicial to
May not amount to basing
the peace, good order or securi- naval operations or seeking
ty of the coastal State
sanctuary
Must be exercised continuMust be exercised continuously and expeditiously
ously and expeditiously
In many situations, then, the rights of innocent and mere passage are
very similar, if not identical. Indeed, prior to UNCLOS, many sources referred to the two interchangeably.77 The German Commander’s Handbook
considers that mere passage should be exercised in accordance with the

nian vessels enjoyed the right of innocent passage, but were acting in excess of it. This
article takes the view that belligerent Iran did not enjoy innocent passage in neutral Saudi
territorial waters, but was instead acting in excess of a right of mere passage.
77. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 235; Waldock, supra note 46, at 232 (quoting the UK’s
comments on the Norwegian neutrality proclamation in which it used the term “innocent
passage” and the Norwegian government’s response referring to the right of “mere” passage).
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UNCLOS rules on innocent passage.78 The main difference between the
two is that the coastal State has a higher degree of discretion to restrict or
prohibit mere passage than it does innocent passage.
2. Non-Suspendable Passage Rights
Hague XIII and UNCLOS both regulate territorial sea passage rights. UNCLOS does not interfere with the Hague XIII right of mere passage, but it
does provide that transit passage, straits innocent passage and archipelagic
sea lanes passage cannot be suspended by the neutral coastal State in any
circumstances.79 According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, where successive treaties govern the same subject matter the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are not incompatible
with those of the later treaty.80 Accordingly, a coastal State’s neutrality is
not impaired by a belligerent’s exercise of non-suspendable rights, and a
neutral coastal State may not impede belligerents in their enjoyment of
them.81
While that is undoubtedly the position when both the coastal State and
the passaging belligerent State are parties to UNCLOS, the position when
either State is not a party to UNCLOS is more complex. Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iran, Peru, Turkey, Venezuela and the U.S. are parties to
Hague XIII, but not UNCLOS.82 Of these, the U.S. strongly asserts that
the UNCLOS passage regime is reflective of customary law; Iran equally
strongly asserts that only innocent passage and straits innocent passage are
reflective of customary law.83 If the U.S. position is correct, all belligerent
States, whether UNCLOS parties or not, may enjoy the non-suspendable
passage rights in the territorial sea of a neutral State. This would be the case
regardless of whether the coastal State is a party to UNCLOS. If the Irani78. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 246.
79. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 38(1), 44, 45(2), 54. See also SAN REMO MANUAL,
supra note 26, r. 23 & ¶¶ 23.1–23.3.
80. Where the parties to the later treaty are parties also to the earlier treaty. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
81. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 24; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ.
2.3, cmt. at 503.
82. For Hague XIII parties, see Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, ICRC,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView (follow Hague XIII hyperlink; then follow State party hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). For UNCLOS parties, see Status of
UNCLOS, supra note 36.
83. See supra p. 206.
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an view is correct, then where either the belligerent or coastal State is not a
party to UNCLOS, the belligerent State may only enjoy straits innocent
passage in addition to Hague XIII mere passage. The San Remo Manual
and the Helsinki Principles can be read to support either view.84 It has already been observed that the weight of academic opinion favors the more
restrictive view espoused by Iran.85
3. Exercising Passage Rights: Defensive Measures
The manner in which a belligerent warship or auxiliary may exercise its passage rights is controversial. It is clear that it must not commit any act which
violates the State’s neutrality; hostilities may not be conducted and visit and
search is forbidden.86 But the San Remo Manual states that: “Belligerents
passing through . . . neutral straits or waters . . . are permitted to take defensive measures consistent with their security, including launching and
recovery of aircraft, screen formation steaming, acoustic and electronic
surveillance.”87 Military manuals surveyed also adopt this position.88 NWP
1-14M and the German Commander’s Handbook imply that the right to
take defensive measures is based in the law of self-defense rather than the
vessel’s status as a belligerent. It is not clear whether the San Remo Manual
provision contemplates that the right to take defensive measures stems
from a State’s rights as a belligerent or from a State’s inherent right of selfdefense. The self-defense basis is the correct one. The law is clear that belligerent measures (the conduct of hostilities) may not be undertaken in
neutral territorial seas. However, the inherent right of self-defense applies
at all times, even during an armed conflict and even when in another State’s
territory or territorial seas.89 It is under the law of self-defense that the
84. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 24 & ¶ 24.1; Helsinki Principles, supra
note 10, princ. 2.3, cmt. at 503.
85. See supra p. 206.
86. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 2.
87. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 30.
88. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.18; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.6; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 247. The Chinese Manual is silent on
the matter.
89. It has recently been argued that individual units enjoy a right of self-defense under
international law which is separate from States’ rights of self-defense under U.N. Charter,
Article 51. See Charles P. Trumbull IV, The Basis of Unit Self-Defense and Implications for the
Use of Force, 23 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (2012).
For the traditional view that an individual unit’s right of self-defense is derived from a
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permissible extent of defensive measures by belligerents in neutral territorial seas must be considered. Self-defense allows a State to respond forcibly
to an armed attack perpetrated against it.90 An attack on a warship or other
State vessel would prima facie amount to an armed attack, and permit a forcible response. If a State decides to respond to an armed attack with force,
the response must satisfy three criteria: immediacy, proportionality and necessity.91
The ICJ considered allowable defensive measures during passage in the
Corfu Channel case between the UK and Albania in 1949.92 British warships
were exercising straits innocent passage in the Corfu Channel in Albanian
territorial waters when two of them struck mines. It does not matter that
the Corfu Channel case concerned facts which occurred outside of an armed
conflict, because the legal regime which governs the right to take defensive
measures is the law of self-defense, not the law of armed conflict. The Albanian government had alleged that the passage of the UK warships was
not innocent because the ships were maneuvering and sailing in formation
with soldiers on board, were at action stations, and the number of ships
and their armament was intended by the British to intimidate Albania.
The Court found against Albania on each of these arguments. It found
that the ships’ sailing formation and being at action stations were proportionate defensive measures adopted in response to the known mine threat
and the fact that previous British ships had been fired upon when sailing
through the channel. The ships were carrying their usual detachments of
marines, which did not affect the nature of the passage.93 The Court concluded, however, that a subsequent passage of the strait by a British minesweeping force—done without the consent of the Albanian government
and with the sole aim of sweeping mines—was a breach of Albanian sovereignty.94 In its argument, the British government conceded that the minesweeping force was not exercising the right of innocent passage, choosing
instead to justify the passage on other grounds.95
State’s Article 51 right, see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE
243 (5th ed. 2011) (“it must be grasped that, from the standpoint of international law, all
self-defence is national self-defence”).
90. U.N. Charter art. 51.
91. See generally Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6).
92. Corfu Channel, supra note 38.
93. Id. at 30–32.
94. Id. at 34–35.
95. The grounds argued were the exercise of a treaty right, to gather evidence for an
international tribunal, and for the purpose of self-help/self-preservation; all were rejected
216

Modern Maritime Neutrality Law

Vol. 90

The Corfu Channel case shows that proportionate defensive measures
are permitted, and supports the view that their legality falls to be judged
under the self-defense rubric. The case is also indicative of the measures
which will be considered proportionate in the factual circumstances faced
by the British squadron. Nonetheless, the San Remo Manual provision was
drafted in broad terms because the drafters struggled to agree on measures
which would be lawful in three postulated scenarios.96 In the discussion
that follows of those scenarios, it will be assumed the belligerent forces
within neutral waters are legitimately present; they will be referred to as
“transiting forces.”
a. Defense by transiting forces of allied units outside neutral waters (including
by organic aircraft).
The San Remo Manual addresses the question of whether transiting forces
in neutral territorial waters would be entitled to use force against enemy
belligerent forces conducting attacks against other units from the transiting
forces’ State or allies.97 It has already been observed that under the law of
self-defense, States may take forcible measures which are proportionate,
necessary and justified by the immediacy of an ongoing attack against their
units and personnel. This general principle is unassailable. If these facts
were to occur outside of an armed conflict, none would claim that the
transiting forces’ presence in a third State’s territorial seas prevented them
from taking lawful self-defense measures against the attacking forces. Such
measures could include the launching of aircraft, use of sensors and firing
of ordnance. In the author's view, this general principle is not displaced
during an armed conflict. Accordingly, the transiting forces are entitled to
take action in self-defense on behalf of other units while engaged in passage of neutral territorial seas.

by the Court in swift terms. Id. The present author considers that the self-help grounds
was potentially justified and certainly warranted closer examination by the Court. See also
John Norton Moore, Jus ad Bellum Before the International Court of Justice, 52 VIRGINIA
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 903, 917–18 (2012).
96. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶¶ 30.1–30.3.
97. Id., ¶ 30.2.
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b. Measures by transiting forces in response to long-range missile attack against
them by over the horizon enemy forces.
The distance or over the horizon aspect of this scenario might be considered a red herring, but it does affect the range of responses which might be
available to the attacked transiting forces. Doubtless, launching chaff and
decoys or defensive maneuvering would be permitted to defend the transiting forces from the missile attack. Similarly, use of a close-in weapon system to shoot down the inbound missile would be lawful. The more difficult
question is whether, if those measures were sufficient to neutralize the missile attack, the transiting forces would be entitled to use force against the
units which launched the missiles. If the missile attack had been successfully neutralized, then the law of self-defense would not permit a retaliatory
attack. However, the transiting forces might be concerned that the attack
upon them (itself a breach of the law while they are in neutral territorial
sea) was evidence of a likely further attack. If the transiting forces’ sensors
were sufficiently capable, they might be able to glean further evidence as to
whether the unit which attacked them was likely to continue the attack.
The unit’s posture, course and speed might all assist in making that determination. Launching an aircraft or a military device with the intention of
gaining that evidence would be a lawful defensive measure in this author’s
view. If the evidence pointed to the conclusion that the attack had ceased
(the attacking unit has fled the scene, for example) then it would no longer
be necessary for the transiting force commander to use force, so it would
be unlawful for him to do so under self-defense. Indeed, unless there was
positive evidence that further attack on his units was imminent, there
would be no grounds for the commander to use force until he was outside
of neutral territorial waters and once again able to conduct hostilities.
c. Measures by transiting forces in response to a submarine lying in wait outside
neutral waters.
This is the hardest of the three scenarios to assess. If the enemy submarine
is acting in accordance with the law, then it is not a threat to the transiting
forces until they exit neutral territorial seas. However, at the time of exit, it
constitutes an immediate threat and there might be insufficient time for the
transiting force commander to neutralize it before that threat manifests
itself. Furthermore, the transiting force commander will obviously not
know whether the submarine commander plans to abide by the law or not.
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The law of self-defense does not require a State to absorb a first blow,
which could be potentially fatal, before it may use force in self-defense.98
Where the threat of an armed attack is imminent and overwhelming, then
the potential victim is entitled to take proportionate and necessary
measures before the attack occurs. That logic would permit the transiting
forces to use force against the submarine only if it constitutes a sufficiently
imminent threat. The behavior of the submarine would be key in making
this determination. For example, if sonar data indicated the submarine had
flooded its torpedo tubes, this would indicate that an attack was imminent.
Lesser measures open to the commander include tactical maneuvering
(such as steering an erratic zig-zag course to make it harder for the submarine to obtain a firing solution). This would plainly be lawful. Other nonforcible measures open to the transiting force commander bring their own
difficulties. If the forces remained in neutral territorial waters in the hope
that the submarine left, they would be at risk of being in excess of mere
passage and breaching the sanctuary rule. If they turn back, then they have
forfeited the freedom of navigation intentionally preserved in the rules on
belligerent passage. Depending on the geography of the particular conflict,
this could have the perverse effect that a submarine lurking at the edge of
territorial seas could become virtually immune from attack under the law,
yet while achieving a significant sea denial effect upon the enemy.
B.

Neutral Vessels’ Passage Rights in Belligerent Territorial Seas

The law which applies between belligerents and neutrals is prima facie the
law of peace.99 Subject to the belligerent coastal State’s right temporarily to
suspend innocent passage for reasons essential to national security, neutrals
appear to enjoy the full suite of peacetime passage rights in belligerent territorial seas. The San Remo Manual adopts this position, but suggests that
neutrals inform a belligerent of the passage prior to exercising any of these
rights although it is clear that this is hortatory only and not an obligation.100
However, there is some State practice to the contrary. Many international
straits in belligerent territorial seas were mined during the Second World
War and closed to merchant shipping. Some national manuals seem to accept that belligerents retain a right to restrict, even if not suspend altogeth98. Whether this is described a right of “pre-emptive” self-defense depends on the
stage at which the armed attack is defined as having started. See generally DINSTEIN, supra
note 89, at 201–7.
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er, passage through straits during an armed conflict. This runs counter to
the plain text of UNCLOS, but does garner some support from scholars.101
PART TWO: BELLIGERENTS’ RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN NEUTRAL
PORTS
Delegates disagreed on the acceptable scope of belligerent activity in neutral ports at the Hague Conference.102 Britain, with its many and widespread colonial possessions, did not need to rely upon neutral ports for
logistical support. It was much readier to condemn their use as basing operations than, say, France, which regarded such support merely as the provision of “offices of humanity” by the neutral State. Consequently, the
rules in Hague XIII are the result of compromise.
Some rules are relatively uncontroversial. For example, a belligerent is
under a specific duty not to establish a prize court in neutral territory or
territorial waters.103 Belligerents may not replenish war material or armament, or complete their crews in neutral ports or territorial seas.104 These
rules will not be examined further.105 Four aspects of belligerent use of neu99. See, e.g., Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 1.3., cmt. at 499.
100. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 26, ¶ 26.2.
101. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 377; Wolff Heintschel
von Heinegg, The Law of Naval Warfare and International Straits, in THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENIUM (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds.,
1998) (Vol. 71, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).
102. JAMES B. SCOTT, THE REPORTS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899
AND 1907, at 861–62 (1909) [hereinafter HAGUE REPORTS].
103. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 4. Interestingly, this rule is not reflected in the
manuals surveyed, except the CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 261. In the writer’s
opinion, there is no reason to doubt this remains a rule of international law. Marsden dates
the rule as far back as 1694. R. G. Marsden, Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law: Part III, 26
THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 34, 46 (1911) [hereinafter Marsden, Early Prize Law:
Part III].
104. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 18; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.2;
NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.2.2; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note
24, ¶ 239; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 261. The rule is reflected only obliquely in
the SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 20(c). The drafters considered that Rule 20(c)
was sufficient to give effect to Article 18. Id., ¶ 20.2(c). The UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶
13.9C.b, adopts the San Remo Manual position.
105. Another belligerent duty, the duty to abstain from any act which would constitute a violation of the coastal State’s neutrality, has already been discussed in the context
of passage rights. See supra pp. 215-217. See also Hague XIII, supra note 7, arts. 1-2; SAN
REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 15, 16; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 1.4; UK
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tral ports warrant closer analysis, however: refueling, taking on provisions
and fresh water (or “revictualing”), the conduct of repairs and the twentyfour hour rule. Each will be examined in turn.
A.

Refueling
Hague XIII, Article 19, provides:
[Belligerent war-ships] may only ship sufficient fuel to enable them to
reach the nearest port in their own country. They may, on the other hand,
fill up their bunkers built to carry fuel, when in neutral countries which
have adopted this method of determining the amount of fuel to be supplied.

Further refueling may not take place in a port in the same neutral State
within three months.106 The San Remo Manual proposes, contrary to Article 19, that topping up should be eschewed for the “more objective and
determinable standard” of “being able to reach a port of its own territory.”107 The Helsinki Principles do not address the issue specifically, but say
generally that the “right of passage and sojourn of belligerent warships in
neutral waters and ports is governed by [Hague XIII], which reflect[s] customary law.”108 The UK Manual adopts the San Remo position.109 NWP 114M, the German Commander’s Handbook and the Chinese Manual all
prefer to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the neutral State.110
While unsatisfactory from the perspective of legal certainty, two arguments suggest that, in practice, the lack of clarity makes little difference.
First, even were a belligerent warship to take sufficient fuel to reach a
home port, she would be under no obligation actually to go home rather
than rejoin the hostilities. Such a provision was deliberately excluded from
Hague XIII.111 Second, the distance of many warships’ theaters of operaMANUAL, supra note 22, ¶¶ 13.8–9; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶¶ 7.3, 7.3.4; GERMAN
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 243.
106. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 20.
107. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 20.2(c).
108. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.2, cmt. at 502.
109. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.9C.
110. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.2.2; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 240; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 263.
111. Despite being pressed for by the British delegate. HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL.
III, supra note 8, at 639.
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tions from home may well mean that the standards are, in reality, the same.
Accordingly, contrary to the San Remo and UK positions, the better rule is
to allow topping up. It is a clearer and more objective standard than obliging the neutral State to assess how much fuel a belligerent warship would
use to get to a home port, especially when this volume will vary depending
on speed, weather, climate or class of ship. The rule limiting repeated refueling in the same neutral State is the more onerous to belligerents, is clear
in its effect and is a better safeguard against excessive belligerent use of
neutral port facilities.
B.

Revictualing

Hague XIII, Article 19, provides “Belligerent war-ships may only re-victual
in neutral ports or roadsteads to bring up their supplies to the peace standard.” Neutral States have no discretion to adopt a uniform topping up policy in respect of victuals as they do with fuel. Neither does the three-month
resupply limit apply to victuals. Indeed, victuals are measured completely
differently than fuel. The maximum resupply allowed is the peace standard.
The practice of setting a ship’s victualing capacity by peace and war standards now seems anachronistic. In the UK Royal Navy victualing endurance
is set according to the ship’s expected tasking (or readiness state) rather
than by peace or war.112 As well as being anachronistic, these standards are
rather opaque. They are defined by the warship’s flag State and, for understandable reasons, are often classified information. The peace standard is,
therefore, often indeterminable by the neutral port authorities and is an
inappropriate basis for the law. As navies move away from setting victualing capacity by peace or war standards, the peace standard limit in Hague
XIII is likely to fall into desuetude,113 if it has not already.
The unsuitableness of the peace standard means that there is significant
divergence among contemporary references as to what limit does apply to
revictualing. The Helsinki Principles maintain Article 19 still reflects the
law, whereas the San Remo Manual provides that the same “enough to get
you home” standard that applies to fuel should apply to victuals. The UK
Manual reflects the San Remo position, while the other manuals surveyed

112. 1 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DEFENCE CATERING MANUAL arts. 1301–8 (5th ed.
2011).
113. For the concept of desuetude, see, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, How International Law
Dies, 93 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 939 (2005).
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prefer to leave the matter to neutral States’ discretion.114 The difference
between the various approaches matters more in the context of victuals
than fuel. Topped up, many warships of frigate and destroyer size will have
the capacity to carry beyond sixty or seventy days’ worth of food, while
their fuel carrying capacity is much more limited. Topping up victuals
amounts to a far greater increase in a warship’s sustainability on operations
than topping up fuel, but it is difficult to recommend a clearer, more objective limit. The “peace” and “enough to get you home” approaches are
opaque and unsatisfactory. Accordingly, this writer recommends that victuals be subject to the same rules as fuel, that is topping up is permitted, but
resupply from the ports of the same neutral State is forbidden within three
months.
C.

Repairs
Hague XIII, Article 17, provides:
In neutral ports and roadsteads war-ships may only carry out such repairs
as are absolutely necessary to render them seaworthy, and may not add in
any manner whatsoever to their fighting force. The local authorities of
the neutral Power shall decide what repairs are necessary, and these must
be carried out with the least possible delay.

Under the strict wording of the Convention, it does not matter whether the
damage in need of repair occurred by stress of weather or by enemy action.115 So long as the repairs are limited to what is absolutely necessary for
seaworthiness, repair seems to be permitted.
By the 1930s, however, international and domestic law began to
demonstrate a consensus against permitting battle damage repair. For instance, Article 9 of the 1928 Havana Convention on Maritime Neutrality116
forbade battle damage repair altogether. The Havana Convention’s applicability was limited by the fact that it was only ratified by the United

114. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.2; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26,
¶ 20.2(b). UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.9C.b; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.2.2;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 240; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note
25, at 263.
115. The contemporaneous record does not report any discussion of this issue among
delegates. HAGUE REPORTS, supra note 102, at 858.
116. Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 20, 1928, 135 L.N.T.S. 187.
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States and seven other States, all of which are located in the Americas. 117
The 1938 neutrality codes of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and the U.S. president’s proclamation
of neutrality on September 5, 1939 also prohibited battle damage repair.118
The 1939 Harvard Draft Convention, an academic project undertaken by a
group of scholars at Harvard University, similarly forbade it.119 During the
Second World War, this emerging consensus against battle damage repair
was undermined by the Admiral Graf Spee incident, which will be examined
presently. The law on whether battle damage repair is permitted or not remains in dispute.120 The San Remo Manual's Rule 20(c) reflects Hague
XIII’s silence on the point. The UK Manual adopts the text of Rule 20(c)
verbatim.121 NWP 1-14M simply records that the law is unsettled.122 The
German and Chinese manuals are silent on the issue.
An unseaworthy belligerent warship is not required to leave a neutral port. Rather, as provided by Hague XIII, Article 24, the neutral power
is obliged to “take such measures as it considers necessary to render the
ship incapable of taking the sea during the war.” Where a ship is interred
pursuant to Article 24, so too must be its crew for the remainder of hostilities. The Harvard Draft Convention similarly provided that “a condition of
distress which is the result of enemy action may not be remedied and if the
vessel is unable to leave, it shall be interned.”123

117. Treaties and States Parties to such Treaties, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=290(la
st visited Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Treaty Parties].
118. These codes and proclamations are reproduced in PAYSON S. WILD JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS 44–46 (1939). The U.S. had also refused to allow battle damage repairs to Russian ships during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–5. See Charles C.
Hyde, The Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, 2
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 507, 520 (1908).
119. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, art. 34. The Convention’s commentary surveys State practice from the First World War and nineteenth
century conflicts, which is inconclusive. The commentary does not explicitly state why the
drafters adopted the position they did. Id. at 462–72.
120. SAN REMO MANUAL supra note 26, ¶ 20.2(c).
121. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.9C.
122. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.2.2.
123. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, art. 34.
224

Modern Maritime Neutrality Law

Vol. 90

The Graf Spee incident partially illustrates these rules.124 In December
1939, following an engagement with a Royal Navy squadron, the German
battleship Graf Spee put into the neutral Uruguayan port of Montevideo.
The British insisted that the ship be made to leave as soon as possible.125
They relied upon Hague XIII, Articles 12, 14 (which provides that extended stay in neutral ports may only be granted on account of damage or stress
of weather) and 24. Great Britain did not expressly rely on Article 17,
probably because its position on battle damage repair was not clear. The
commanding officer of the Graf Spee, Captain Langsdorff, requested to stay
for a period of fourteen days in order to effect repairs.
While Uruguay was a party to the 1928 Havana Convention, Britain
and Germany were not, so its express prohibition on battle damage repair
was inapplicable.126 Uruguay determined that, under Hague XIII, it was only obliged to prevent repairs that increased the vessel’s fighting capability
and did not consider itself bound to prevent seaworthiness repairs which
were the result of enemy action. Uruguay exercised its Hague XIII, Article
17, right to assess the extent of the repairs necessary. The inspectors concluded that seventy-two hours would be sufficient and that Graf Spee would
be obliged to depart on December 17. After that time, if the ship was still
present in Montevideo, it would be interred. Interestingly, no party seems
to have taken issue with the accuracy or fairness of the inspectors’ decision,
implying that they regarded Uruguayan port authorities as the proper arbiter of what repairs were absolutely necessary within the meaning of Article
17. However, the German authorities were unpersuaded that seventy-two
hours was sufficient. Langsdorff was ordered by the German government
to avoid internment at all costs and that he should attempt to break out or
scuttle the ship. He waited until the end of his allotted seventy-two hours
124. The following facts are taken from TUCKER, supra note 46, at 245 n.2, and Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL 294, 305 (2011).
125. The British position was initially that the Graf Spee should be required to leave
“immediately,” but this position was relaxed for operational reasons to allow the cruiser
Cumberland to arrive at the scene before the Graf Spee sailed. Lewis, supra note 124, at 305
n.71.
126. See Treaty Parties, supra note 117. Uruguay was also not represented at the Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics that prepared the 1939
Pan-American Declaration of Neutrality. In any event, that declaration was silent on the
question of battle damage repair. See Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American
Republics—Final Act, 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 1, 10
(1940).
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and then scuttled the ship in the River Plate on December 17. The crew
was interred for the remainder of the war. Langsdorff later committed suicide.
The case of the Graf Spee illustrates the consequences of abusing neutral
ports’ hospitality, but brings little clarity to the battle damage repair rule.
The interwar consensus, if it can be called that, against allowing battle
damage repairs was accepted in neither word nor practice by the protagonists in the Graf Spee affair (none argued in favor of the prohibition).
What might be the jurisprudential basis for forbidding battle damage
repairs? If, instead of managing to limp into port, the warship had sunk and
the neutral State had rescued the crew, the neutral State would have been
obliged to inter them until the end of the conflict or otherwise ensure they
could take no further part in hostilities.127 A ship rendered unseaworthy,
even if not sunk, by enemy action should be considered lost. It is not be
the role of a neutral State to assist a belligerent in reversing that fact. As a
matter of lex ferenda, these considerations probably tip the balance in favor
of a prohibition against battle damage repair in neutral ports. However, the
state of the present law is unclear.
D.

The Twenty-Four Hour Rule

The twenty-four hour rule is found in Hague XIII, Article 12: “In the absence of special provision to the contrary in the legislation of a neutral
Power, belligerent war-ships are not permitted to remain in the ports, roadsteads or territorial waters of the said Power for more than twenty-four
hours, except in cases covered by the present Convention.” The San Remo
Manual and the Helsinki Principles reflect the twenty-four hour rule in Article 12 terms.128
The UK position, however, is that the rule no longer reflects the law in
view of modern State practice.129 This bold statement seems surprising. It is
in stark contrast to other national manuals surveyed, which expressly rec-

127. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 24. See further OPPENHEIM VOL. II, supra note 5, at
471–73.
128. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 24; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10,
princ. 2.2.
129. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.4. This position on the twenty-four hour rule
was adopted by several States in the negotiations at the Second Hague Peace Conference.
Ironically, it was opposed by Great Britain. HAGUE REPORTS, supra note 102, at 848–54.
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ognize the rule.130 On further examination, though, the British position is
not the outright rejection of the rule that it first seems, but a geographical
qualification. If, for example, the UK was engaged in an armed conflict in
the Arabian Gulf, a Royal Navy warship engaged in other peacetime operations in the Caribbean and making no contribution to operations in the
Gulf is not, on the British view, prevented from staying in a Caribbean port
in excess of twenty-four hours. Such a visit would not impact on the campaign in the Gulf and so application of the rule is unnecessary.131 It is curious the UK Manual should choose the twenty-four hour rule, but no other,
in making this geographical argument. If the principle is sound, there is no
reason why geography should not limit every other rule of maritime neutrality. Despite the claim that this interpretation of the rule is based on observance of modern State practice, the lack of acceptance of a geographical
limit in other prominent national manuals means it cannot be considered as
reflective of customary law.
Assuming the twenty-four hour rule remains applicable, under Hague
XIII it is only a default position. It only applies when the neutral State has
declined to legislate a different period. Once again, what would otherwise
have been an impasse at the Hague Conference in 1907 was resolved by
providing a default rule, but ultimately leaving the matter to neutral States
to determine for themselves as long as they did so impartially between the
belligerents.132
Article 12's phrase “except in cases covered by the present Convention” creates ambiguity. Where the Convention makes express derogation
from the twenty-four hour rule, there is no difficulty. For example, where a
neutral port is unable to furnish a belligerent warship with fuel 133 within
twenty-four hours of its arrival, the twenty-four hour rule is extended by a
further twenty-four hours.134 Also, where opposing belligerent vessels are in

130. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.2.1; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 246; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 263.
131. This argument is taken from Steven Haines, The United Kingdom’s Manual of the
Law of Armed Conflict and the San Remo Manual: Maritime Rules Compared, 36 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 89, 103–4 (2006).
132. NEFF, supra note 9, at 133.
133. The word the Convention uses is “coal,” but it is hopefully not too controversial
to construe this as “fuel.”
134. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 19.
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the same neutral harbor, the neutral State may impose a twenty-four hour
interval between their departures.135
However, the way in which the twenty-four hour rule interacts with the
rules on belligerent passage in neutral territorial sea is less clear. The right
of mere passage is covered by Hague XIII in Articles 9 and 10, but there is
no express requirement that passage must take less than twenty-four hours.
The modern non-suspendable passage rights—transit passage, straits innocent passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, discussed in Part One—are
obviously not covered by Hague XIII.136 In the Second World War, the
States-party to the Pan-American General Declaration of Neutrality of October 3, 1939 concluded that all belligerent passage was subject to a twentyfour hour time limit.137 This was qualified in respect of passage through the
Panama Canal, however, because it was simply not possible to transit the
Canal and Panamanian territorial waters in less than twenty-four hours.
The annexed Neutrality Proclamation to the Canal Zone therefore allowed
the time taken to transit the Canal to be added to the twenty-four hour period otherwise granted on the grounds of necessity.138
The Helsinki Principles use a formulation similar to the Canal Zone
proclamation in describing belligerent passage rights. They assert the applicability of the twenty-four hour rule to mere passage, but permit the exercise of the non-suspendable passage rights for periods in excess of twenty-four hours “where the time ordinarily needed for this passage is more
than 24 hours.” The Helsinki Principles rely on the UNCLOS formulation
that such passage must be continuous and expeditious to limit any belligerent abuse of neutral territorial sea.139 On a first reading, the San Remo
Manual appears to apply the twenty-four hour rule to Hague XIII mere
passage, but not to the non-suspendable passage rights. Rule 21 states:

135. Id., art. 16. For historical examples of this rule being enforced, see R. G.
Marsden, Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law: Part II, 25 THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 243 (1911) [hereinafter Marsden, Early Prize Law: Part II]; Marsden, Early Prize Law:
Part III, supra note 103, at 48.
136. See supra pp. 209-215.
137. General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics ¶ 3(d), Oct. 3,
1939, 3 Bevans 604, reprinted in 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 9 (1940).
138. Regulations Concerning Neutrality in the Canal Zone, Proclamation No. 2350, 4
Federal Register 3821 (Sept. 9, 1939), reprinted in 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 28, 29 (1940).
139. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.2, 2.4, cmt. at 502.
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[A] belligerent warship or auxiliary vessel may not extend the duration of
its passage through neutral waters . . . for longer than 24 hours unless
[this is] unavoidable on account of damage or the stress of weather. The
foregoing rule does not apply in international straits and waters in which
the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage is exercised.140

Rule 21 says bluntly that the twenty-four hour rule “does not apply” in international straits and archipelagic sea lanes, whereas the Helsinki Principles permit an exception to the rule only when the normal time taken for
such passage is more than 24 hours. However, the San Remo Manual’s explanation makes clear that Rule 21 is intended to be construed in the same
way as the rule is stated in the Helsinki Principles.141
The justification for the application of the twenty-four hour rule to
passage is clear—belligerent forces are forbidden from using neutral waters
(whether archipelagic, in international straits or elsewhere) as a safe haven
or as a base of operations.142 Where the twenty-four hour rule is breached,
it may be presumed that either the base of operations or sanctuary prohibitions have also been breached. This presumption is rebuttable only when a
belligerent warship is exercising a non-suspendable passage right and it
would normally take longer than twenty-four hours to complete the passage.
PART THREE: BELLIGERENT CONTROL OF NEUTRAL TRADE
Belligerents have long sought to deny their enemies resources which sustain their war effort. One way of doing this is to strangle the enemy’s ability
to import war-sustaining resources from overseas, whether from neutral
States or from enemy overseas possessions or colonies. Since, even now, so
much trade is carried by sea, this task has always fallen to maritime forces.
Hague XIII prevents neutral States from supplying belligerents with war
material, but expressly preserves the rights of neutral private citizens to
continue trading with belligerents, even in material which aids the belligerent war effort.143 Nonetheless, they do so at their own risk, because belligerents are entitled to seize and confiscate items of contraband. Contraband

140. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 21.
141. Id., ¶¶ 21.1–21.2.
142. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, cmt. at 502.
143. Hague XIII, supra note 7, arts. 6–7.
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is any item which is (a) useful to the enemy in waging its war and (b) actually
destined to reach the enemy.
Historically, belligerents also sought to control their enemies’ trade
with their colonies. Usually this trade was confined to vessels flagged to the
belligerent colonial power. These vessels, enemy in character, could be captured as of right. However, in order to place this trade beyond the reach of
their enemy, belligerents allowed neutrals to carry colonial trade, even
though this was a trade usually closed to them. Innovative prize courts created the Rule of 1756 to justify capturing neutral vessels engaged in belligerent colonial trade. These two rules—contraband and the Rule of 1756—
are the subject of this Part.
A.

Contraband

Contraband controls were last employed extensively during the First and
Second World Wars. Since then they have been used only sparingly: the
Arab-Israel conflict from 1948 to 1979 and the brief conflicts between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.144 Given the lack of recent State practice, much of the law is rather old. In fact, it was considered old even prior
to the outbreak of the First World War. As noted by one commentator, “in
1914 [in the UK] the law of prize stood . . . virtually where it was left by
Lord Stowell at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.”145 Nonetheless, rules on
contraband are contained in modern military manuals and there is nothing
which yet indicates that States believe that contraband law has fallen into
desuetude.

144. There is evidence of Russian controls on Georgian trade at sea during the 2008
conflict, but the nature of these controls is unclear. Some news sources claim Russia established a blockade. Russian Navy Blockade Georgia, CHINA VIEW (Aug. 10, 2008), http://news
.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/10/content_9138604.htm#prof. The 2009 Report by
the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia claimed
instead that the Russian Black Sea Fleet established a maritime security zone. See 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA,
REPORT 212 (2009), available at http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf
[hereinafter FACT-FINDING REPORT].
145. G. G. Fitzmaurice, Some Aspects of Modern Contraband Control and the Law of Prize,
22 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73, 74 (1945). For a fascinating account
of the influence of the decisions of the English Prize Court in the early 1800s, see EDWARD S. ROSCOE, LORD STOWELL—HIS LIFE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH
PRIZE LAW (1916).
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As far back as the thirteenth century, belligerents intercepted goods
destined for their enemies and preemptively purchased them from the neutral carrier (by the payment of freight money).146 Interference with enemy
goods in neutral shipping was eventually outlawed in the 1856 Declaration
of Paris, which provided that “The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods with
the exception of contraband of war.”147 This rule, known as the “free ship,
free goods” principle, meant that belligerents could not interfere with private neutral traders even if they were carrying their enemies’ goods. However, contraband of war was preserved as an exception and was subject to
capture and condemnation as prize. Neutral States were prepared to tolerate this exception partly because the acts of the neutral carriers caught carrying contraband were not attributed to their government. Private traders
bore responsibility and loss themselves. By the early 1900s, this was well
known as the “commercial adventure” principle.148
Disagreement at the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conference precluded
the inclusion of any provisions on contraband in Hague XIII.149 The 1909
Declaration of London did contain detailed provisions on contraband, but
it was never ratified. Commitments to abide by it on both sides in the First
World War were soon abandoned.150 By 1909, the two classifications of
goods—arms and ammunition, and dual-use goods—were universally accepted as absolute and conditional contraband, respectively. Absolute contraband could be seized as long as it was consigned to an address or recipient in territory belonging to or controlled by the enemy, no matter whether
the specific recipient within that territory was a government official or a
private person. The circumstances in which conditional contraband could
be seized were stricter. It could be seized only if it was destined specifically
146. In England this was done by “portsmen” under notional control of a regional
port admiral. They were most charitably characterized as privateers and were a law unto
themselves, but aggrieved parties did occasionally complain about their conduct to the
Crown and achieved the restoration of their property. The first judicial prize condemnation
seems to have been in 1426. See R. G. Marsden, Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law: Part I,
24 THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 675, 681–82 (1909) [hereinafter Marsden, Early
Prize Law: Part I].
147. Declaration of Paris art. 2, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. TS 1, 15 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
SUPPLEMENT 89 (1907).
148. NEFF, supra note 9, at 20.
149. HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. III, supra note 8, at 1111.
150. See, e.g., British Orders–in-Council dated March 11, 1915 and February 1, 1917.
These were the subject of litigation in The Leonara [1918] P. 182.
231

International Law Studies

2014

for the enemy belligerent’s government or armed forces within enemy controlled territory. Such specific destination could be presumed if the articles
were consigned to a known government contractor, or if the goods were
consigned to a “fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy.”151
Because an item’s utility in any given armed conflict would depend on
the circumstances of that conflict, belligerent States would set out, in published lists, items they would consider to be absolute and conditional contraband liable to seizure.152 Goods not included in the lists were considered
“free” under the Declaration of Paris. Listing, therefore, came to be a lawful requirement before items could be seized as contraband, although it is
not clear when this requirement crystalized into law. It was accepted without question at the London Conference in 1909.153 However Sir William
Scott’s prize decisions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
make no reference to the requirement of a contraband list.154
This Part will first consider the three criteria for establishing that an
item is contraband: prior publication in a list, qualification as an item of
absolute or conditional contraband and enemy destination. It will then
consider the penalties which have been imposed by prize courts in contraband cases, before assessing how the law is likely to develop in future.
1. Contraband Lists
The San Remo Manual requires belligerents to publish in advance “reasonably specific” lists of goods they consider to be contraband in the circumstances of the particular armed conflict.155 The UK Manual and the German Commander’s Handbook reflect the San Remo Manual position. 156
NWP 1-14M observes the requirement for lists, but opines that it may be
satisfied by the publication of a list of “free” goods.157 The U.S. approach
151. Declaration Concerning Laws of Naval War arts. 30, 33, 34, Feb. 26, 1909, 208
Consol. T.S. 338 [hereinafter Declaration of London].
152. An early example was the war between the United Provinces and the Spanish
Netherlands in 1589. It is described in Marsden, Early Prize Law: Part I, supra note 146, at
692.
153. Declaration of London, supra note 151, arts. 22–25.
154. See, e.g., The Ringende Jacob (1798) 1 C. Rob. 89.
155. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 149.
156. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.109; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 260. The Chinese Manual is silent on the issue of lists.
157. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.4.1.
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seems to leave more latitude to the belligerent State and provide less certainty for neutral carriers. If reasonably specific lists are the law, the free
goods approach would likely not be sufficient to satisfy that standard.
In the post-Second World War conflicts in which belligerents have employed contraband controls, State practice indicates that it is the more onerous requirement to publish affirmative lists of contraband that best reflects the law. For instance, during its conflict with Israel which began in
1948, Egypt, having initially denied that contraband lists were required at
all, subsequently published affirmative lists.158 In the conflict between India
and Pakistan in 1971, both sides published affirmative contraband lists.159
Even when drafting affirmative lists, however, States enjoy broad discretion as to which items they list as contraband. Indeed, while still neutral,
the U.S. protested against the UK’s long contraband lists in both world
wars.160 It is, therefore, easy to see why NWP 1-14M places relatively little
store by the contraband list as a limit on belligerent contraband controls.
Against that, it might be argued that at least the requirement of a published
affirmative list gives neutral States the opportunity to protest against the
listed items.
2. Absolute and Conditional Contraband
The distinction between absolute and conditional contraband was prescribed in the 1909 Declaration of London. The Declaration listed certain
items which would automatically qualify as absolute or conditional contraband without the need for notice in lists.161 However, it allowed belligerents
the discretion to add other items by publishing lists.162 Perusal of the items
158. See Thomas D. Brown Jr., World War Prize Law Applied in a Limited War Situation:
Egyptian Restrictions on Neutral Shipping with Israel, 50 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 849, 857–58
(1966).
159. See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,
Belligerent Interference with Neutral Commerce, 66 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 386, 386–87 (1972) for both States’ lists, which were published in December 1971.
Neither side had published a list in the 1965 conflict.
160. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 264 n.3; Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the
American Republics, Resolution on Contraband of War (Oct. 3, 1939), reprinted in 34
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 13, 14 (1940).
161. Declaration of London, supra note 151, arts. 22, 24 (absolute and conditional
contraband, respectively). See also James B. Scott, The Declaration of London of February 26,
1909: Part I, 8 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 274, 305–9 (1914).
162. Declaration of London, supra note 151, arts. 23, 25.
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listed in the Declaration demonstrates the futility of attempting specifically
to catalogue contraband items in an international agreement. Many items
seem quaint in the modern context and would surely not be considered
contraband today. For example, “all kinds of harness” and “horseshoes and
shoeing materials” automatically qualify as contraband under the Declaration.163 The problem of the list becoming dated was recognized as the Declaration was being drafted. Spain proposed, by way of a solution, that there
should be consensual periodic review of the lists in the Declaration. Given,
however, that it was troublesome enough to persuade States to agree on
the lists in time of peace, it was rightly concluded that, were a review to fall
during a period of hostilities, agreement would prove impossible. The idea
was, accordingly, rejected.164
The line between absolute and conditional contraband was blurred by
belligerent practice in the world wars. It was contended by both sides in
both conflicts that it was impossible to distinguish between goods intended
for armed forces’ consumption and goods intended for civilian consumption.165 The practice of government rationing of goods available on the civilian market added to the difficulty. In the Arab-Israeli conflict Egypt initially maintained a distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, but later in the conflict its prize court abandoned it.166 Moreover,
during the conflict between India and Pakistan in 1971, the lists drawn up
by both parties made no distinction between absolute and conditional contraband.167 The San Remo Manual eschews any contemporary distinction
between absolute and conditional contraband; the Helsinki Principles and
UK Manual take the same position.168 The German Commander’s Handbook states that the distinction is no longer relevant, but observes that in
all cases there must be sufficient evidence to show that the goods are ulti163. Id., arts. 22(6) & 24(12), respectively. Against this view, it must be conceded that
in 1971 India’s contraband list did include “all kinds of harness of a military character.”
Belligerent Interference with Neutral Commerce, supra note 159, at 387.
164. Scott, supra note 161, at 309–10.
165. See The Alwaki and others [1940] P. 215 at 218 per Sir Boyd Merriman, P (“There
was the clearest possible evidence of German Decrees which imposed Government control on all these articles and prescribed that they were automatically seized at the moment
of coming into the customs house.” (relying on The Hakan [1918] AC 418)).
166. See Brown, supra note 158, at 859.
167. Belligerent Interference with Neutral Commerce, supra note 159, at 386–87.
168. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 148; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10,
princ. 5.2.2–5.2.3. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶¶ 13.106–13.111. On the UK MANUAL,
see also Haines, supra note 131, at 98 n.23.
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mately destined for the military.169 Only NWP 1-14M continues to draw the
distinction, but even it acknowledges its collapse during the Second World
War.170 The Chinese Manual is silent on the issue.171
How should prize courts and admiralty practitioners deal with this
merger? First, courts must be careful only to condemn items which appear
on States’ reasonably specific contraband lists. Second, of those items
listed, some will be undeniably useful in prosecuting the conflict. Examples
include weaponry, ammunition and other military hardware. Little additional evidence will be required for the court to conclude that such items
are destined for the military. However, in the case of dual-use items, such
as fuel or foodstuffs, the prize court should require clear evidence (which
at least satisfies a balance of probabilities evidentiary burden) that they are
destined for military or governmental use before they may be condemned.
Further, it must be clear that the actual goods seized are destined for military use; proof that their import will free up other resources commercially
available for military use is insufficient. Although sanctioned in the English
Prize Court during the world wars, such reasoning was never relied on exclusively to justify a condemnation in prize. Based on an Order-in-Council
dated July 7, 1916, the approach was characterized as a reprisal measure.
That an import frees up commercially available resources has not been employed as a basis for condemnation by a belligerent in any subsequent conflict and should not be considered part of the contemporary law.
While belligerent States enjoy a broad discretion as to which items to
include in their contraband lists, international law does recognize that certain items, or free goods, should never be included as contraband.172 More
recently, the San Remo Manual sought to specify a minimum standard for
free goods, including religious objects, articles intended for the treatment
of the sick and wounded, civilian bedding, essential foodstuffs and means
of shelter, items for prisoners of war and other goods not susceptible for
use in armed conflict.173 These categories are taken from analogous provi-

169. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 260.
170. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.4.1.
171. One contemporary commentator maintains there is still a distinction between
absolute and conditional contraband, but cites no national manuals or State practice in
support of this position. Bothe, supra note 18, ¶ 1142.
172. See, e.g., Declaration of London, supra note 151, arts. 28–29; Scott, supra note 161,
at 311–12.
173. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 150, ¶ 150.2.
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sions in the 1949 Geneva Conventions174 and the 1977 Additional Protocol
I.175 The UK Manual, NWP 1-14M and the German Commander’s Handbook use nearly identical terms.176
3. Destination
Where items are consigned directly to destinations in enemy territory, determining as a matter of fact that there is the requisite enemy destination is
a relatively straightforward endeavor. But neutral traders, whose livelihoods
may have been dependent on trade in a particular commodity in time of
peace with a now belligerent State, might face ruination when that commodity was declared contraband. One way to reduce the risk of capture
and condemnation was to import the commodity via another neutral port.
Superficially at least, it would appear that the goods were being shipped
between two neutral traders in two neutral States. The doctrine of “continuous voyage” was developed to allow a prize court to look at the cargo’s
ultimate—not immediate—destination and condemn it if it was, in fact,
destined for the enemy.177
The doctrine was first employed in England in The Jesus (1756).178 It has
been repeatedly employed subsequently. During the U.S. Civil War, Union
prize courts routinely applied it in contraband cases. The U.S. Secretary of
State, William Jennings Bryan, would later explain to the U.S. Senate, which
was complaining bitterly about British contraband rules in force during the
First World War, “[i]t will be recalled, however, that American Courts have
established various rules bearing on these matters. The rule of ‘continuous

174. E.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 55, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
175. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 54, 70, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
176. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.110; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.4.1.1;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 261. The Chinese Manual is silent
on this issue.
177. See, e.g., The Polly (1800) 2 C. Rob. 361, 368–69, per Sir William Scott.
178. Burrell 165. See also O. H. Mootham, The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage, 1756–1815,
8 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62, 66 (1927).
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voyage’ has been not only asserted by the American tribunals, but extended
by them.”179
The doctrine of continuous voyage was recognized in the Declaration
of London, although a compromise was struck between those States which
observed the doctrine (Great Britain and the United States) and those
which did not (the continental European powers).180 The Declaration applied the doctrine to absolute contraband, but not conditional contraband.181 The Declaration’s provision in this respect was soon abandoned by
Great Britain and Germany in the First World War.182 As the distinction
between absolute and conditional contraband has likely also been abandoned, the Declaration’s position is no longer tenable, if it ever was. During the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Egyptian Prize Court relied on the doctrine to find that Genoa was a “principal base for [any] contraband traffic
destined for Israel.”183
The San Remo Manual recognizes the doctrine of continuous voyage
by the use of the phrase “ultimately destined” for enemy territory.184 The
UK Manual reflects this position.185 Continuous voyage is also preserved by
NWP 1-14M.186 The German Commander’s Handbook holds that continuous voyage may not apply in blockade, but accepts its applicability in the
context of contraband.187 The Helsinki Principles also apply continuous
voyage to contraband, albeit subject to an evidentiary rule that, in cases of
doubt as to whether goods are intended for a military destination, the burden of proof in subsequent prize proceedings lies with the captor State.188
As will be seen, this evidentiary rule does not reflect domestic prize court

179. Reproduced in The Kim and others (Condemnation of cargo) [1915] P. 215, at 274. Examples of U.S. cases are Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. 110 (1855), and The Bermuda, 70 U.S. (3
Wall) 514 (1865).
180. Scott, supra note 161, at 316.
181. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 35.
182. The Louisiana and Other Ships [1918] AC 461, 470, per Lord Parker of Waddington.
183. The Flying Trader, 17 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 440, 442 (Prize Ct. of Alexandria 1956) (Egypt). See also George K. Walker, State Practice Following World War Two:
1945–1990, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: TARGETING ENEMY MERCHANT SHIPPING
120, 123 (Richard J. Grunawalt ed., 1993) (Vol. 65, U.S. Naval War College International
Law Studies).
184. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 148, ¶ 148.4.
185. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.106–9; Haines, supra note 131, at 98, 106–7.
186. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.4.1.2.
187. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶¶ 261, 301.
188. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 5.2.3-4, cmt. at 510–11.
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decisions. Nonetheless, the broader doctrine of continuous voyage undoubtedly reflects contemporary customary law.
The doctrine of continuous voyage depends upon the capturers being
able to show—or, perhaps, the neutral carrier’s failure to show otherwise—
that the goods would proceed from the intervening neutral port to enemy
territory. Consequently, if it could be shown that the journey was broken or
ended at the neutral port, the doctrine would not apply. The existence of a
break is a question of fact in each case. In Britain, Sir William Grant considered that the goods’ “importation into the common stock of the country” was required,189 reasoning later adopted by the chief justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court in The Bermuda.190 Unloading and reloading was insufficient,
as was unloading and reloading into a different ship for onward shipment.
Sale to another party was sufficient only where it was evidence of bona fide
importation. Only clear evidence of the landing of the goods and payment
of import duties was enough to satisfy the high evidentiary threshold.191
During the First and Second World War, other evidentiary and procedural devices employed by prize courts made it easier for capturing States
to prove items were headed for an enemy destination. For example, the
“rationing” doctrine introduced in the English Prize Court allowed the
court to presume that if a neutral power which neighbored the enemy imported goods in excess of its normal peacetime supply, the excess was going to the enemy.192 While dicta indicated the English court regarded rationing as grounds in law to condemn cargo as prize, there was a marked
reluctance to rely on it alone as grounds for confiscation.193 Another device
was shifting the burden of proof on the destination issue completely to the
neutral trader. The English Prize Court in the First World War adopted this
approach, on the ground that: “The State of the captors is necessarily unable to investigate the relations between the neutral trader and his corre-

189. The William (1806) 5 C. Rob. 385.
190. The Bermuda, supra note 179.
191. The Immanuel (1799) 2 C. Rob. 186, 203, per Sir William Scott; The Kronprinsessan
Margareta [1921] 1 AC 486, 494, 499 (Privy Council). See generally Mootham, supra note 178,
at 74–79; Scott, supra note 161, at 314–15.
192. Fitzmaurice, supra note 145, at 89–95; TUCKER, supra note 46, at 275 n.25;
Brown, supra note 158, at 854.
193. The Baron Stjernblad [1917] AC 173, 177; The Kim, supra note 179, at 223–24, 232;
Fitzmaurice, supra note 145, at 89–93.
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spondents in enemy or neutral countries, but the neutral trader is or ought
to be in a position to explain doubtful points.”194
First World War prize courts were also prepared to read the phrase
“fortified place” widely to ensure as many dual-use goods as possible could
be defined as conditional contraband. Under the Declaration of London,
goods identified as conditional contraband could be confiscated if they
were bound for a fortified place belonging to the enemy.195 The German
government identified all major ports in the British Isles as “fortified places” in 1915.196 The English Prize Court adopted a similar approach for
German ports in the same year.197 Another British First World War evidentiary presumption held that enemy destination was presumed to exist if
goods were consigned to a person in a neutral State who had previously
forwarded goods to the enemy.198 During the Second World War, the English Prize Court also presumed that, in a totalitarian State such as Italy or
Germany, the government would requisition and dispose of all goods in a
manner which would best support the war effort.199
The 1798 case of The Ringende Jacob demonstrates how the evidentiary
approach of the English court in the twentieth century had changed since
the Napoleonic Wars. In respect of a cargo of unwrought iron, destined for
the French naval base port of Brest, Sir William Scott said, “as this cargo is
going to a port of naval equipment, it would very probably be applied as a
naval store; but it may be too much to decide merely on this inference, that
it is an article absolutely hostile.”200 He sought the opinion of an inspecting
officer of the king’s yards as to whether the iron should be considered a
naval store or not. This apparent restraint is in remarkable contrast with

194. The Louisiana, supra note 182, at 465. During the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Supreme Prize Court similarly declared that the onus of proving innocence lay with
the neutral carrier and that this was the “generally accepted practice by Prize Courts of all
countries.” The Arabia, July 20, 1904, reported in 1 CECIL J. B. HURST & FRANCIS E. BRAY,
RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE PRIZE CASES 42 (1912) [hereinafter “HURST & BRAY VOL. I”].
195. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 34, and supra p. 232.
196. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 269 n.10.
197. The Kim, supra note 179, at 271–72. The British government formally abandoned
the distinction between destinations required of absolute and conditional contraband in
April 1916. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 269 n.10.
198. British Maritime Rights Order-in-Council (July 7, 1916).
199. The Alwaki and Others, supra note 165; The Monte Contes [1944] AC 6, 13 (Privy
Council) per Lord Wright.
200. The Ringende Jacob, supra note 154.
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the evidentiary presumptions his successors made during the First and Second World Wars.
Taken together, the evidentiary rules employed in the world wars had
the effect that virtually all goods destined to the enemy, and a great many
goods destined for neighboring neutral States, could be confiscated as contraband. To describe contraband as an exception to “free ship, free goods”
in these circumstances seems absurd—the exception had become the rule.
Evidentiary rules of prize courts are a domestic law issue, and would not
expect to be found in national military law of armed conflict manuals. In a
common law country such as the UK, the cases cited nonetheless remain
good law. If, in a future conflict, contraband controls were imposed and
prize courts employed, it seems likely that these evidentiary devices could
be employed again, to the detriment of neutral traders.
4. Penalty for Contraband Carriage
Having identified items as contraband, prize courts have imposed various
penalties on neutral contraband carriers. These have included confiscation
of the contraband items, confiscation of the remaining non-contraband
cargo and confiscation of the vessel. It stands to reason that in all circumstances the contraband items will be confiscated to avoid the possibility of
their reaching their intended enemy destination. The other penalties are of
interest, however, because they might prove more costly to the neutral carrier than the mere confiscation of the contraband items. An assessment of
each of them follows.
Caution is required, however. Except for modern developments in
arms trade regulation, considered below, international law does not forbid
private citizens carrying contraband items.201 Even if neutral States were
obliged to prevent their citizens carrying contraband, the remedy for a
breach of that obligation would lay between the aggrieved belligerent and
the errant neutral State, not the private neutral carrier. The penalties imposed by prize courts on neutral traders found to be carrying contraband
must, therefore, be viewed as a matter of domestic law. Nonetheless, English Prize Court judges have often ruled that they were applying international law. In The Maria (1799), Sir William Scott said,

201. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 7.
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The seat of judicial authority is, indeed, here, in the belligerent country,
according to the known law and practice of nations: but the law itself has
no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine this
question exactly as he would determine the same question if sitting in
Stockholm.202

The present author’s view is that a prize court applies domestic law, but
domestic law which should accord with the relevant principles of international law. The decisions themselves are plainly not automatically declaratory of international law.
Confiscation of the remaining innocent cargo first occurred in France.
France introduced a policy of “infection” in 1778, decreeing that where
three-quarters of the value of a vessel’s cargo was contraband, it was entitled to confiscate the rest as well.203 The English Prize Court later also confiscated innocent cargo on the basis that contraband had infected it. It did
so in The Staat Emden (1798),204 but only in respect of innocent items in the
same ownership as the contraband. In The Kronprinsessan Margareta and other
ships,205 the UK Privy Council found that the basis of the rule was not punishment. Rather, it was to deter shippers from trading in contraband:
[F]ew modes of deterring contraband trade are more effectual than to establish a rule, known by and applicable to all, that the inclusion by a shipper among his other shipments by the same vessel of one parcel having in
fact an ulterior enemy destination may lead to the condemnation of the
whole.206

On the English approach, the contraband cargo had to account for “a substantial proportion of the goods” before the remaining cargo could be confiscated.207
The Declaration of London did not contain any threshold requirement,
although the principle of infection was recognized without great dissent
among the delegates at the London Conference.208 Although Great Britain
relied on it during the First World War, it was not often employed in the
202. 1 C. Rob. 340, 350.
203. NEFF, supra note 9, at 65.
204. 1 C. Rob. 26.
205. The Kronprinsessan Margareta and other ships, supra note 191.
206. Id. at 496 per Lord Sumner.
207. The Kim, supra note 179, at 286, per Sir Samuel Evans, P.
208. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 42.
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English Prize Court in the Second World War. This is because longer,
more comprehensive contraband lists had reduced the need for the Crown
to rely on it in justifying confiscation applications—not because the UK no
longer viewed infection as reflective of the law.209
Infection was not relied upon in reported cases from the Egyptian
Prize Court in the Arab-Israel conflict, nor by India or Pakistan in 1965
and 1971. In these more limited conflicts, it might have been that the factual circumstances which could have invoked the doctrine of infection
simply did not arise. The principle is not explicitly recognized in any of the
modern military manuals surveyed, but it would not need to be. To the naval operator to whom such manuals are addressed, the principal concern is
whether he has grounds to capture, not how the cargo will be disposed after subsequent judicial proceedings. The relative absence of State practice
since the First World War should not lead to the conclusion that States
have abandoned the infection doctrine. The policy reason behind it remains valid and could lead to its invocation again.
As to confiscation of the vessel, the 1909 Declaration of London provided that where at least 50 per cent of a vessel’s cargo was contraband by
value, weight, volume or freight, then the vessel might also be condemned
as good prize.210 The Declaration’s commentary observed that the condemnation of the vessel would be justified where the “carriage of contraband formed an important part of her venture.”211 The UK and U.S. governments were prepared to compromise in 1909 and allow the Declaration
to reflect the European approach, which was based upon percentage of
cargo, rather than the mala fides of the neutral master, which was the basis
of the Anglo-American approach.212 The French Prize Court had required
75 per cent of the cargo to be contraband before the vessel could be condemned. On the other hand, the decision in the 1799 Jonge Margaretha
case213 was an early example of the Anglo-American approach. Sir William
Scott declined to confiscate the vessel in addition to the cargo, because
“the party has acted without dissimulation in the case and may have been
209. S. W. D. Rowson, Prize Law During the Second World War, 24 BRITISH YEARBOOK
LAW 160, 195 (1947). Only three Second World War cases relied on
the doctrine. The Grootekerk (1941) Lloyd’s List 21 Mar.; The Hakozaki Maru (1943) Lloyd’s
List 14 May; Various Remittance ex Mails (1945) Lloyd’s List 14 June & 27 July.
210. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 40.
211. Scott, supra note 161, at 326–27.
212. Id.
213. 1 C. Rob. 187.
OF INTERNATIONAL

242

Modern Maritime Neutrality Law

Vol. 90

misled by an inattention to circumstances to which in strictness he ought to
have adverted.”214
Following Great Britain’s abandonment of the Declaration of London,
the English court remained loyal to its forbears. In The Kim and others (Condemnation of ships) [1920], Sir Henry Duke relied on the vessel owner’s
knowledge of contraband carriage to justify condemnation of the vessels in
question, without reference to the percentage of cargo.215 The Japanese
Higher Prize Court also adopted this reasoning in The M.S. Dollar and The
Wyefield cases during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5.216 However, in
each of these cases the court found that the contraband items had formed
a substantial proportion of the goods, so the judgment would have been
the same on either approach. Relevant State practice is somewhat old, but
indicates there is no rule of international law favoring one approach over
the other.
5. Future Development
a. Navigation Certificates
By a navigation certificate, commonly abbreviated to “navicert,” a neutral
ship subjected itself to inspection by belligerent authorities prior to sailing
from a neutral port. It would receive certification that it was not carrying
contraband and thus be guaranteed freedom from interference from the
certifying belligerent State. Navicerts were most fully developed by Great
Britain during the world wars.217 A similar system to Britain’s was adopted
in some detail in the 1939 Harvard Draft Convention.218 The Harvard system was primarily designed to safeguard inter-neutral trade, and was only
applicable to neutral-belligerent trade where there had been specific agreement between the neutral power and the belligerents.

214. Id. at 196.
215. P. 319, at 331.
216. 2 CECIL J. B. HURST & FRANCIS E. BRAY, RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE PRIZE CASES
284, 291 (1912) [hereinafter HURST & BRAY VOL. II].
217. The system was a reprisal measure justified under an Order-in-Council dated
February 16, 1917.
218. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, arts. 41–43, 48,
cmt. at 505–17. Previous historical precedents for the issue of certificates of neutrality are
found in id. at 507 and the British system in the First World War is described in detail at
508–9.
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The British system began as voluntary for neutral shippers. For the
shipper, the benefit was being safeguarded from interference en route from
at least one belligerent. For Britain, it reduced the necessity for naval vessels to conduct visit and search operations, allowing them to be re-tasked
elsewhere. However, the United States objected that neutral compliance
with the navicert regime might breach neutrality in two ways. The first was
that the neutral power that allowed the inspections to take place in its territory permitted its neutrality to be violated; the second was that the neutral
vessel which became so certified was engaging in unneutral service. 219
Nonetheless, Great Britain expanded the scheme by an Order-in-Council
of July 31, 1940, which declared that any vessel not carrying a navicert was
liable to capture and condemnation as a prize on this ground alone.220 This
effectively made navicerts compulsory for neutral traders hoping to avoid
interference from British warships.
Modern military manuals do not consider the exercise of a navicert system as a violation of neutral territory nor a species of unneutral service on
the part of compliant vessels. NWP 1-14M and the German Commander’s
Handbook expressly adopt this position.221 The Helsinki Principles address
the practice in similar terms.222 The San Remo, UK and Chinese manuals
do not specifically address the issue. None of the sources go so far as to
say that absence of a navicert is a sufficient ground in itself for capture, but
equally none asserts that it cannot be.
It is likely that the navicert system will retain its place in contemporary
law, although the method of its implementation may change. Surface navies
have shrunk drastically since the Second World War. In any future conflict,
States will likely not have the capacity or desire to employ their warships
and auxiliaries in the conduct of visit and search operations. Even the Second World War navicert system is reasonably resource-intensive. It requires
the forward deployment of civilian inspectors to key neutral ports. It seems
likely that, in the future, the navicert system will develop so that it can be
performed using electronic means, perhaps by uploading bills of lading to a
database for inspection remotely. A spot-checking system might be needed
as back up and enforcement. Heintschel von Heinegg has also made this
observation and suggested further that neutral States’ own export controls
219. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 282.
220. Fitzmaurice, supra note 145, at 83–89.
221. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.4.2; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra
note 24, ¶ 263.
222. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 5.2.6., cmt. at 511.
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may render the need for belligerent contraband controls of any form obsolete in future.223
A side effect of the navicert system is its impact on the business of
prize courts. The universal adoption by Great Britain of compulsory navicerts in the Second World War was partly responsible for the enormous
reduction in the number of cases before the English Prize Court when
compared to the First World War.224 The reason for this is simple: certifying ships before they sail eliminates the need to visit, search and subsequently capture them and bring them into port for prize adjudication. The
regime prevented many who might be tempted to carry contraband from
doing so, because they would not be able to obtain a certificate and, as an
uncertified vessel, they were virtually certain to be stopped and captured.
Even when uncertified vessels were captured, once it had been determined
that the absence of a certificate was sufficient grounds in itself for capture
and condemnation, there was little to be argued or achieved by the neutral
trader in contesting prize litigation. The UK Manual asserts in a footnote
that the UK is unlikely to employ the prize court in future; it has been
roundly criticized for so doing.225 However, it is certainly true in the context of contraband enforcement that a navicert regime renders the future
use of prize courts highly unlikely.

223. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare: Part II, Developments since 1945, 30 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
89, 89–90, 133–34 (1992) [hereinafter Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and
Capture: Part II].
224. Fitzmaurice, supra note 145, at 74. He also sets out other factors which reduced
the number of prize cases in the English court in the Second World War in comparison to
the First. These were that the precedent established in prize cases in 1914–18 reduced the
need for litigation, during the Second World War there were fewer neutral countries bordering Germany than in the First, the declared Allied operational zones in the Atlantic and
the Mediterranean meant that many vessels which would otherwise be taken as prize were
instead sunk, and the Allied practice of diverting vessels to a home port for visit and
search.
225. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.89 n.103. For criticism, see YORAM DINSTEIN,
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
248 (2010). In response to this criticism, one of the authors of the Maritime Warfare chapter of the UK Manual has corrected the position, saying that the High Court retains a prize
jurisdiction which would still be exercised if required. Haines, supra note 131, at 107.
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b. The Commercial Adventure Doctrine
Hague XIII, Article 6, provides that neutral States are forbidden to supply
“warships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever” to belligerent States.226 Conversely, neutral States are under no duty to prevent their
citizens or subjects from supplying war material to belligerents. This principle is enshrined in Hague V and XIII at common Article 7: “A neutral
Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either
belligerent, of arms, ammunition, or, in general, of anything which could be
of use to an army or fleet.” This is the commercial adventure doctrine. It
was affirmed as recently as 2009 by the drafters of the Air and Missile Warfare Manual, which provides: “A Neutral is not bound to prevent the private export or transit on behalf of a Belligerent Party of aircraft, parts of
aircraft, or material, supplies or munitions for aircraft.”227
While the commercial adventure doctrine allows neutral traders to
trade in contraband, they do so at their own risk. The risk of belligerent
interception and confiscation is carried by the neutral trader. This point
was made clear by the UK Privy Council in The Louisiana: “according to
international law, neutrals may during a war trade freely as well with belligerents as with other neutrals. If, however, the goods in which they trade are
in their nature contraband, the traffic includes certain risks.” Their Lordships described the neutral trader’s position before the Prize Court as “not
in the position of a person charged with a criminal offence. . . . He comes
before the Prize Court to show that there was no reasonable suspicion justifying the seizure or to displace such reasonable suspicion as in fact exists.”228
This traditional understanding of the doctrine may now be in doubt,
particularly in relation to the arms trade.229 As early as 1939, the commentary to the Harvard Draft Convention expressed the view that the law
might be developing in favor of a duty on neutral States to prohibit private
226. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 6. See also Convention on Maritime Neutrality, supra
note 116, art. 15.
227. AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 173. See also Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare art.
45, Feb. 19, 1923, reprinted in 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 12 (1938) (not in force).
228. The Louisiana, supra note 182, 464–65. For a similar view expressed in the U.S.
Supreme Court, see Northern Pacific Railway Company v. The American Trading Company, 195
U.S. 439 (1904). This case is discussed in Scott, supra note 161, at 325.
229. This point was recognized in the AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, cmt. 3 to r. 173 at
319.
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arms exports, and supported that development.230 The Draft Convention
stopped short of including such a prohibition, merely providing that neutral States were permitted to control or prohibit the export or transit
through its territory of arms or other war supplies to belligerents.231 The
commentary gives examples of State practice in voluntary controls on arms
exports dating back to the eighteenth century.232
Some argue that, while the law may long have recognized such voluntary controls, the nature of the modern arms trade might now mean that
any sale of arms from a neutral to a belligerent State is unlawful.233 They
argue that virtually all international arms sales now require some exercise of
government power or control. This might be because the State has a significant ownership share in an outwardly private arms company, or because
States choose to impose monopolistic controls on all arms sales. In either
circumstance, a sale of arms or ammunition by a neutral private trader to a
belligerent power is likely to necessitate direct involvement and supervision
of the public power, and constitute a breach of that State’s duties under
Hague XIII, Article 6.234 However, State practice on the control of arms
sales to belligerents since the Second World War is inconsistent, and can
only support the view that neutral States are permitted, rather than obliged,
to enact controls on arms sales during armed conflicts.235 Nonetheless,
States which have domestic arms control laws obviously remain bound to
apply them during an armed conflict. Growing support for the Arms Trade
Treaty, which would place tighter controls on the international arms trade
even in peacetime, might eventually spell the end of the commercial adventure doctrine as far as arms and ammunition are concerned.236

230. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, cmt. at 282–313 (in
particular at 299).
231. Id., art. 11.
232. Id., cmt. at 283–99.
233. GEORGE P. POLITAKIS, MODERN ASPECTS OF THE LAWS OF NAVAL WARFARE
AND MARITIME NEUTRALITY 419 (1998); Bothe, supra note 18, ¶ 1112; NEFF, supra note 9,
at 200–203.
234. POLITAKIS, supra note 233, at 419.
235. See id. at 485–503 for a detailed discussion of State practice in regulating arms
sales during the Falklands War and the Iran-Iraq War.
236. See About the Arms Trade, UN OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://www.
un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTrade/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
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6. Contraband: Closing Remarks
Modern military manuals continue to reflect the traditional law of contraband, indicating a marked desire among States to preserve their belligerent
rights. While States are carefully preserving their positions in case of future
need, even in conflicts where interference with the enemy’s trade is justified the future exercise of contraband control is likely to be fundamentally
different to that prior to 1945. The reduction in the number of naval platforms operated by most States will drive a desire to rely less on traditional
visit and search, and more upon cargo pre-inspection and spot-checks,
possibly conducted electronically. The Tallinn Manual contemplates that
naval blockades might be enforced by cyber means—there is no reason in
principle why the same should not be true of contraband measures.237
States might be unwilling to engage in confiscation as prize of captured
cargo and material which they cannot readily convert to their own use.
Prize proceedings require, in addition to the convening of a prize court and
the retention of admiralty practitioners, warehouse storage facilities; berthing space for captured vessels; administrative infrastructure, including value
assessors; and even accommodation for captured crews. This administrative effort might be disproportionately onerous to the military benefit
gained. Weighed against the practical challenges of administering prize proceedings, the navicert regime discussed above seems particularly attractive.
Taken together, these facts will likely contribute to a significant reduction,
if not abandonment altogether, of prize court use in the future. For example, during enforcement of the Gaza blockade, the Israeli government did
not seek to convert or confiscate captured vessels and cargo. They simply
repatriated them as soon as investigative and evidence gathering considerations allowed.238
Lastly, the law of contraband demonstrates interesting shifts in the positions taken by both the U.S. and the UK over the course of the twentieth
century. The U.S., so often a defender of the rights of the neutral prior to
the Second World War, now adopts the most heavily pro-belligerent position.239 This trend will be demonstrated in other areas of the law. Meanwhile, the UK’s retreat from a fiercely pro-belligerent stance, demonstrated
by positions taken at the Hague conferences, the London Conference and
237. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 67.
238. See infra p. 264.
239. For example, the U.S. assertion that lists of free goods satisfies the requirement
of reasonably specific contraband lists.
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in both world wars, is evidenced in its Manual which takes a more measured position, choosing to adopt (verbatim in many respects) the text of
the San Remo Manual.
B.

The Rule of 1756 (Engaging in a Forbidden Trade)

The Rule of 1756 is the usual name for the rule forbidding a neutral trader
from availing himself of a line of trade with a belligerent in wartime which
is unknown to him in peacetime. It actually significantly predates 1756 and
traditionally referred to trade between a colony and the belligerent colonial
power.240 Almost without exception, colonial powers exercised strict monopolies over the trade of their colonies in order to maximize their own
economic returns. However, in the 1756 war between France and England,
France granted to neutral Dutch vessels the right to carry goods from
French colonies to France.241 This was an attempt to place those goods beyond capture by England.
Prior to the universal recognition of the “free ships, free goods” principle in the 1856 Declaration of Paris, England had entered into a 1674
treaty with the Netherlands which provided that, in the event of war between England and any other country, goods belonging to England’s enemy in Dutch ships would remain free from seizure.242 The English Prize
Court nonetheless found that Dutch ships carrying French colonial trade
were exempt from England’s treaty obligation to the Netherlands.243 Sir
William Scott later explained the rule in The Immanuel (1799):
[T]he general rule is, that the neutral has a right to carry on in time of
war, his accustomed trade to the utmost extent of which that accustomed
trade is capable. Very different is the case of a trade which the neutral has
never possessed, which he holds no title of use and habit in time of
peace. . . .244

The basis of the Rule of 1756 was that the neutral was rendering service to a belligerent inconsistent with the neutral duty of impartiality. In
240. Marsden, Early Prize Law: Part II, supra note 135, at 244.
241. NEFF, supra note 9, at 65.
242. Treaty of Navigation and Commerce art. 8, Eng.-Neth., Dec. 10, 1674, reprinted in
13 CONSOLIDATED T.S. 1673–1675, at 255 (Clive R. Parry ed., 1969). The Treaty is discussed in NEFF, supra note 9, at 65.
243. Mootham, supra note 178, at 64.
244. 2 C Rob. 186, 198.
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essence, the neutral vessel was trading for the enemy belligerent, rather
than with him.245 The penalty for infraction of the Rule was accordingly
severe—forfeiture of not only the offending cargo, but also the vessel. 246
However, the English Prize Court treated that penalty as discretionary and,
in at least two cases, chose in the circumstances only to condemn the cargo.247
Whether the rule was ever reflective of customary law is a matter of
doubt. Sir William Scott, in a later case, ruled that French State practice
indicated that the French government recognized the rule as one of international law.248 A version of the rule was enforced by the Japanese Prize
Court during the Russo-Japanese War. In The Montara, decided in 1906, the
Japanese Higher Prize Court expressly relied on it to sanction capture of a
neutral vessel engaged in small coastal trade in Russia, trade which was
normally open only to Russians. The Japanese court ruled that the Rule of
1756 remained a rule of international law.249
The Rule of 1756 was not addressed at all by the Hague XIII delegates.
The British government also specifically excluded it from the scope of the
1909 Declaration of London, indicating perhaps a desire that the rule be
unmolested.250 The 1939 commentary to the Harvard Draft Convention
opined that breach of the “famous” Rule of 1756 might constitute unneutral service and justify capture, but nothing more than that was said and no
substantive provision was included in the Draft Convention.251 The present
author has not found a prize case since The Montara which relies on the rule
as a ground for capture or condemnation. It is not reflected in any of the
modern military manuals surveyed. The rule’s origin in the context of colonial trade heavily suggests that it has fallen into desuetude. However, it had
lain practically dormant for over one hundred years before being employed
in Japan in 1906. This reliance placed upon it by the Japanese government
in a wholly novel context allows for a very remote possibility that the rule
could be invoked in some new way by States in future conflicts.
245. Id. at 195; NEFF, supra note 9, at 66.
246. The Minerva (1801) 3 C Rob. 229, 232 per Sir William Scott.
247. Id. at 232; The Immanuel, supra note 191, at 205–6.
248. The Wilhelmina 4 C Rob. App 4; Scott, supra note 161, at 539.
249. The Montara (1906), HURST & BRAY VOL. II, supra note 216, at 403. Contrarily, in
The Thea (1904), the Russian Supreme Prize Court said in reference to engagement in Japanese coastal trade “the Thea was engaged in a perfectly peaceful occupation.” HURST &
BRAY VOL. I, supra note 194, at 96.
250. Scott, supra note 161, at 540.
251. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, cmt. at 658–59.
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PART FOUR: BELLIGERENT CONTROL OF THE SEA
Part Three examined belligerent States’ authority to place controls on their
enemy’s trade, including where this trade is carried out by neutral vessels.
This Part examines the circumstances in which belligerent States may place
controls over areas of the sea, even to the detriment of neutral shipping.
The legal concepts of blockade, maritime zones and control of shipping in
the immediate vicinity of naval operations are examined. Blockade is a device allowing belligerent States to control access to and egress from an area
of enemy coast. Maritime zones, a relatively new and still controversial
concept, may allow belligerents to establish controls, including the exclusion of neutral shipping, over operationally significant sea areas. They
might be static geographically defined zones, or they might be mobile
zones around a moving belligerent warship or other unit. Finally, the law
has long accepted that belligerents may place controls on all shipping in the
immediate vicinity of their naval operations. These three concepts are designed to allow the belligerent to have an effect on its enemy, but each has
the ability significantly to interfere with neutral ships exercising their freedoms of trade and navigation.
A.

Blockade

In 1997, Captain Humphrey, then Chief Naval Judge Advocate of the UK
Royal Navy, wrote:
The experiences and practices in the two world wars left the law of
blockade devoid of most of its traditional characteristics and made its applicability and content post 1945 questionable. The practical effect may
be that formal blockade in the sense of close visible investment has become obsolete and resort has to be had to other methods such as minelaying and institution of war zones.252

Nonetheless, in recent years classic blockade has been twice employed by
Israel—in 2006 in Lebanon and in 2009 in Gaza.253 There was broad
252. D. R. Humphrey, Belligerent Interdiction of Neutral Shipping in International Armed Conflict, 2 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 23, 27 (1997).
253. Russian controls on Georgian trade at sea during the 2008 conflict were described as a “blockade” in some news sources. See, e.g., Russian Navy Blockade [sic] Georgia,
CHINA VIEW (Aug. 10, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/10/content_
9138604.htm#prof. The 2009 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the
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agreement that the legal regime which governed those blockades was the
traditional law of naval warfare and maritime neutrality.254 This Part will
first assess the legal requirements for a blockade. It will then address
whether they are suitably robust to accommodate modern weapon systems
and platforms before considering the Gaza blockade as a case study.
Blockade is the blocking of the approach to the enemy coast or ports
for the purpose of preventing the ingress and egress of ships and aircraft of
all States.255 It has been described as
a sort of circumvallation around a place, by which all foreign connexion
[sic] and correspondence is, as far as human force can effect it, to be entirely cut off. It is intended to suspend the entire commerce of that place;
and a neutral is no more at liberty to assist the traffic of exportation than
importation.256

To be lawful, a blockade must comply with five requirements: notification,
effectiveness, impartiality, proportionality and the preservation of access to
neutral coasts.
1. Notification
With the exception of the Chinese Manual, which does not deal with the
criteria for a lawful blockade, the manuals surveyed uniformly state that all
aspects of a blockade must be formally notified.257 Under the traditional
Conflict in Georgia instead described Russian Black Sea Fleet activity as enforcement of a
“maritime security zone.” FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 144, at 212.
254. 1 Jacob Turkel et al., The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident
of 31 May 2010 (2011), available at http://turkel-committee.gov.il/files/wordocs//87072
00211english.pdf [hereinafter Turkel Commission], Turkish National Commission of Inquiry, Report on the Israeli Attack on the Humanitarian Aid Convoy to Gaza on 31 May
2010 (2011), available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Turkish%20Report%20Final%20%20UN%20Copy.pdf. [hereinafter Turkish Report]; U.N. Secretary-General’s Panel of
Inquiry, Report on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.
un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf
[hereinafter
Palmer Report]. All relied upon the traditional law of blockade in their analyses of the
Gaza blockade.
255. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.1; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, at 176.
256. The Vrouw Judith (1799) 1 C. Rob. 150, 151–52, per Sir William Scott.
257. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 93–94; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10,
princ. 5.2.10; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.65; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.2.2;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 292. The AMW MANUAL, supra
note 3, r. 148, endorses an identical rule for aerial blockades.
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law, the mode of notification depended upon the manner in which the
blockade was established. A blockade established by a government was
obliged to be formally notified to other governments. Prior to the advent
of instant global communications, the law also allowed a blockade to be
established de facto by a naval commander on the scene, provided he had
prior authorization to do so from his government. Such blockades required
specific notification to every vessel approaching the blockaded coast.258
Before a merchant vessel may be held to have breached a blockade, the
blockading State must be able to prove the vessel knew or ought to have
known of the blockade’s existence. The traditional law was unclear as to
what evidence was sufficient to prove knowledge. The Anglo-American
approach diverged from the European approach. The former attributed
knowledge to vessels flagged to neutral States whose governments had
been duly notified so long as there had been sufficient time for the vessels
to be informed. The European approach required each potential blockade
runner to have been individually notified by the blockading force.259 The
Ringende Jacob is an early case demonstrating the Anglo-American approach.260 The eponymous vessel was caught apparently trying to breach
the English blockade of Amsterdam during the 1780–84 Anglo-Dutch
War. Sir William Scott sought specific evidence that she had left her port of
origin, Riga, after notice of the blockade had reached there. Only then
would he impute knowledge of the blockade to the vessel’s master.261 As
observed in a prize court decision in the following year, vessels within a
blockaded port need not be specifically notified, because “it is impossible
for those within to be ignorant of the forcible suspension of their commerce; the notoriety of the thing supersedes the necessity of particular notice to each ship.”262
Modern military manuals do not prescribe the manner of notification.
In the case of the Israeli blockades in 2006 and 2009, notification was
achieved by the publication of Notices to Mariners.263 The AMW Manual
states that aerial blockades should be notified by a Notice to Airmen. 264 In
258. The Adula, 176 U.S. 361 (1899).
259. See Charles N. Gregory, The Law of Blockade, 12 YALE LAW JOURNAL 339, 342
(1903).
260. Supra note 154.
261. Id. at 91–92a.
262. The Vrouw Judith, supra note 256, at 152.
263. See, e.g., Notice to Mariners 1/2009 (Jan.6, 2009), available at http://asp.mot.gov.il
/en/shipping/notice2mariners/547-no12009.
264. AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 148(c), cmt. ¶¶ 1–4 at 289.
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light of the lack of objection to the Israeli practice and the position of the
AMW Manual, it may be concluded that these are now the most appropriate means to publicize a blockade.
2. Effectiveness
A blockade must be effective.265 Effectiveness is a question of fact, determined by the risk of capture faced by vessels attempting to breach the
blockade. There must be sufficient danger of capture before the blockade
can be considered effective.266 Dangerousness does not necessitate interception of every blockade runner, but sufficient military resources must be
committed to render it probable that vessels and aircraft will be prevented
from entering or leaving the blockaded area. The dangerousness requirement has its origins in the protection of neutral rights. Found in Article 4
of the 1856 Declaration of Paris, it is grounded in the neutral desire that
belligerent powers not be permitted to declare “paper blockades” without
the means or motive to enforce them. In determining dangerousness, the
distance of the blockading force from the coast and the nature of the
blockading force will be relevant factors.
As to the blockade’s distance from the coast, there are two related but
distinct questions. The first is at what distance from the coast may the
blockade be declared? The second is, once declared, where might the
blockade be enforced? In the blockade paradigm, the blockading State declares a blockade line around an area of enemy coast and places a squadron
of warships on or near the blockade line to enforce it. This archetypal
blockade was contemplated by the States declaring the First Armed Neu265. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 95; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10,
princ. 5.2.10; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.67; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.2.3;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 292.
266. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Law of Armed Conflicts at Sea, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 18, 475, 557 [hereinafter
Heintschel von Heinegg, Armed Conflicts at Sea]; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.2.3. The
dangerousness formulation appears in the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U.S. 510, 517 (1899). It was also employed by Dr Lushington, P., in
The Franciska and others, reported in JAMES P. DEANE, THE LAW OF BLOCKADE AS IN THE
REPORT OF EIGHT CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY ON THE BLOCKADE OF THE COAST OF COURLAND 1854, at 90 (1855). Other manuals simply declare that effectiveness is a question of fact in each case. See SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 95, UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶13.67; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 292.
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trality in 1780–83, which required that the blockading force be “anchored
and sufficiently near” the enemy coast.267 In the view of these States at the
time, only such a close blockade was permissible in law: “The immediate
entrance to a port must be guarded by stationary vessels, in such number as
either to render entrance impossible, or at least to expose any ships running
in to a cross fire from the guns of two of them.”268
On the Anglo-American view, so long as the blockade remained effective, the distance of the blockading force from the coast was irrelevant.
This view balances locating the blockading force so close to the coast that
it may be at risk from enemy onshore weaponry, and locating it so far away
that the blockade may fail for want of effectiveness.269 In 1854, Riga was
blockaded at a distance of one hundred and twenty miles from the coast by
a single ship in the Lyser Ort, a narrow channel forming the only navigable
entrance to the Gulf of Riga. This blockade was held to be effective by the
English Prize Court.270 The contemporary military manuals surveyed and
the San Remo and AMW manuals all adopt the Anglo-American approach.
These manuals provide that the distance from the coast that the force
maintaining the blockade is located is dependent upon military requirements.271 International reaction to the Israeli blockades of 2006 and 2009,
although sometimes critical of the nature and place of Israeli enforcement
action, did not demure from the Anglo-American approach to the distance
question.272
The looser Anglo-American approach means there is no need for a
formal blockade line so long as the blockading force is effective at preventing vessels from entering or leaving the blockaded ports or coast. None of
the contemporary military manuals surveyed refer to any requirement for a
267. The First Armed Neutrality was an alliance of neutral European States organized
to protect their shipping against the Royal Navy's policy of unlimited interference with
neutral shipping destined for France or carrying French contraband. See Gregory, supra
note 259, at 342.
268. Id. at 343.
269. See NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.5; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶
96.1.
270. See The Franciska and others, supra note 266, at 93.
271. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.65; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.2.3;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 292; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra
note 26, r. 96. The AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 155, uses analogous terms in respect of
aerial blockades.
272. The Turkish Report, supra note 254, at 87, criticized Israel’s early enforcement
action, but did not claim that the scope of the declared blockade was excessive under the
law of naval warfare.
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blockade line. The Harvard Draft Convention posited the creation of a
blockade zone as an area of water inside a blockade line in which it was
forbidden for merchant vessels to enter. The Convention commentary was
clear that this did not reflect contemporary law, but suggested it might be a
useful concept for belligerents establishing blockades.273 Nonetheless, the
blockade zone has not been adopted in any of the manuals surveyed. Israel’s blockade of Gaza did include a declared blockade line and a blockade
zone behind it, but neither the line nor the zone is an essential requirement
of a blockade.
As to where a lawfully established blockade may be enforced, there are
two positions: (1) that a blockade may only be enforced in the vicinity of
the blockaded area and (2) that a State which has properly established a
blockade may enforce it anywhere it likes, so long as it can show that the
object vessel intends to breach the blockade.274 Traditionally, the European
approach espoused the more restrictive position, while the AngloAmerican approach adopted the intention doctrine.275 The European approach was adopted in the 1909 Declaration of London after both the UK
and U.S. conceded the point in negotiations.276 The San Remo Manual offered no view on the intention doctrine. NWP 1-14M still expressly embraces it;277 the UK Manual is silent on the issue. The German Manual
states that a vessel may only be captured for breach of blockade if it “has
attempted to leave or approach the blockaded area.”278 While far from explicit, this implies a rejection of the intention doctrine. In the view of the
present author, the doctrine is unsustainable in the contemporary law. The
Gaza blockade case study will amplify this position.
The traditional law had little to say on the nature of the blockading
force. The 1856 Declaration of Paris, Article 4, provides: “Blockades, in
order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force
sufficient really to prevent access to the coats of the enemy.” AngloAmerican prize decisions affirmed that a blockade enforced by a single ves273. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, arts. 69 & 1(e). The
commentary states the right to establish a blockade zone “is not believed to express any
existing rule of law . . . but is intended to supplement the means of enforcing a blockade
now available to belligerents.” Id. at 692–93.
274. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 293–4.
275. Gregory, supra note 259, at 345.
276. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 17; NEFF, supra note 9, at 139.
277. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.4.
278. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 301.
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sel could be effective if the capabilities of that single ship rendered the
blockade effective on the facts.279
More recently, there has been some dispute as to whether a blockade
may be enforced by a naval minefield alone. In 1972, the United States
mined North Vietnamese waters off Haiphong and successfully denied access to and egress from that port for some three hundred days.280 This action was justified by the U.S. as a measure of self-defense and never referred to as a blockade, although the modern NWP 1-14M states expressly
that blockade by minefield alone is lawful, citing the Haiphong mining in
support.281 The U.S. view might be criticized on the grounds that an unmanned blockade risks unintended harm to, for example, a vessel in distress or one that is ignorant of the blockade.282 Some commentators have
suggested that blockade by minefield alone would be lawful only so long as
the blockading State provided sufficient monitoring to prevent unintended
harm.283 A second criticism is that the prescribed penalty for breach of
blockade is capture, not destruction or attack (unless capture is resisted),
which manifestly cannot be achieved by a minefield.284 However, a properly
notified minefield can be such a strong deterrent that there are no breaches
and, therefore, no penalties to be applied.
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq enforced a declared maritime exclusion
zone by the use of air assets alone.285 The purpose of the Iraqi zone was
blockade-like, although never described as a blockade. It was intended to
prevent oil tankers accessing the Iranian oil infrastructure. Iraq’s enforcement of the zone was justly criticized on the grounds that it was indiscriminate and excessive; Iraq used fighter aircraft to attack merchant vessels in

279. E.g., The Olinde Rodrigues (1899), supra note 266, at 517.
280. Humphrey, supra note 252, at 31.
281. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.5.
282. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 97.1; Heintschel von Heinegg, Armed
Conflicts at Sea, supra note 266, at 557.
283. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Methods and Means of Naval Warfare in NonInternational Armed Conflicts, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 211, 222 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S.
Naval War College International Law Studies) [hereinafter Heintschel von Heinegg, Methods and Means].
284. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 98; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶
13.70; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.10, GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra
note 24, ¶ 301.
285. WALKER, supra note 76, at 47–48.
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and approaching the zone.286 However, there is no reason in principle why
a blockade (or a lawful zone) may not be enforced by air assets alone so
long as the blockade is effective and enforcement activity is sufficiently discriminate and proportionate.287
The Tallinn Manual, Rule 67, states: “Cyber methods and means of
warfare may be used to maintain and enforce a naval or aerial blockade
provided that they do not, alone or in combination with other methods,
result in acts inconsistent with the law of international armed conflict.” In
the accompanying commentary, the Manual suggests that “[r]emote access
cyber operations against propulsion and navigation systems are examples
of the sort of cyber operations that can support naval blockades.”288 As
cyber capabilities develop, this is another example of how a blockade might
now lawfully be enforced without any physical presence in the blockaded
area. However, the enforcement activity contemplated by the Tallinn Manual—targeting propulsion and navigation systems—could leave the object
vessel at risk and might generate a monitoring requirement, akin to the argument in respect of blockade by minefield. This is obviously a developing
area of the law and the scope of the rule cannot yet be determined.
3. Impartiality
A blockade must be applied impartially, that is, it must be enforced against
vessels from all States, whether neutral or belligerent, regardless of the nature of the goods they are carrying. The traditional reason for the impartiality requirement was to ensure that the blockading State could not improperly benefit from the declaration of a blockade by allowing its own merchant vessels to trade to the exclusion of all others. Modern manuals continue to reflect the rule.289 The Turkish government criticized the Israeli
blockade of Gaza for failing uniformly to enforce the blockade.290 This criticism was misguided, relying as it did upon evidence which pre-dated the
286. William J. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval Warfare, 24 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 121 (1986).
287. AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, cmt. 1–3 at 287 (observes

that naval blockades
may be enforced by air assets alone and that an aerial blockade might be similarly enforced
by naval assets).
288. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 3, at 200.
289. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.2.4; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.72;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 297; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra
note 26, r. 100.
290. Turkish Report, supra note 254, at 74–75.
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Israeli declaration of blockade, but it nonetheless reflects the widespread
contemporary view of the continuing validity of the impartiality rule.
Failure to comply with the impartiality rule renders the entire blockade
void. Accordingly, the blockading power must lift it. Before the failed
blockade is lifted a merchant vessel may not disobey or ignore a notified
blockade because it unilaterally considers the blockade unlawful. However,
captures on the basis of a failed blockade should be found unlawful during
subsequent prize proceedings, and vessels and cargo restored.291
It is argued below that there is no rule of law that a maritime zone must
be enforced impartially.292 Indeed, enforcement of a zone only against enemy shipping, as opposed to against all shipping, helps ensure the zone’s
impact on neutrals is not disproportionate. This logic applies equally to a
blockade. The traditional motivation for the impartiality rule lacks contemporary relevance and it would be a favorable development in the law if it
were removed from the law of blockade. This would allow the blockading
belligerent to focus only on preventing access to, or egress from, the
blockaded coast which had an immediate military benefit, while reducing
the potential for economic impact upon neutral traders.
4. Proportionality
This article groups the three rules which limit the effect a blockade can
have on the civilian population of the blockaded territory under the general
heading “proportionality.” They are not, strictly, all rules of proportionality,
but they are so interrelated that contemporary manuals, as will be seen, often deal with them in the same provision or rule. The three rules are: (1) a
blockade may not be intended to starve civilians; (2) a blockade may not
inflict suffering which is disproportionate to the military advantage it confers; and (3) a blockade must not prevent supply to the civilian population
of items essential to their survival.293
The first rule is an outright ban on a blockade that has as its sole purpose the starvation of civilians. NWP 1-14M, the German Commander’s
291. See The Franciska and others, supra note 266, at 96 (where Dr Lushington, P., was
prepared to restore the prizes if the blockade had not been found “legitimate” for want of
effectiveness or impartiality).
292. See infra p. 305.
293. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 102–3; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶¶
13.74–75; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.2.5; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK,
supra note 24, ¶¶ 298–300.
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Handbook and the San Remo Manual state the rule in these terms.294 The
UK Manual says that a blockade will be unlawful if it is “intended to
starve” the civilian population.295 This appears broader than the sole purpose threshold. The AMW Manual also prefers a broader interpretation of
the rule, stating that a blockade will be unlawful if it has the “sole or primary” purpose of starving civilians.296 Sole appears to be a very high threshold
such that it might render the starvation rule of very limited practical application. Even where a blockading belligerent is unscrupulous enough to impose a blockade in order to starve civilians, it will likely be possible to attribute some other military advantage to the blockade which might help it
evade being in noncompliance of this rule. It is easy to see why the UK and
the drafters of the AMW Manual preferred a broader statement of it.
The second rule is a rule of proportionality. A blockade is prohibited if
the damage caused to the civil population is excessive compared to the expected military advantage conferred. The military manuals surveyed and the
San Remo Manual agree that this rule limits the establishment of blockades
just as it does any other military activity.297 It is clear that the sort of damage contemplated in this rule is starvation or, perhaps more broadly, hunger.298 This rule is broader than the starvation rule, and includes blockades
which incidentally cause starvation or hunger, in addition to those intended
to starve civilians. Abolition of the impartiality requirement, recommended
above, would also assist blockades remain proportionate. Enforcement activity could then lawfully be focused on vessels whose breach of the blockade has a military effect. The current requirement that a blockade be uniformly enforced renders its impact on the blockaded population necessarily
more onerous than it would if the impartiality rule were abolished.
The third rule is that a blockade must not deprive the civilian population of items essential to its survival. It is reflected in all contemporary
manuals save for the Chinese Manual, which, as has already been observed,
294. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.2.5; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 298; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 102(a), ¶¶ 102.1–3.
295. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.74.a.
296. AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 157(a). The commentary to rule 157(a) makes
clear this is intended to be broader than the NWP 1-14M and San Remo position. Id., cmt.
2 at 296.
297. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 5.3.3; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.74.b;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 298; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra
note 26, r. 102(b). See also AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 157(b), for aerial blockades.
298. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 102.4; Turkel Commission, supra note 254,
at 93–95.
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does not deal with the specific criteria for a lawful blockade.299 Essential
items include items involved in the production of foodstuffs and medical
supplies, and perhaps heating fuel, depending on the circumstances of the
blockaded population. The blockading power retains the right to determine
the technical arrangements for how such items are provided to the population of the blockaded territory.300 The denial does not have to be intended by
the blockading State for the blockade to be unlawful under this rule. However, when a blockading State makes technical arrangements for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the blockaded territory, merchant vessels carrying it are obliged to abide by those technical arrangements. As a matter of
lex lata, vessels carrying humanitarian aid have no right simply to sail
through the blockade, as they might do if the impartiality rule was abolished. To describe this third rule as a “duty of free passage” binding upon
the blockading State is not an accurate assessment of the current law, although it would be a desirable development.301
5. Preservation of Access to Neutral Coast
All of the manuals surveyed except the Chinese Manual assert that a blockade must not block access to a neutral State’s coastline.302 The AMW Manual reflects this position, but also explicitly states that an aerial blockade
must not bar access to straits used for international navigation or archipelagic sea lanes.303 The Manual’s commentary claims that the origin for this
rule is the law of naval blockade.304
299. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.74.a; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.2.5;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 300; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra
note 26, r. 102(a). See also AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 157(a).
300. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶¶ 13.74.a, 13.75; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 300; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 102(a), ¶¶ 103–4.
301. Andrew Sanger, The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, 13
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 397, 420 (2010), adopts this description. This is not a position reflected elsewhere. Heintschel von Heinegg Methods and
Means, supra note 283, at 230–31, asserts that the blockading State has the authority to
control the passage of relief consignments.
302. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.71; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.2.5;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 296; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra
note 26, r. 99; AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 150 (in respect of aerial blockades the
blockade must not bar access to “neutral airspace ”); TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 3, r.
68.
303. AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 150.
304. Id., cmt. ¶¶ 1, 3 at 290–91.
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What is meant by access? Historically, the term meant physical access
by vessels and aircraft. The Tallinn Manual preserves this definition in respect of naval and aerial blockades, whether enforced by cyber or traditional means. Some of the Tallinn drafters accepted the concept of a pure cyber
blockade. Those who did considered that access to neutral cyberspace and
infrastructure must also be preserved during such a blockade.305
6. Breach of Blockade
The San Remo Manual and the UK Manual provide that a vessel may be
captured if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it is breaching
or attempting to breach the blockade.306 If the blockading State has declared a blockade line, crossing or attempting to cross it would certainly
constitute grounds for capture. Under the intention doctrine a vessel’s public declaration of an intention to breach the blockade would be sufficient
grounds for capture wherever the vessel is located.307 Other conduct which
would constitute grounds for capture includes loitering near the blockaded
area, failing to answer radio communication from the blockading force,
failure to display night navigation lights or other attempts at concealment.308
The doctrine of continuous voyage, discussed earlier in the context of
contraband, was never recognized as a method of breaching a blockade.309
In The Jonge Pieter case the English Prize Court asserted:
The blockade of Amsterdam is, from the nature of the thing, a partial
blockade, a blockade by sea; and if the goods were going to Embden,
with an ulterior destination by land to Amsterdam, or by an interior canal
navigation, it is not, according to my conception, a breach of blockade.310

305. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 68, cmt. ¶¶ 1-3 at 200–201, cmt. ¶¶ 1-13 at
195–98.
306. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.70; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 98.
Neither NWP 1-14M nor the German Commander’s Handbook employ this formulation,
but neither do they suggest another threshold for capture.
307. See supra p. 256.
308. See, e.g., the judgment of the Sasebo (Japanese) Prize Court in The Veteran,
HURST & BRAY VOL. II, supra note 216, at 190.
309. See supra pp. 236-238.
310. The Jonge Pieter (1801) 4 C. Rob. 79, 83.
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Although rejecting continuous voyage in the case of blockade, English
prize law held that if a vessel were intercepted en route to a neutral port
from which it intended subsequently to sail to a blockaded port, it might be
captured.311 English law at the time recognized the intention doctrine, so
no reliance needed to be placed upon continuous voyage in making this
finding. American prize law took the same view.312 No contemporary manuals expressly rely on continuous voyage in the case of blockade; indeed,
the German Commander’s Handbook expressly rejects it.313
The law of blockade was traditionally the only lawful means of interference with enemy exports. Thus, a blockade was breached as much by
egress from the blockaded port as entrance to it.314 Definitions in military
manuals continue to support the view that vessels leaving a blockaded area
are as liable to capture as those entering it.315
The traditional penalty for breach of blockade is capture, subject to later adjudication before a prize court. This position continues to be reflected
in the surveyed manuals.316 In many circumstances, however, there will be
no need to capture a vessel to enforce the blockade, even though the
blockading State is lawfully entitled to do so. Simply ordering the vessel to
divert will often suffice.317 Diversions preserve the effectiveness of the
blockade and do not require the blockade commander to expend valuable
resources capturing the vessel, appointing a prize crew and tasking one of
his warships to escort it to the nearest home port. Even where vessels are
captured, there may be no necessity or appetite to confiscate the vessel as
prize. After Israel enforced the Gaza blockade against the so-called Freedom Flotilla, the vessels and crew were repatriated to their home States and
no prize proceedings were initiated. This is another example of a development which limits the likelihood of future prize court use.

311. Mootham, supra note 178, at 71–73.
312. See cases discussed in The Kim, supra note 179, at 272–73; Gregory, supra note
259, at 344.
313. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 301.
314. The Juno (1799) 2 C Rob. 119; The Prize Cases (The Brig Amy Warwick), 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 635, 678 (1863) (in respect of the barque Hiawatha); Gregory, supra note 259, at
345.
315. See, e.g., GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 301.
316. See, e.g., UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.106.f; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶
7.10.
317. See infra pp. 298-300.
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If a merchant vessel clearly resists capture, it may be warned that it
might be attacked if it persists.318 By analogy, a vessel which resists other
enforcement activity (such as a simple diversion) may also be warned that it
may be attacked if it persists. The legal basis for this position is that clear
resistance renders a merchant vessel a military objective, that is, a prima facie
lawful target for attack. Clear resistance is a question of fact in each circumstance, but the threshold is a high one. Mere evasion or attempting to
flee without persisting in breaching the blockade is not sufficient. Firing
upon the blockade force or attempting to ram a blockading warship would
meet the threshold, as was the case in the Second World War when the
British government instructed its merchant ships to resist boardings and
attempt to ram German U-boats.319 Even though a resisting vessel is a lawful target, before a commander may attack it he is obliged to weigh the likely military advantage to be obtained from attacking it against the number of
civilian casualties the attack would be expected collaterally to cause. Incidental injuries to civilians are sometimes an inevitable consequence of a
lawful attack on a legitimate military objective and are not inherently unlawful unless they are excessive.320 However, the commander bears a strict
duty to take all feasible measures to keep them to a minimum.321
What sort of military advantage might attacking the vessel confer?
Most obvious is that allowing a vessel through the blockade seriously calls
into question the blockade’s effectiveness, especially if the action is part of
a coordinated campaign to undermine it. After all, an ineffective blockade
must be abandoned. Or it might be known that the resisting vessel is carrying cargo that will make a valuable contribution to the enemy’s military effort ashore.
7. A Case Study: the Gaza Blockade
Many issues of controversy in the law of blockade were thrown into sharp
relief by Israel’s blockade of Gaza. In May 2010, a flotilla of six ships gath318. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.10; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 98.
The UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.70, with reference to paragraph 13.46–48 is more
guarded, adopting the position that determination of clear resistance may not be sufficient
in all circumstances to render a vessel a military objective and thus a lawful target for attack.
319. Fenrick, supra note 286, at 102.
320. Additional Protocol I, supra note 175, art. 57.
321. Id. See also SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 46; UK MANUAL, supra note 22,
¶ 13.32; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 8.3.1.
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ered in the eastern Mediterranean with the publically declared purpose of
breaching Israel’s blockade of Gaza. The Mavi Marmara was the largest ship
in the flotilla. It carried activists from the Free Gaza Movement, the Turkish charity “Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief” (known as IHH), others sympathetic to the circumstances of the
people of Gaza and numerous journalists. IHH’s reputation has been described as “checkered,” with reported links to Islamic extremist organizations, including Al Qaeda.322 In a series of communications culminating late
on May 30, Israel informed the flotilla that unless it diverted to Ashdod, an
Israeli city to the north of Gaza, and allowed its cargo to be inspected and
distributed under Israeli control, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel
would board the vessels and prevent them from reaching the Gaza coast.
When the flotilla refused to divert, the IDF boarded the ships sixty-four
nautical miles outside of the declared blockade zone; five were captured
without loss of life. Onboard the Mavi Marmara, however, nine civilian activists were killed during clashes with the IDF boarding party.
Three significant panels of inquiry have investigated the incident. Facts
found and legal conclusions reached by the three panels vary greatly. Israel’s inquiry was led by Supreme Court Justice Emeritus Jacob Turkel.323
The Turkel Commission’s report concludes the Israeli blockade was lawful
as a matter of international law and that the Israeli enforcement operation
was, in the main, similarly lawful. The Turkish National Commission of
Inquiry included representatives from the Prime Minister’s office and other
government offices.324 The weight of the Turkish Report’s analysis and
conclusions are therefore regrettably diminished because of its transparent
political motivation. It concludes the blockade was unlawful and that the
Israeli boarding operation, which it describes as an “attack,” used excessive
force. Both these reports were provided to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, who established his own commission headed by Sir Geoffrey
Palmer to consider the incident.325 The Palmer Report takes into account
the findings of the two national inquiries and concludes that, while the establishment of the blockade was lawful, the Israeli boarding operation ap-

322. James Kraska, Rule Selection in the Case of Israel’s Naval Blockade of Gaza: Law of Naval Warfare or Law of the Sea?, 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
367, 370 (2010).
323. Turkel Commission, supra note 254.
324. Turkish Report, supra note 254.
325. Palmer Report, supra note 254.
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peared to use excessive force in dealing with the passengers and crew of
the Mavi Marmara.
The case highlights two questions in particular which warrant consideration: whether the intention doctrine reflects the law and what level of
force may be employed in capturing a vessel in enforcement of a blockade.
These will be considered in turn.
With respect to the intention doctrine, the Turkish Report said the early enforcement of the blockade left no room for “peaceful and non-violent
alternative measures to stop the vessels.”326 The Palmer Report agreed.327
These criticisms, while not specifically grounded in a legal objection to the
intention doctrine, would likely be validly raised against every blockade enforcement action which relied upon it. It has already been seen that of the
manuals surveyed only NWP 1-14M explicitly endorses the doctrine. The
UK, once supportive, seems to have abandoned it. Whatever the doctrine’s
status in the past, the present author believes the intention doctrine cannot
be considered reflective of contemporary customary law. The lack of support for the doctrine in contemporary manuals and the widespread criticism of Israeli reliance on it in 2010 lead to this conclusion. Purely as a
matter of policy, use of the intention doctrine (even if lawful) is likely to be
problematic. Belligerents often wish to court international support of their
cause. The perception of over-zealous enforcement of rules that might
heavily impact upon neutral States’ trade or use of the sea risks undermining that support.
The question of permissible use of force in blockade enforcement actions is more complex. The Turkel Commission concluded there were
around 570 civilians on board the Mavi Marmara who took no part in resisting the IDF’s attempts to board.328 If the vessel had been attacked and sunk
with a large loss of life, this would surely have been an unacceptable level
of incidental injury, particularly when the military advantage of preventing
breach of the blockade could have been achieved by carrying out an opposed boarding and capturing the vessel, as the IDF in fact did.329
Since a blockading force will be dealing almost exclusively with merchant vessels, the blockade commander’s starting point must always be that
326. Turkish Report, supra note 254, at 87.
327. Palmer Report, supra note 254, at 53.
328. Turkel Commission, supra note 254, at 234–42.
329. ALAN COLE ET AL., SANREMO HANDBOOK ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ann. D
at 84 (2009) (An opposed boarding is “a boarding where the master or crew has made it
clear that steps will be taken to prevent the boarding.”).
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individuals on board the object vessel are civilians protected from attack
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.330 The International Committee for the Red Cross propounds the following test for
whether an act amounts to direct participation:
1. the act must be likely adversely to affect the military operations or
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict;
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act done and the
harm inflicted; and
3. that act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.331

If a commander is satisfied that this test is met by persons resisting boarding, then it is lawful for his forces to attack them.
Additionally, members of the boarding party always retain their right to
use force in personal self-defense or in defense of others. This may include
lethal force where such force is proportionate and necessary, for example,
when there is an imminent threat to human life and there is no other way
to extinguish the threat.332 There are, therefore, two legal bases upon which
boarding parties may use force during a blockade enforcement action: (1)
against those who directly participate in hostilities and (2) in self-defense.
In many circumstances, members of the armed forces confronted with direct participants will be justified in using force in self-defense and will not
need to consider the more complex direct participation formulation. That
will not always be the case, however, as the Mavi Marmara case illustrates.
Anticipating that they would be boarded, some persons on board the
Mavi Marmara armed themselves in order physically to repel the IDF boarding party.333 The boarding party attempted to board by speedboat, but was
unable to do so because some persons on board used water cannons and
330. Additional Protocol I, supra note 175, art. 51(3) (reflecting customary international law).
331. NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 46 (2009).
332. See Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment
of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials ¶ 9 (1990), available at http://www.unrol.org/files/
BASICP~3.PDF. See also Trumbull, supra note 90, at 145–47.
333. Palmer Report, supra note 254, at 56 (e.g., by sawing iron bars from the guard
rails and assuming agreed positions).
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threw objects at the speedboats.334 After the speedboat boarding failed,
three helicopters inserted the boarding party. There were reports that live
fire was used from the helicopter against personnel on the upper deck of
the Mavi Marmara, although this was denied by Israel.335 During the boarding, Israeli forces faced armed resistance. Israel claimed firearms were used
against its forces, though none were found on board afterwards and this
was denied by the activists. Before the boarding party gained control of the
ship, nine activists were killed by firearms. The autopsies showed some of
the bodies had multiple bullet wounds, some inflicted from behind and
some at close range.
The Turkel Commission devoted much time to considering (with the
benefit of hindsight) which personnel on board the Mavi Marmara were directly participating in hostilities.336 The blockade force commander would
have had far less knowledge than the Commission. Once the speedboat
boarding was attempted and repelled, however, it would have been abundantly clear that there were individuals on board prepared forcibly to resist
the IDF boarding. At that point it could have been concluded that the resisting members of the passengers and crew were direct participants. If
they could have been adequately identified and distinguished, they could
lawfully have been targeted with sniper fire from the helicopter prior to the
boarding team’s landing, as was alleged by the activists but denied by Israel.
The Mavi Marmara experience, therefore, demonstrates circumstances
where a direct participation analysis would allow a commander lawfully to
use force in circumstances beyond self-defense.
The Turkel Commission determined that it could not criticize the level
of force used by the IDF in the fatal cases because of the level of resistance
demonstrated and the consequent challenging operating environment.337
However there is much to commend the view of the Palmer Report, which
concluded that Israel had provided insufficient evidence as to the circumstances of the deaths to allow the panel to conclude that each of the nine
could have lawfully been targeted under the law of armed conflict (i.e., that
the test for direct participation had been met in each case).338 The Panel of
Inquiry members were rightly unpersuaded that the nine were lawfully

334. Turkel Commission, supra note 254, at 142.
335. Turkish Report, supra note 254, at 93.
336. See Turkel Commission, supra note 254, at 184–201.
337. Id. at 263–69.
338. Palmer Report, supra note 254, at 58–60.
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killed in self-defense, because of the nature and number of the bullet
wounds inflicted.339
8. Blockade: Concluding Remarks
The traditional law of blockade remains part of the customary international
law of naval warfare. Despite a lack of consensus on every aspect of the
law, the three investigations into the Mavi Marmara incident all relied on the
classic law of blockade. However, this article has offered the view that
blockades should no longer be required to be impartial in order to be lawful. Abolition of this rule would allow blockades to be militarily effective,
while avoiding unnecessary interference with neutral trade and without inflicting unnecessary deprivation upon the civilian population of the blockaded territory.
It is also clear that blockade need not be enforced by capture in every
instance. Simple diversion orders to vessels which would otherwise be in
breach of blockade achieve the blockading State’s aim of ensuring that warsustaining material does not enter the blockaded area. Capturing vessels
and taking them for prize is onerous, time consuming and resource intensive. In the Gaza case, even once the offending vessels were captured and
brought within Israeli authority, the IDF commander did not resort to
prize proceedings; the vessels and crews were repatriated when circumstances allowed. Without capture there is no need for prize proceedings,
and the recent developments in the practice of blockade suggest again that
prize courts are an unlikely feature of future naval warfare.
This article has also concluded that the intention doctrine does not reflect customary law. Israel’s enforcement action sixty-four nautical miles
from the blockade zone was the subject of intense criticism. The criticism
would be valid in any blockade enforcement action based upon the intention doctrine. The UK’s abandonment of the doctrine in its manual probably leaves only the U.S. and Israel as its proponents.
Lastly, use of force in blockade enforcement operations may be based
on a direct participation in hostilities or self-defense analysis. The Mavi
Mamara case demonstrated circumstances in which a direct participation
analysis offers the blockade commander broader lawful targeting parameters than self-defense.

339. Id. at 61.
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Maritime Zones

Maritime zones, whereby belligerent States purport to control sea areas to
the exclusion of shipping, are a relatively recent—and still controversial—
development. There has been little commonality in terminology in States’
operational practice in this area. Commentators, national manuals and others refer to “security” zones, “special” zones, “exclusion” zones, “war”
zones, “barred” zones and others. Whether these are intended to refer to
the same concept is not always clear. To make matters worse, some national manuals refer to zones with significantly different characteristics within
the same umbrella term. For example, the U.S. Naval War College’s Maritime Operational Zones handbook uses the phrase “warning area” to refer
to a specified static sea area, but it also uses the term to refer to approach
limitations around moving military assets.340 However they are styled, the
practice of declaring zones has the potential for significant interference
with the freedom of navigation of neutral shipping. Accordingly, they are
as much a part of neutrality law as blockade and the right to exclude shipping from a specific area of naval operations, considered later in this Part.
This article will consider zones under the following classifications: mobile
zones (whether employed in peace or during an armed conflict), static law
of naval warfare zones and static peacetime zones.341
1. Mobile Zones or Defensive Bubbles
Many States have employed defensive bubbles around military units to define approach limits for other vessels and aircraft, including neutral vessels
and aircraft. The U.S. adopted a five nautical mile/two thousand feet defensive bubble around its units in the Persian Gulf during the last years of
the Iran-Iraq War in the following terms:
U.S. Naval Forces operating in international waters are taking defensive
precautions against terrorists. All surface and subsurface ships are requested to avoid closing U.S. Naval Forces closer than 5 Nm [nautical
miles] without previously identifying themselves. Ships that close within 5

340. MARITIME OPERATIONAL ZONES 2-2–2-4 (Dennis Mandsager ed., 2006) [hereinafter ZONES HANDBOOK].
341. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶¶ 115, 304.
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Nm without making prior contact and/or whose intentions are unclear . .
. may be held at risk by U.S. defense measures.342

A U.S. Notice to Airmen of the same year was in similar terms, but included a 2,000 feet altitude limit. The UK declared a defensive bubble around
the task group sent south to recapture the Falkland Islands in 1982.343 The
German Commander’s Handbook declares it is the right and duty of a warship captain to defend his ship and crew, including by the “establishment
of warning areas or declaration of security or defensive bubbles.”344
States agree that there is no requirement of notification of the location
of a mobile zone. If there were, it would entail the publication of the
whereabouts of military units, information which States understandably
often desire to withhold.345 Although not required, the U.S. and UK practice shows that the effectiveness of the bubble depends upon public declaration that units will operate under it. Defensive bubbles are not (or should
not be) binary in nature: they declare neither that all traffic outside the
bubble is safe from attack nor that all traffic which enters it may be attacked. Approach to, or entry in, a bubble should be considered as an operational consideration for the unit commander in assessing whether a detected contact (at whatever range) is hostile, friendly or neutral. Other considerations will include, inter alia, the contact’s speed, apparent characteristics, point of origin, “identify friend or foe” signature, if any, compliance
with normal flight and shipping routes, known intelligence on enemy or
neutral activity, other enemy activity in the area, and many others. There is
plainly nothing in law, whether in peace or during armed conflict, which
prohibits a commander from using a set range from his unit (presumably
set in accordance with intelligence data on the likely threat and the capabilities of the unit’s weapon systems) as a consideration in assessing the threat
posed by a vessel or aircraft. But the decision to establish fixed approach
distances creates no duty on neutral shipping to remain outside of the de342. U.S. HYDROPAC 78/17 (1984) Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman.
343. Although no specific approach limit was set. Note from the British government
to the Argentine government, The Right of Self-Defence (Apr. 23, 1982), reprinted in CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION, BRITAIN AND THE FALKLANDS CRISIS: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 42 (1982).
344. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 115. The CHINESE
MANUAL, supra note 25, at 113, expressly preserves the right of warships to exercise the
national right of self-defense, but does not explicitly refer to the right to declare a defensive bubble.
345. ZONES HANDBOOK, supra note 340, at 1-9.
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clared bubble. The text of the U.S. notifications “requesting” other vessels
and aircraft to remain clear of the defensive bubbles reflects this position.
Two cases are routinely used to demonstrate the potential danger of
overreliance on the defensive bubble device. The USS Stark was operating
under the U.S. defensive bubble in the Persian Gulf in 1987 at the height
of the Tanker War between Iran and Iraq. She was struck by two Exocet
anti-ship missiles fired by an Iraqi F-1 Mirage fighter aircraft, which apparently erroneously believed the Stark to be an oil tanker.346 Even once the F1 was in missile release range, Stark took no defensive measures and issued
none of the standard warnings to the aircraft that it was approaching a U.S.
Navy warship. If she had, the erroneous attack may well have been averted.
This failure appears in part to have been because the F-1 was outside the
defensive bubble and, therefore, considered to be non-threatening.
Less than a year later, the USS Vincennes was operating in the Straits of
Hormuz and dealing with a threat from Iranian fast inshore attack craft.
Concurrently, she became aware of an unidentified incoming air contact,
which was, in fact, a civilian airliner, Iran Air Flight 655. Key informational
factors could have identified it as non-threatening: its course (a recognized
flight path) and its point of origin (Bandar Abbas civil airport). The commanding officer considered these, but to him they had less weight because,
unusually for a civil airliner, the aircraft was 3–4 miles away from the centerline of the flight path, and because Bandar Abbas airport had also been
used for military purposes, including the basing of strike aircraft which had
launched from there within the previous twenty-four hours. Further, nearby was an Iranian P3 aircraft, which could have provided the contact with
valuable targeting information. All these factors conspired to make the aircraft appear hostile. If the Vincennes was to stay out of missile range (and
avoid the fate of the Stark), the commanding officer felt he needed to act
immediately. He ordered that the aircraft be shot down, with the consequent loss of 290 civilian lives.347
The facts indicate the defensive bubble clouded the judgment of the
Stark command team which believed the approaching Iraqi fighter aircraft
was not a threat until it entered the defensive bubble. It is too simplistic to
346. Rear Admiral Grant Sharp, USN, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances
Surrounding the Attack on the USS Stark (FFG 31) on 17 May 1987, at 2–3 (June 12,
1987).
347. Iran Airbus Crash Tied to U.S. Errors: Mistakes Were in 'Fog of War,' Report Says of Fatal Gulf Incident, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 21, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/198808-21/news/mn-1071_1_persian-gulf.
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say that the fateful decision to shoot down Flight 655 was taken solely because the aircraft was on course to enter the bubble—other factors appeared to support the decision to take immediate defensive action.348 The
cases do show how overreliance on a defensive bubble can lead to opposite, but equally dangerous, assumptions: “it’s outside the bubble so can do
me no harm” or “it’s on course to enter the bubble, it must intend me
harm.” A defensive bubble is—and must be—but one of many operational
considerations in determining how to respond to an approaching ship or
aircraft.
2. Static Law of Naval Warfare Zones
No mention of zones is made in Hague XIII, the 1928 Havana Convention
or any other treaties dealing with the law of naval warfare. The Harvard
Draft Convention was specific in forbidding a belligerent from establishing
“a barred zone or other area . . . in which it seeks to impose special prohibition, restriction or regulation upon the passage of neutral vessels.”349 The
development of static law of naval warfare zones depends almost entirely
on State practice during and since the world wars. Tucker claims the development of the practice of static zones was a product of belligerent desire to
achieve a blockade, without having to comply with the attendant onerous
legal requirements during the world wars.350
The San Remo Manual commentary notes that by 1994 there was a
considerable body of State practice of declaring zones and that many of
these did not have blockade-like objectives.351 Zones are described in the
348. Although some of these factors were based on erroneous interpretation of data.
For example, there was confusion in Vincennes as to whether the aircraft was ascending or
descending. The latter would support the suspicion that it was flying an attack profile.
However, the aircraft was in fact ascending. See Admiral William M. Fogarty USN, Formal
Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on
3 July 1988, Chairman, Second Endorsement from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
Secretary
of
Defense
2–7
(Aug.
18,
1988),
available
at
www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/International_security_affairs/other/172.pdf. POLITAKIS, supra
note 233, at 108–19, is less sympathetic to the commanding officer of the Vincennes’ position than the investigating admiral.
349. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, art. 70.
350. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 296–97. Commentators are clear these days to distinguish zones from blockade. See, e.g., POLITAKIS, supra note 233, at 158–59; Heintschel von
Heinegg, Armed Conflicts at Sea, supra note 266, at 545.
351. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, at 181–83. The drafters were apparently split
as to whether such zones were lawful at all, but a simple majority considered that they
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San Remo Manual as an “exceptional measure,” subject to the principle of
proportionality. 352 Due regard must be had to neutrals’ legitimate use of the
sea. According to the Manual, “a belligerent cannot be absolved of its duties under international humanitarian law by establishing zones which
might adversely affect the legitimate uses of defined areas of the sea.”353 It
also provides that necessary safe passage must be provided where a zone
significantly impedes access to neutral ports or coasts, or where normal
navigation routes are affected and military requirements allow.354 Static
zones must be declared and notified.355 The Manual’s provisions provide
that maritime zones must be proportionate in two respects. They must not
have a disproportionate effect on enemy civilians (law of armed conflict
proportionality) and they must not have a disproportionate effect on legitimate neutral use of the sea (neutrality proportionality).
The use of zones is well documented in contemporary national manuals. The UK Manual, under the heading “Security zones” permits zones as
a “defensive measure or to impose some limitation on the geographical
extent of the area of the conflict.”356 It goes on to refer to the establishment of “maritime exclusion zones and total exclusion zones.”357 It is not
clear whether these are intended to be construed as separate categories of
zones, examples of security zones, or whether the phrases are to be considered interchangeable.358 It is submitted that the second construction is most
likely because the UK Manual goes on, in wording identical to the San
Remo Manual and not limited to maritime exclusion zones or total exclusion zones, to set out the conditions under which such zones will be lawful.359 U.S. and German guidance reflects the San Remo Manual position. 360
were and ought to be regulated. They accepted that the rules they set forth are a novel
attempt to balance the interests of belligerents and neutrals. The Helsinki Principles deal
with “special” zones in similar terms. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 3.3, cmt. at
505.
352. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 106.
353. Id., r. 105.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.77.
357. Id., ¶ 13.77.1.
358. Id., ¶ 13.77. Another reason for the specific mention of “maritime” and “total”
exclusion zones might be to reassert the lawfulness of the zones (by the same name) imposed by the UK during the Falklands War in 1982. See infra p. 276.
359. Id., ¶ 13.78, repeating SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 106.
360. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.9; ZONES HANDBOOK, supra note 340, at 4-8;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 305.
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The Chinese Manual asserts that the declaration of a zone may not interfere with the vessels of neutral States, although acknowledges that many
States have declared zones that do.361 In the case of the British Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) around the Falkland Islands in 1982, the Chinese
Manual states that the declaration of the zone did not prevent the sinking
of the ARA General Belgrano outside of the zone and observes that “this
incident was not considered a violation of international law.”362
Despite congruence between the San Remo Manual and national manuals, areas of uncertainty remain. The first is rather fundamental: for what
purpose is it lawful to establish a zone? Several potential purposes present
themselves: protection of a high value unit, denial of a sea area to the enemy, management of battlespace, protection of neutral shipping, focusing
military resources in appropriate areas, limiting the geographical scope of
an armed conflict and ruse of war. A logical answer is that a zone may be
established for any purpose which would be legitimate under the law of
armed conflict and which does not violate any other principle or rule.
A second issue is whether zones are subject to the requirements of effectiveness and impartiality by analogy with the law of blockade. Good policy reasons suggest they are, or should be, required to be effective.363 Like a
blockade, a maritime zone is capable of significant interference with neutral
shipping, thus the problem of paper zones could be as pernicious to neutrals as paper blockades were before the Declaration of Paris in 1856. No
such policy arguments support the view that every zone must be impartially
enforced against all traffic. Indeed, for a zone not to have an intolerable
effect on neutral shipping, it might be entirely appropriate for it to target
only enemy shipping, as did the British MEZ around the Falkland Islands.364
The consequences of a neutral’s infraction of a declared zone are perhaps the principal reason for the persisting controversy surrounding zones.
Entry into a declared zone by a neutral merchant vessel during the world
wars often resulted in its being sunk on sight.365 Commentators and nation361. CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 249.
362. Id..
363. Heintschel von Heinegg, Armed Conflicts at Sea, supra note 266, at 549.
364. John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, Speech in the House of Commons
(Apr. 7, 1982), HANSARD ONLINE, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/
1982/apr/07/falkland-islands#S6CV0021P0_19820407_HOC_423.
365. A famous example was the sinking of the SS Lusitania by a German submarine in
1915.
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al manuals are united in declaring the illegality of unrestricted warfare
zones, or the complete suspension of the principle of distinction within a
zone.366 More recent State practice (in both declaring and responding to
zones) reflects this view, as the British experience in the Falklands War
demonstrates. While only the Soviet Union registered an official protest,
the British TEZ was criticized on the ground that it seemed to affect a free
fire zone.367 The words used in declaring the zone gave that impression:
“any ship or aircraft . . . within this zone without authority from the Ministry of Defence in London will be . . . regarded as hostile and will be liable
to attack by the British forces.”368
The critical response to that phraseology demonstrates the widespread
view that the declaration of a zone is not grounds to abandon the principle
of distinction, or otherwise modify the application of the law of armed
conflict within the zone.369 On the commencement of Operation Iraqi
Freedom in March 2003, the U.S. declared a maritime safety zone in the
eastern Mediterranean Sea while conducting carrier and missile strike operations into Iraq. The penalty for infraction was visit and search by U.S.
forces. The stated purpose of the zone was battlespace management, given
the high intensity of offensive operations being conducted therein. It lasted
only as long as strike operations persisted.370 This operation represents a
contemporary example of a lawful zone. It was proportionate and reasonable, and asserted no more control in its extent, duration and effect on neutral shipping than was necessary in order to conduct the relevant operation.

366. See, e.g., Heintschel von Heinegg, Armed Conflicts at Sea, supra note 266, at 540–41;
POLITAKIS, supra note 233, at 162. The 1936 London Protocol is often cited in support of
this position. Procès-Verbal: Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part
IV of the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 353, 3 Bevans
298, reprinted in 31 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 137
(1939) [hereinafter 1936 London Protocol].
367. Fenrick, supra note 286, at 111–12.
368. POLITAKIS, supra note 233, at 76–77.
369. One commentator has suggested, however, that the principle of distinction may
operate differently inside a zone. Heintschel von Heinegg, Armed Conflicts at Sea, supra note
266, at 548 (“the demands resulting from the principle of distinction are less strict than
outside an exclusion zone”). This is probably because (particularly in respect of an exclusion zone) the fact of presence within a zone is itself evidence—although far from conclusive—that can support a vessel’s classification as a legitimate military objective under the
San Remo Manual test. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 40.
370. Dale Stephens, Law of Naval Warfare and Zones, in ZONES HANDBOOK, supra note
340, at 4-1, 4-17.
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The appropriate penalty for a neutral vessel in breach of a zone is a
matter of conjecture. As far as the author is aware, no belligerent has
sought to enforce a zone by capturing vessels in breach as prize. The UK
never had to enforce its Falkland Islands TEZ in 1982 so the issue of the
penalty never arose. Both belligerents in the Iran/Iraq War declared zones.
Their mode of enforcement, however, was indiscriminate and widely condemned, adding further support, were it needed, for the position that attack is a disproportionate and unlawful penalty.371 Fenrick concluded:
An attempt to appraise legal aspects of the use of exclusion zones in the
Iran/Iraq conflict must take cognizance of the fact that neither belligerent
appears to be paying particular heed to legal issues in determining their
courses of action. . . . About Iranian conduct, one can quote J W Garner
again concerning German war zones and simply observe, it was so flagrantly contrary to the laws of maritime warfare that nothing can be said
in defence of it.372

U.S. practice in 2003 suggests that simple diversion or visit and search
is an appropriate way for belligerents to deal with zone infractions, without
need to resort to capture. If zones are not enforced by capture, then prize
proceedings will not result, again demonstrating that prize proceedings are
an unlikely feature of future naval warfare.
3. Static Peacetime Zones
UNCLOS permits States to declare safety zones around artificial islands in
the exclusive economic zone or above the continental shelf and around
scientific research installations, even when on the high seas.373 Other static
peacetime zones might be declared pursuant to the freedom of the high
seas. For example, temporary warning zones might be created to facilitate
weapons testing or military exercises.374 There is no obligation on neutral
States to suspend their own uses of such zones during an armed conflict. If
belligerent forces are operating in neutral States’ exclusive economic zones,
or in the vicinity of neutrals exercising their high seas freedoms in these
371. See POLITAKIS, supra note 233, at 92 (“in fact the Iraqi exclusion zone closely resembles the type of unrestricted warfare Germany conducted . . . in World War II”).
372. Fenrick, supra note 286, at 121.
373. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 60(4), 80, 260.
374. ZONES HANDBOOK, supra note 340, at 2-2.
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ways, they will be obliged to have “due regard” for the neutral States’ activities.375
The corollary of this is that neutral States must have due regard for belligerents’ legitimate uses of the high seas under the law of naval warfare.
For example, it would not be acceptable for a neutral State to interfere in a
belligerent’s right to establish and enforce a blockade by establishing an
overlapping warning zone in order to conduct a military exercise. Finally, it
should be noted that modern military manuals are clear that the declaration
of a static control or exclusion zone might be a legitimate measure taken
under the inherent right of self-defense in appropriate circumstances.376
C.

The Immediate Vicinity of Naval Operations

The right of belligerents to exclude neutral shipping from the immediate
vicinity of naval operations is recognized as a well-established rule in the
commentary to the Helsinki Principles.377 It receives recognition in the San
Remo Manual.378 NWP 1-14M and the UK Manual reflect the San Remo
Manual position.379 The German Commander’s Handbook states that belligerents “are permitted to establish special restrictions for neutral maritime
and air transport.”380 The Chinese Manual recognizes belligerent authority
to exclude shipping from “naval battlefields.”381 Neutral vessels are obliged
to obey orders from belligerents in the immediate area of naval operations;
in these circumstances belligerents’ security interests outweigh the freedom
of navigation of neutral shipping.382 Any neutral ship which disobeys belligerent orders is liable to capture or diversion. Where a neutral vessel’s disobedience or interference confers a positive advantage upon one belligerent,

375. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 59, 87(2).
376. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.77.1; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 2.6.4;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 115. The CHINESE MANUAL, supra
note 25, at 113, is less clear on the matter, but discusses other measures which may be
taken in self-defense.
377. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, cmt. at 505. The rule received only oblique
reference in the Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, art. 70, cmt.
at 694–96.
378. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 146(e).
379. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.8; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.106.
380. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 305.
381. CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 248.
382. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 146.6.
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the circumstances might even render it a legitimate military objective at risk
of attack.383
There is seemingly no requirement that the immediate vicinity of naval
operations be declared before the rule may be enforced. There is little guidance on the definition of immediate vicinity, but given the words used and
the broad rights of control enjoyed by belligerents within, a narrow construction seems to be intended. Tucker was clear that the right was a transient one and only pertained to an area where naval hostilities were actually
taking place or belligerent forces were operating.384 He concluded, consistent with a narrow construction, that the rule was not a “serious restriction upon neutral freedom of navigation on the high seas.”385 This view
is consistent with the position of modern military manuals.
Recent State practice also supports Tucker’s position. In 2011, NATO
members and partner States launched air and missile strikes from the sea
into Libya. These have been described as “battlespace shaping operations”
for subsequent enforcement of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973.386
As circumstances required, merchant shipping was ordered by radio transmissions to remain clear from sea areas where cruise missile launches were
taking place. The orders remained in force only so long as strikes were carried out.387
PART FIVE: UNNEUTRAL SERVICE
The phrase unneutral service was first coined by Sir Christopher Robinson,
an English Admiralty court reporter in the 1800s.388 He used it to describe
two unneutral acts which the English Prize Court had begun to treat more
severely than mere carriage of contraband—the carriage of enemy troops
383. Id.; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.8; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶¶ 13.106,
13.92.
384. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 300–301.
385. Id. at 301 (comparing this right to belligerent establishment of “war zones,” a
practice in which he considered “there may be found a serious—and perhaps even a fatal—blow to the traditional law”).
386. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at http://www.
un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011). See also CLAIRE TAYLOR, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LIBYA 5 (2011), available at http://www.parliament.uk/
business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN05909/military-operations-in-libya.
387. The author was a member of HMS Cumberland’s command team during her involvement in Security Council Resolution 1973 enforcement operations.
388. Norman L. Hill, The Origin of the Law of Unneutral Service, 23 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 56, 66 (1929).
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and the carriage of enemy dispatches. Previously, international treaties and
domestic prize courts had treated soldiers and dispatches merely as varieties of contraband. However, the jurisprudence of the English Prize Court
during the Napoleonic Wars took a different approach, thereby influencing
international law.389 Henceforth, unneutral service was characterized by
closeness to the enemy, which was more culpable. In giving judgment in
The Friendship (1807), Sir William Scott said, “It is the case of a vessel letting
herself out in a distinct manner, under a contract with the enemy’s government . . . which cannot be considered to be permitted to neutral vessels.
. . .”390 Accordingly, in the early 1800s, the English Prize Court penalized
unneutral service not just by seizure of the offending items or persons carried, but also by condemnation of the vessel itself.391 The concept grew and
grew. Writing in 1955, Tucker said that unneutral service “has come to signify little more than any service rendered by a neutral subject to a belligerent contrary to international law, excluding the acts of contraband carriage
or blockade breach.”392 He then divided unneutral service into three categories: unneutral service which results in liability for treatment as an enemy
warship; unneutral service which results in liability for treatment as an enemy merchant ship; and unneutral service which results in liability for seizure.393 This Part will proceed on the basis of Tucker’s classification, before
assessing whether it still reflects the law.
A.

Enemy Warship Unneutral Service

The law of naval warfare allows enemy warships to be attacked on the basis
of their status. Tucker said that neutral vessels which directly participate in
the military operations of the belligerent, whether by entering into actual
hostilities or by serving as an auxiliary, also render themselves liable to at-

389. Id. at 58.
390. 4 C. Rob. 420, 428–29.
391. This practice was also adopted in prize courts outside the UK. In The Nigretia
(1905), the Japanese Higher Prize Court dismissed an appeal against a decision of the Sasebo Prize Court to condemn a neutral vessel for the carriage of two Russian naval officers. HURST & BRAY VOL. II, supra note 216, at 201–16.
392. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 318, 318 n.1 (He conceded that “this can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory definition, yet it is perhaps the best that can be given.”).
393. Id. at 318–31. For the 1909 Declaration of London’s classification of unneutral
service, see Scott, supra note 161, at 524–25.
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tack on sight.394 More recently, the San Remo Manual has stated, in language mirroring Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2), that merchant ships
may be attacked if, by their nature, location, purpose or use they make an
effective contribution to the enemy’s military effort.395 Other contemporary
manuals agree that neutral merchant vessels may be attacked when they
participate in the enemy’s war effort.396 Conduct which renders a neutral
merchant vessel liable to attack includes being incorporated into an enemy’s intelligence system, sailing under convoy of enemy warships, laying
mines, minesweeping, cutting undersea cables, attacking friendly merchant
ships and acting as an auxiliary.397 Acting as an auxiliary includes carrying
troops or supplies for warships or task groups and would encompass, as an
example, the merchant ships taken up from trade used by the UK during
the Falklands conflict.398
Before an offending neutral merchant vessel might be attacked, however, the 1936 London Protocol seems to require that its passengers, crew
and papers be placed in safety by providing:
[E]xcept in the case of a persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship . . . may not
sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having
first placed passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a place of safety.399

National manuals specifically acknowledge the limitations imposed by
the 1936 London Protocol.400 The San Remo Manual and Helsinki Principles also make explicit reference to it in their commentaries.401 It seems
394. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 319–20. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary,
supra note 30, art. 65, cmt. at 658 (It also provided that a neutral vessel which participated
in hostilities or acted as an auxiliary could be treated as an enemy warship.).
395. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 40.
396. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 5.1.2(4)(a)–(e); UK MANUAL, supra note
22, ¶ 13.47; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶¶ 7.5.2, 8.6.2.2; GERMAN COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶¶ 273–74; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 265.
397. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 67(b)–(f), ¶¶ 67.24–26.
398. Id.
399. 1936 London Protocol, supra note 366, art. 2.
400. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.47.f; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 8.6.2.2;
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 273; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note
25, at 258.
401. SAN REMO MANUAL supra note 26, ¶ 60.10 (referring to the U.S. Navy manual,
which was NWP 9, the predecessor to NWP 1-14M); Helsinki Principles, supra note 10,
princ. 5.1.2(3)–(4), cmt. at 508.
281

International Law Studies

2014

unlikely, however, that these manuals are asserting that a neutral merchant
ship which is, for example, attacking friendly merchant ships cannot be attacked unless Article 2 has first been satisfied. The general law of armed
conflict would not place such an onerous burden upon belligerents. 1977
Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2), provides:
[A]ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects
are concerned, military objectives are limited to those which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

Article 52(2) reflects customary law that plainly applies at sea.402 Once
the Article 52(2) test is satisfied, a proportionality assessment is required.403
This collateral damage estimate need not consider members of the passengers and crew of the vessel who are direct participants in hostilities. 404 On
the other hand, the London Protocol seems to provide that in respect of
attacks on merchant ships not only is collateral damage forbidden, but that
even passengers and crew who are direct participants must be removed to
safety before a neutral vessel may be attacked.405 This would be an unjustifiable limitation on targeting discretion and surely cannot be intended. As
one commentator has suggested, “there is no reason in either experience or
logic why the London Protocol should be interpreted as protecting neutral
merchant ships which are engaged in the same functional activities that result in lack of protection for an enemy merchant ship.”406 The German
Commander’s Handbook shares this view, saying, “the provisions of the
London Protocol are based on the assumption that the vessels concerned
are merchant vessels only performing their original civilian functions, i.e.,
not taking any part in the hostilities.”407
402. Despite the language in Article 49(3) of Additional Protocol I, supra note 175,
stating that the Protocol’s provisions do not apply to pure law of naval warfare scenarios,
the drafters of the San Remo Manual used exactly the text of the Protocol's Article 52(2)
in framing rule 40. The same text appears in the UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.26.
403. Additional Protocol I, supra note 175, art. 57.
404. Id., art. 51(3).
405. For a discussion of the concept of direct participation, see supra pp. 266-267.
406. W. T. MALLINSON JR, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES
IN GENERAL AND LIMITED WARS 130 (1968) (Vol. 56, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).
407. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 273.
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Another provision which may now affect a belligerent’s response to a
neutral merchant vessel committing enemy warship unneutral service is the
prohibition on the use of force found in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
An attack on a neutral-flagged merchant vessel may amount to a use of
force against the neutral flag State and, therefore, be forbidden by Article
2(4). A small group of the drafters of the San Remo Manual thought as
much, opining that in all cases an attack on a neutral merchant vessel required separate justification as self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.408 The majority, however, rejected that position, saying that the U.N.
Charter had no role to play in determining the legality of belligerents’ conduct during an armed conflict.409
The position of the minority deserves further scrutiny. During the IranIraq War, the U.S. relied upon self-defense following alleged Iranian attacks
on its flagged vessels, including merchant vessels. The MV Sea Isle City was
a merchant oil tanker struck by a missile on October 16, 1987.410 The MV
Bridgeton, another merchant vessel, struck a mine (alleged by the U.S. to be
Iranian) in the central Arabian Gulf. The U.S. claimed that Iran was using
two oil platforms to coordinate attacks on neutral merchant shipping, and,
having cleared them of personnel, destroyed them. The U.S. subsequently
reported these acts to the U.N. Security Council as acts of self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Here the U.S. was in the position
of a neutral State vis-à-vis belligerent Iran. It plainly considered that the
U.N. Charter governed its relations with the belligerent States and that the
alleged attacks on each vessel amounted to uses of force. Indeed, the U.S.
considered the attacks were not only uses of force, but armed attacks justifying a forcible response under Article 51. This position tends to support
the approach of the minority at San Remo. However, in the resulting Oil
Platforms litigation, the I.C.J. rejected the U.S. claim to have been acting in
self-defense on a number of bases, observing in the process that it doubted
an attack on a merchant vessel could ever amount to an armed attack on
the vessel’s flag State.411 The I.C.J.’s position tends to support the San
Remo majority.
408. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 67.3.
409. Id.
410. Sea Isle City was a Kuwaiti oil tanker reflagged to the United States shortly prior
to the attack. See further Scott Davidson, United States Protection of Reflagged Kuwaiti Vessels in
the Gulf War: The Legal Implications, 4 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ESTUARINE AND
COASTAL LAW 173 (1988).
411. Oil Platforms, supra note 91, ¶ 64.
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The U.S.’s own manual, NWP 1-14M, also supports the position of the
majority that neutral merchant vessels which are making an effective contribution to a belligerent’s war effort may be attacked without separate justification under Article 51.412 The U.S. plainly saw no contradiction between this provision in NWP 1-14M and the action it took against Iran,
which the U.S. alleged did attack its merchant vessels. The U.S. doctrine in
NWP 1-14M and its experience during the Tanker War suggests that States
have a discretion as to whether they view an attack on one of their merchant ships as a use of force or an armed attack against them. Whether they
do or not will depend on the circumstances. For example, if the Sea Isle
City, instead of being an oil tanker engaged in commercial activity, was a
passenger ship contracted to the Iraqi government and acting as a troop
carrier (even though still under a U.S. flag), it is unlikely the U.S. would
have claimed a right to act in self-defense if Iran attacked it.
B.

Enemy Merchant Ship Unneutral Service

According to Tucker, operating under the direct control of a belligerent
government, but performing service short of participation in operations or
acting as an auxiliary, means a neutral vessel acquires enemy character and
may be treated in the same way as an enemy merchant ship. He gives being
chartered to a belligerent government to make commercial voyages on its
behalf as an example.413 Unlike enemy warship unneutral service, this behavior does not justify attack under the law of armed conflict. Therefore,
for targeting purposes, distinguishing between enemy and neutral merchant
vessels is largely meaningless. What matters in the targeting context is
whether the merchant vessel may be said to be a legitimate military objective, not whether it is enemy or neutral flagged.414
Outside of targeting, the distinction between the two once did have
significance. Enemy merchant vessels may be subject to capture and condemnation.415 Neutral vessels must perform some offense before they may
be captured and condemned as a prize, e.g., carriage of contraband, breach
of blockade, etc. Furthermore, once capture has been affected, belligerents
traditionally enjoyed broad discretion to destroy enemy merchant vessels,
412. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶¶ 7.5.2, 8.6.2.2.
413. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 322.
414. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶¶ 67.6–67.10.
415. Id., r. 135; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.99; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶
8.6.2.1.
284

Modern Maritime Neutrality Law

Vol. 90

whereas discretion to destroy neutral prizes was strictly limited.416 But that
position seems to have changed. The San Remo Manual considers that a
merchant ship of any variety may only be destroyed when (1) military circumstances preclude taking the vessel as a prize and (2) there can be compliance with the 1936 London Protocol requirement concerning the safety
of the ship’s crew, passengers and papers. It makes no distinction between
enemy and neutral merchant vessels. The U.S. Manual and German Commander’s Handbook reflect the same position.417
The UK Manual still draws a distinction between captured enemy and
neutral merchant vessels. In the case of enemy merchant vessels, the UK
Manual provisions are the same as those in the San Remo Manual.418 With
respect to neutral merchant vessels, however, the UK maintains a position
it has held since the nineteenth century: that destruction of a neutral prize
is never permitted. Neutral prizes which are not taken for adjudication
must be released, on the UK view. The earliest authority for this position is
The Felicity (1819).419 In that case, Sir William Scott set out the duties of a
commander who is not in a position to take a ship as a prize due to military
circumstances. In the case of an enemy ship, Scott said, “Under this collision of duties nothing was left but to destroy her, for they could not . . .
permit the enemy’s property to sail away unmolested. If impossible to bring
it in, their next duty is to destroy enemy’s property.”420 In respect of a neutral ship, he went on:
[T]he act of destruction cannot be justified to the neutral owner, by the
importance of such an act to the public service of the captor’s own state;
to the neutral it can only be justified, under any such circumstances, by a
full restitution in value. These are rules so clear in principle and established in practice that they require neither reasoning nor precedent to illustrate or support them.421
416. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 349–54.
417. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 8.6.2.2 (enemy merchant vessels), ¶ 7.10.1 (neutral
merchant vessels). NWP 1-14M does not specifically address the destruction of an enemy
merchant vessel after capture, but does make explicit reference to the 1936 London Protocol in relation to the attack of enemy merchant vessels under the heading “Destruction.”
It may thus be safely inferred that the U.S. position reflects the San Remo position. The
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 288, is much clearer in favoring
the San Remo position. The Chinese Manual does not address this issue.
418. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.103. See also Haines, supra note 131, at 98.
419. 2 Dods. 381.
420. Id. at 386.
421. Id.
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The rule established in The Felicity has remained the British view since that
case was decided.422
For States, such as the U.S. and Germany, which recognize no difference in the lawful treatment of neutral and enemy prizes after capture, this
type of unneutral service may be safely assimilated into Tucker’s third category of “unneutral service which results in liability for seizure,” discussed
presently. For the UK, the distinction between Tucker’s second and third
category of unneutral service is illusory in all but the most exceptional of
circumstances. It has already been observed that captures in prize are an
unlikely feature of future naval warfare. Circumstances where there may be
a need to destroy or release a prize after capture are therefore extremely
unlikely. It is safe to conclude that Tucker’s “enemy merchant ship” category of unneutral service serves no purpose in the modern law.
C.

Unneutral Service Which Results in Liability to Seizure

Tucker concluded that the carrying of certain enemy persons or dispatches
would result in liability to seizure, because it “may be undertaken in much
the same manner as the carriage of contraband, that is without implying a
direct control by—or even a close relationship with—the belligerent.”423 It
is interesting that Tucker adopts this position, as it was precisely the proximity to the belligerent that led the English Prize Court to distinguish these
two acts from general contraband carriage. If he is right, it may no longer
make sense to continue to classify carriage of enemy persons and dispatches as distinct from carriage of contraband. This is especially true if, as is
widely held, serious examples of carriage of contraband may result in condemnation of the vessel in addition to condemnation of the cargo. Nonetheless the substance of the traditional rules will be considered before this
question will be assessed.
1. Carriage of Enemy Persons
The 1802 English prize case of The Carolina424 was the first in which transportation of members of the armed forces of a belligerent was established
422. The history of the British position is set out in the Harvard Draft Convention
with Commentary, supra note 30, cmt. at 566–68.
423. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 324.
424. 4 C. Rob. 256.
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as a species of unneutral service. The Carolina was a Swedish-flagged vessel
employed as a French troop transport between French colonies and Alexandria, Egypt during the Napoleonic Wars. On her last voyage before capture, she had carried one hundred and fifty French dragoons to Alexandria.
During the British campaign for Alexandria, the British forces permitted all
neutral ships to leave the port, but the Carolina did not sail until four days
later, claiming that the French commander would not permit her to do so.
She was captured by the British. During prize proceedings, it was argued
on the vessel owner’s behalf that (a) her capture was unlawful because she
was not in delicto at the time of capture and (b) that she was forced into the
action by French duress. Sir William Scott accepted neither argument. As
to the first he found as a matter of fact that the vessel was still under contract to the French and, therefore, still in delicto, even though the offending
troop carriage had been completed.425 As to the second he found that a belligerent cannot entertain claims of duress by the other belligerent. The
proper mode of redress for such oppressive conduct lay against the belligerent government that had applied the duress and caused the vessel owner’s loss.426
The facts of The Carolina beg the question of when carriage of enemy
persons becomes acting as an auxiliary justifying not just capture, but attack
as a legitimate military objective. This will be a question of fact in each circumstance, based on application of the criteria in Additional Protocol I,
Article 52(2). If the Carolina had been caught in the act by British forces,
she would doubtless have been a lawful target under the law of armed conflict and liable to attack on sight.
A contentious issue in the negotiations leading to the 1909 Declaration
of London was whether belligerents enjoyed the right to remove enemy
persons from a neutral vessel where there are no independent grounds to
capture the vessel.427 In the end, the Declaration did provide for such a
right, even in the face of stiff U.S. disapproval.428 It extended only to mem425. Id. at 261. Other commentators (e.g., Hill, supra note 388, at 64) have cited the
case as authority for the position that a vessel which commits unneutral service need not
be in delicto in order to be subject to capture, but given Sir William Scott’s finding of fact,
the case is not authority for that position.
426. Id. at 260. See also The Friendship, supra note 390; The Orozembo (1807) 6 C. Rob.
430.
427. There would be no grounds for capture, for example, where the enemy individual had privately paid for his passage and was traveling in his private capacity, an exception
contemplated by Sir William Scott in The Friendship (1807), supra note 390.
428. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 47; Scott, supra note 161, at 526.
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bers of the enemy armed forces. Tucker concluded that “the practice of
states may be regarded as having sanctioned this measure.”429 However,
despite the terms of the Declaration of London, he was not able to state
the boundaries of the rule. Was it limited to members of the enemy armed
forces, or did it include, for example, males of military age, or even “any
person of value to an enemy’s war effort—particularly scientists”?430
One case which might support a broad interpretation of the rule involved the Japanese passenger steamship Asama Maru in 1940 (when Japan
was still neutral in the Second World War). A Royal Navy destroyer visited
and searched the vessel on the high seas, but only thirty-five nautical miles
off the coast of Japan. The destroyer’s commanding officer ordered the
removal of twenty-one of fifty German passengers on board. The Japanese
protested the proximity of the visit to the Japanese coast and claimed that
international law only permitted the capture of members of the armed
forces. The British government justified the capture on the basis that “assuming that a right to remove enemy nationals from neutral ships exists at
all (and this is not disputed by the Imperial Japanese Government), it must
include persons returning to their own country for the purpose of fulfilling
the obligation of military service which is imposed upon them by law.”431
The Japanese response stated that the British had confused the right to detain persons having lawfully captured the vessel as a prize with the more
specific right contained in the Declaration of London. A compromise was
eventually reached whereby the UK returned nine of the twenty-one passengers to Japan as unsuited for military service, and the Japanese government having assured the British government that passage in Japaneseflagged vessels would henceforth be refused to belligerent military personnel or persons suspected of so being.432 A contemporary U.S. commentator
concluded that the British had acted in excess of the law and that the right
of seizure of belligerent nationals from a neutral vessel was only lawful in
the case of military personnel. He cited the U.S. government’s position
during the First World War in support of his view.433
429. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 328, 328 n.16.
430. Id. at 329, 329 nn.18–19.
431. Letter from Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador to Japan, to the Japanese
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jan. 27, 1940), extract reprinted in Herbert W. Briggs,
Removal of Enemy Persons from Neutral Vessels on the High Seas, 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 249, 251 (1940). The position adopted by the British ambassador is
almost exactly that taken in Article 62 of the Harvard Draft Convention.
432. Id. at 253.
433. Id. at 255–58.
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Positions have shifted somewhat in the intervening years. The contemporary UK Manual does not assert a belligerent right to capture enemy personnel of any sort in neutral shipping. Neither do the San Remo Manual or
the Helsinki Principles. The German Manual seems only to contemplate
capture of enemy personnel in a neutral merchant vessel after it has been
captured as a prize.434 In stark contrast to the U.S. position up to 1940, the
contemporary U.S. Manual is alone among the manuals surveyed in asserting the rule as follows:
Enemy nationals found on board neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft as passengers who are actually embodied in the military forces of the
enemy, who are en route to serve in the enemy’s armed forces, who are
employed in the public service of the enemy, or who may be engaged in
or suspected of service in the interests of the enemy may be made prisoners of war . . . whether or not there is reason for [the vessel or aircraft’s]
capture as a neutral prize.435

No authority is cited in support of this position in the U.S. Manual, nor in
the most recent annotated supplement.436 It is unlikely that the U.S. position reflects contemporary customary law.
2. Carriage of Dispatches for the Enemy
The Constitution (1802)437 was the first case to apply principles of unneutral
service to the carriage of enemy dispatches. Subsequently in The Atalanta
(1808),438 Sir William Scott found that knowledge (whether real or construed in cases where a lack of due diligence is displayed) is required before
the court will order condemnation of the vessel.439 While carriage of dispatches for an enemy might have been of potentially catastrophic effect on
the wronged belligerent in 1808, Tucker notes that by 1955 due to techno-

434. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶¶ 289–90. The Chinese
Manual does not address this issue.
435. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.10.2.
436. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (A. R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, U.S.
Naval War College International Law Studies).
437. 6 C. Rob. 455.
438. Id. at 440.
439. Id. at 459.
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logical developments this was no longer the case.440 If true in 1955, it is a
fortiori the case now and it may safely be concluded that the old carriage of
dispatches rule has fallen into desuetude. Indeed, even by 1909 the Declaration of London preferred the term “transmission of information in the
interest of an enemy,”441 and it is this phrase which is employed in the U.S.
Manual as a grounds justifying capture of a neutral merchant vessel.442
Tucker rightly concluded that fitting new forms of communication into
a legal framework designed to regulate quite different acts was a misleading
endeavor.443 If a neutral merchant vessel transmitted information to the
enemy by radio or other instantaneous form of communication, the effect
on the wronged belligerent might be immediate and disastrous, and sufficient to render that vessel a lawful object of attack. An example of this occurred during the Falklands conflict in 1982. The Argentine-flagged fishing
trawler Narwal repeatedly reported the position of UK forces to Argentinian authorities and was accordingly attacked and disabled by British forces
on May 9. It is irrelevant that the Narwal was Argentinian- vice neutralflagged: what matters is that she was by her use making an effective contribution to military action and that her destruction, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offered a definitive military advantage.444
D.

Unneutral Service: Concluding Remarks

Tucker’s three categories of unneutral service require substantial revision.
Beginning with the last seizure category, the old carriage of dispatches rule
has fallen into desuetude. Carriage of enemy troops still amounts to
grounds for capture and might lawfully be subject to punitive prize
measures, but no more so than serious cases of carriage of contraband. The
policy reasons for the English court’s innovation in the early 1800s no
longer pertain and carriage of enemy troops may, once again, be viewed as
a species of contraband carriage. An exception to this is where carriage of
enemy troops is of sufficient consequence to render the vessel treatable as
440. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 330 (although he concluded that the customary rules
in respect of dispatches still had force).
441. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 45(1).
442. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.10 (although the word “communicating” is used
vice “transmission”).
443. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 331.
444. For an account of the attack on the Narwal, see SANDY WOODWARD, ONE
HUNDRED DAYS: THE MEMOIRS OF THE FALKLANDS BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER 191–
95 (1997).
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an enemy auxiliary, in which case she may be attacked on sight. Tucker’s
enemy warship unneutral service should instead be labelled “unneutral service resulting in liability to attack.”
Accordingly, the law now recognizes two categories of unneutral service: first, that resulting in liability to attack and, second, that resulting in
liability to seizure. This way, the law can accommodate emerging ways of
committing unneutral acts. For example, Walker has suggested that Internet messages or hacks which contribute to enemy warfighting efforts may
be equated with neutral shipping which commit unneutral acts. 445
Heintschel von Heinegg has argued that for a neutral knowingly to allow
the transmission of a belligerent cyber attack through its cyber infrastructure would be in breach of its neutrality obligations.446 Were either of these
acts committed by a neutral vessel at sea, this unneutral service would surely now be grounds for capture (or even attack). The criteria of knowledge
and culpability which characterized the traditional law should ensure that
unneutral service will only be grounds for intercepting (or attacking) neutrals who have accepted this risk. In that way, the law of unneutral service
is not the overbearing collection of belligerent rights to interfere with neutrals that Tucker worried it might become, but it is flexible enough to accommodate new ways for neutrals to infringe their impartiality obligations.
Parts Three and Four concluded that simple diversions might be sanction enough against neutral vessels carrying contraband or attempting to
breach a belligerent controlled area, such as a blockaded coast or maritime
zone. However, unneutral service contemplates acts which might be committed by a neutral vessel without transiting anywhere. Carrying out Internet hacks or transmitting a cyber attack might just as easily be carried out at
anchor as underway. Accordingly, ordering a diversion or course change
might be insufficient to remedy the unneutral act being committed. Unneutral service might therefore be the only grounds where proper enforcement
still depends upon the ability to capture the offending vessel. Historically,
all captures required judgment in prize; however, it has already been shown
that prize proceedings can be avoided by simple repatriation after capture.
Accordingly, even where capture is required for effective enforcement, this

445. George K. Walker, Neutrality and Information Warfare, in COMPUTER NETWORK
ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 233, 239 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O'Donnell
eds., 2002) (Vol. 76, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).
446. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace, 89
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 123, 151 (2013).
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does nothing to increase the likelihood of the use of prize proceedings in
future conflicts.
PART SIX: MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT
Neutral merchant shipping is inviolable by belligerents except in six situations. These are when they are carrying contraband, engaging in a forbidden trade, breaching a blockade, intruding in a declared maritime zone,
transgressing the vicinity of ongoing naval operations and giving unneutral
service to the enemy. When any of the six circumstances pertain, three
means of enforcement against neutral shipping are available to belligerents:
visit and search, diversion and capture. Each will be examined in turn.
A.

Visit and Search

Some have questioned whether visit and search will remain an important
mode of enforcement against neutral shipping in time of armed conflict.447
It is nonetheless preserved by modern military manuals and was relied upon as a belligerent right by Egypt from 1948–79, India and Pakistan in
1965 and 1971, and Iran and Iraq from 1980–88. Coalition forces in the
1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars employed visit and search, as did NATO forces
in operations in Libya in 2011. These conflicts and operations serve to
demonstrate the persisting operational utility of visit and search, even if in
some cases its legal basis was Security Council authorization rather than the
law of armed conflict.
Belligerents may carry out visit and search operations on the high seas
and in their own, and their enemy’s, internal waters, territorial seas and exclusive economic zones. While nothing in UNCLOS forbids belligerents
from conducting visit and search operations in neutral States’ exclusive
economic zones and above their continental shelves, they may not carry
out such operations in neutral internal waters or territorial seas.448 In certain
sea areas, belligerents must have due regard to the rights of neutral States
and others.449 As Walker has noted:

447. See, e.g., Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture: Part I, supra
note 20.
448. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 2.
449. Some rights under UNCLOS are enjoyed not solely by States, but by, inter alia,
“ships and aircraft” (e.g., transit passage) and “mankind” (resource-related rights in the
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Although coastal States have rights in the contiguous zone, exclusive
economic zone . . . and the continental shelf, these zones’ waters remain
subject to high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight as do waters
above the [International Sea Bed Area, or “Area”], i.e., the deep seabed
the LOS Convention reserves as humankind’s common heritage. Visit
and search operations in these areas, and on [the] high seas . . ., are subject to a requirement that belligerents observe due regard for neutral
States’ rights, whether that be high seas rights, neutrals’ rights in these
zones, or humankind’s rights in the Area.450

He goes on to say that even in the belligerents’ territorial seas, neutral
States enjoy the right of innocent passage, and that belligerents must pay
due regard to that right, unless innocent passage has been lawfully suspended.451 Walker’s position is undoubtedly correct.452
Under the law of armed conflict, the UK and San Remo manuals provide that a neutral vessel may be visited and searched where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel is subject to capture.453 This reasonable grounds threshold is not reflected in the same terms anywhere else.
The Helsinki Principles provide for different thresholds depending on
whether the object vessel is suspected of carrying contraband or breaching
a blockade. In respect of the former, Principle 5.2.1 states “belligerent warships have a right to visit and search vis-à-vis neutral commercial ships in
order to ascertain the character and destination of their cargo.”454 On the
other hand, Principle 5.2.10 provides, “Neutral vessels believed on reasonable and probable grounds to be breaching a blockade may be stopped and
captured.”455 The formulation of the Helsinki Principles reflects the plain
fact that there is no need to visit and search a vessel to determine whether
or not it is in breach of blockade—the belligerent is entitled to capture the
sea-bed and subsoil thereof beyond national jurisdiction). UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 38,
pmbl. para. 6.
450. WALKER, supra note 76, at 358.
451. Id. See also UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 25(3).
452. See also Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 3.1-2, cmt. at 503–4.
453. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 118; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.91.
In accordance with the general theme of the UK Manual, the right of visit and search is
also subject to the caveat that “even when resort to force is justified, it should not exceed
what is necessary and proportionate to the achievement of the goal for which force is
used.” UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.3.
454. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 5.2.1.
455. Id., princ. 5.2.10.
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vessel as soon as there is reasonable suspicion of breach. But reasonable
suspicion is still required. No such threshold is used in the Principles in
respect of the right of visit and search in the context of contraband. It can
only be presumed that the difference is intentional, but regrettably there is
no explanation to confirm this in the Principles’ commentary.
The Declaration of London, Havana Convention and the Harvard
Draft Convention placed no threshold criterion on the belligerent right of
visit and search.456 In the commentary to the Harvard Draft Convention,
the drafters went as far as to say, “[Article 49] states an unquestioned rule
of international law and is not deemed to require any explanatory discussion.”457 The reasonable grounds formulation is not used in the German
Commander’s Handbook, the Chinese Manual or NWP 1-14M.458 Neither
do these manuals suggest an alternative limiting threshold. The implication
is that the right of visit and search may be exercised entirely at the belligerent State’s discretion. Nonetheless, scholars have suggested that reasonable
suspicion has long been a de facto prerequisite for visit and search of a
neutral vessel.459 For instance, belligerents will always wish to make best use
of their military resources, and it makes sense to focus visit and search operations where there is the greatest suspicion of unneutral behavior.
Whether the law imposes a threshold requirement for visit and search
is, accordingly, uncertain. Practically, it probably does not matter. The doctrine of continuous voyage and the intention doctrine broaden the scope of
vessels which might reasonably be suspected of unneutral conduct justifying capture. Continuous voyage renders it reasonable to suspect even vessels destined for neutral ports of contraband carriage. This author doubts
that the intention doctrine is reflected in contemporary customary law but,
if it is, it widens the scope of reasonable suspicion of breach of blockade to
include vessels far from the blockaded coast.460 The threshold of reasona456. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 63; Convention on Maritime Neutrality, supra note 116, art. 1; Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, art.
49.
457. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, cmt. at 532.
458. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 276; CHINESE MANUAL,
supra note 25, at 266; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.6.1 (but does recommend that visit
and search be undertaken with “all possible tact and discretion.”).
459. Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture: Part I, supra note 20,
at 297; Humphrey, supra note 252, at 39. In 1921, Oppenheim took the intermediary position that a vessel might be visited without suspicion, but searched if the visit generated
“grave suspicion.” OPPENHEIM VOL. II, supra note 5, at 610.
460. See supra p. 266.
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ble suspicion is, therefore, so easily overcome in practice that it cannot
amount to a substantial limitation on the exercise of visit and search. For
this reason, Tucker described this debate as “bordering on sophistry.”461
Another issue, in the context of visit and search, is whether the law exempts neutral vessels under neutral convoy from belligerent visit and
search. Historically, it did not. In The Maria (1799),462 Sir William Scott punitively confiscated cargo and vessels when the neutral Swedish merchant
vessels under the convoy of a Swedish warship forcibly resisted visit and
search by a British warship. He recognized no exception from the regime
of visit and search for vessels under neutral convoy. He reasoned: “[T]he
right of visiting and searching merchant-ships upon the high seas . . . is an
incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent
nation. . . . [I]t cannot legally be maintained that [a neutral Sovereign] is
authorized by law to obstruct the exercise of that right . . . .”463
On the other hand, the San Remo Manual states that a neutral merchant vessel under neutral convoy is exempt from the exercise of the belligerent’s right of visit and search if it satisfies the following criteria:
a) it is bound for a neutral port;
b) it is under convoy of an accompanying neutral warship of the same
nationality or a neutral warship of a State with which the flag State of the
merchant vessel has concluded an agreement providing for such convoy;
c) the flag State of the neutral warship warrants that the neutral merchant vessel is not carrying contraband or otherwise engaged in activities
inconsistent with its neutral status; and
d) the commander of the neutral warship provides, if requested by the
commander of an intercepting belligerent warship or military aircraft, all
information as to the character of the merchant vessel and its cargo as
could otherwise be obtained by visit and search.464

The rule, in these terms, is also contained in military manuals.465
461. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 341.
462. Supra note 202.
463. Id. at 359–61.
464. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 120. The Helsinki Principles recognize the
rule in broadly the same terms. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 5.2.8, 6.1, cmt. at
514–15. See also Declaration of London, supra note 151, arts. 61–62.
465. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.93; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.6; GERMAN
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 271. The Chinese Manual does not address
this issue.
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Recent State practice is broadly supportive. During the Iran-Iraq War
in the 1980s, Iran had stopped, searched and, in some cases, attacked Kuwaiti tankers on the grounds that they were exporting oil from Iraq via
Kuwaiti ports and helping to fund Iraq’s war effort. The legal basis for this
activity is dubious. It has already been observed that a blockade is the only
lawful grounds for interfering with enemy exports. Iran did not declare a
formal blockade against Iraq and even if it had this would afford no justification for interfering with exports from neighboring, neutral, Kuwait. Even
if Kuwait was complicit in exporting Iraqi oil, this does not appear to constitute a breach of its broader neutral duties of impartiality or abstention.466
In 1987, the U.S. responded to a request from the Kuwaiti government and
re-flagged several Kuwaiti tankers to its own flag and placed them under
the protection of its warships to safeguard them against Iranian interference. The U.S. declared that its ships would not be carrying oil from Iraq
and that neither party would have any basis for taking hostile actions
against U.S. naval ships or the vessels they were protecting.467 Iran did not
attempt to board the re-flagged and convoyed vessels.468 However, it might
have been that Iran was motivated by a desire not to provoke the U.S. rather than any concern that it was legally bound to afford the re-flagged vessels any special protection.469
Reaction from other States similarly supports the view that vessels under neutral convoy were exempt from visit and search. At the time, the UK
described its warships in the Persian Gulf as escorting rather than convoying its merchant vessels, perhaps reflecting a persisting view that a neutral
convoy provided no protection from visit and search.470 Since then, however, the UK has adopted the San Remo position in its 2004 manual.471
France used a warship to protect a French-flagged merchant vessel (the
Ville d’Angers) from being visited and searched by an Iranian warship, im-

466. See Introduction, supra p. 202.
467. The U.S. statement risked implicitly accepting that, without that guarantee, Iran
might have been lawfully justified in interfering with the tankers. See Davidson, supra note
410, at 183.
468. Although as noted earlier, one, the Bridgeton, did strike a mine which the United
States claimed was Iranian. Another, the Sea Isle City, was struck by a missile which the
United States attributed to Iran. See supra p. 283.
469. See WALKER, supra note 76, at 57. It has already been observed that both sides
played scant regard to the law in other aspects of the Tanker War. See supra pp. 257-258.
470. Humphrey, supra note 252, at 34.
471. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.93.
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plying that France held the view that merchant vessels under the protection
of a neutral warship were immune from visit and search.472
Some criticized the Kuwaiti re-flagging on the grounds that the reflagged vessels did not enjoy a genuine link to the new flag State, although
without doubting the broader principle that a neutral convoy provided protection from visit and search.473 UNCLOS imposes substantial duties on
flag States and requires a genuine link between vessel and State.474 Third
States (including the belligerents) would not be compelled to recognize the
flag-shift if the link to the new flag State was not genuine.475 The U.S., a
non-party to UNCLOS, accepted at the time that the genuine link requirement was an obligation under customary law and believed that U.S. ownership, manning, safety and inspection requirements met the requirement.476
The San Remo Manual formulation of the rule avoids the genuine link
issue because it does not require re-flagging for a merchant vessel of one
neutral State to be convoyed by a warship of another neutral State. 477 An
agreement between the neutral States to allow the convoy is sufficient. As
long as that agreement is robust enough to allow the commander of an escorting warship to certify with certainty the character and cargo of the vessels protected, then the belligerent is obliged to rely upon the convoy
commander’s undertaking.478 An agreement under the San Remo Manual
rule would be sufficient to satisfy not just the law, but also the political
message that the re-flagging was designed to convey to Iran: attack on or
interference with the vessels would be construed as an attack on, or interference with the rights of, the U.S.479 The broad acceptance of the San
Remo Manual’s position both in national manuals and State practice sug-

472. Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture: Part II, supra note
223, at 104; WALKER, supra note 76, at 63.
473. See Davidson, supra note 410, at 185–86.
474. UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 94.
475. See Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 70 (Feb. 5); Davidson, supra note 410, at 188.
476. David L. Peace, Major Maritime Events in the Persian Gulf 1984–1991: A Juridical
Analysis, 31 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 545, 554 (1991).
477. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 120.
478. Id., ¶ 120.4.
479. See U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
100th Cong. 55 (1987) (statement of Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs), available at http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadata Prefix=html&identifier=ADA496911.
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gests the exemption from visit and search of vessels under neutral convoy
reflects customary law.
B.

Diversion

A belligerent might wish to divert a neutral merchant vessel from its course
for two purposes. First, diversion might be a sanction in itself to prevent
the neutral vessel from committing some unneutral act, for example,
breaching a blockade. This might be styled diversion simpliciter. Second, it
might be ordered so that visit and search might be carried out in the safety
of a belligerent’s port.
As to diversion simpliciter, the San Remo Manual states, “As an alternative to visit and search, a neutral merchant vessel may, with its consent, be
diverted from its declared destination.”480 The Manual’s drafters considered
this a novel rule and a new belligerent right. However, they believed that it
was in the interests of neutrals and belligerents that the right be provided.
The Manual’s explanation observed: “There are situations in which it will
suffice to keep merchant vessels out of certain areas instead of diverting
them . . . for the purpose of visit and search.”481 Such situations might include preventing a neutral merchant vessel from breaching a blockade, infringing a declared maritime zone or transgressing the immediate vicinity of
naval operations. The rule eliminates the need for a time-consuming and
potentially hazardous visit and search operation. The UK Manual also
adopts this position.482 Neither NWP 1-14M nor the Chinese Manual specifically refer to a right to divert neutral shipping as an alternative to visit
and search. The German Commander’s Handbook authorizes the “giving
of course instructions” to neutral merchant vessels where there is an “adequate probability of seizure,” but does not require the vessel’s consent.483
The San Remo and British view that diversion simpliciter can occur only
with the consent of the neutral master is puzzling and, in the view of this
author, wrong. The San Remo and UK manuals suggest that if the neutral
master does not consent, then the intercepting warship may visit and
search the vessel, divert it for visit and search, or let it proceed.484 It seems
odd that the sanction with lesser effect (diversion) requires consent, where480. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 119.
481. Id., ¶ 119.2.
482. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.92.
483. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 281.
484. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 119.2.
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as the more onerous ones do not. Furthermore, one might question whether consent which is enforced by the threat of a more serious sanction is
properly characterized as consent. Since the rule is a novel one, it is unlikely that any iterations of it yet reflect customary law. However, in terms of
lex ferenda, the position of the German Commander’s Handbook is to be
preferred.
Diversion to facilitate visit and search was heavily employed during the
First and Second World Wars. Visit and search had become more difficult
for a number of reasons: the increase in size of merchant vessels, neutral
shippers’ ability to hide contraband items among other cargo and the risk
of submarine attack borne by a stationary warship undertaking visit and
search. The Allied Powers began to divert neutral merchant ships to safe
sea areas or, better, a home port where visit and search might be carried
out in greater detail and in greater safety. The British found this had other
benefits. Neutral cargo brought into the domestic jurisdiction in this way
found itself subject to British domestic licensing, customs and fiscal law.
Even if cargo was not condemned as contraband, these other domestic restrictions could also prove effective in limiting commerce with the enemy.485 Widespread use of diversion, even if ostensibly only for the purpose
of the safe conduct of visit and search, significantly reduced the number of
cases resulting in capture and prize proceedings. It is another example of a
development which contributes to the demise of the prize court.
The difficulties encountered in the world wars in conducting visit and
search at sea still pertain. It is widely accepted among commentators that
the right to divert a neutral merchant vessel in order to conduct visit and
search persists.486 The right is included in the San Remo Manual in circumstances when “visit and search at sea is impossible or unsafe.”487 The Manual’s explanation is clear that this sort of diversion is a compulsory order
which a neutral merchant vessel is compelled to obey, a point which only
serves to underline the incongruity of the Manual’s insistence that diversion
for its own sake may be done only with the neutral vessel’s consent.488

485. The Falk [1921] 1 AC 787, 796-8, per Lord Sumner. See also Fitzmaurice, supra
note 145, at 74–78.
486. WALKER, supra note 76, at 133 (who cites the San Remo Manual to say that “the
diversion option” is now recognized practice). See also Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit Search
Diversion and Capture Part II, supra note 223, at 133.
487. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 121.
488. Id., ¶ 121.1.
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Tucker was persuaded that the practice of diversion for visit and search
purposes had survived into post-Second World War law, but wondered
whether, as a matter of lex ferenda, it ought to have.489 His concern was that
diversion could be ordered as soon as there was justification for visit and
search; since there was a very low threshold, if any, for visit and search, it
gave belligerents authority to divert virtually any neutral merchant ship to
one of its ports. Previously, belligerent warships’ boarding parties would
have to show sufficient evidence to justify seizure, and then formally take
the vessel as prize before sending it off to a home port for prize proceedings—a significantly higher evidentiary threshold. Diversion could be particularly pernicious to neutral traders, especially as it renders their cargo
subject to the domestic jurisdiction of the diverting State. The English
Prize Court has ruled, consistent with the UK Manual’s position on visit
and search, that a reasonable suspicion of some unneutral behavior is required before diversion.490 Given the low threshold for legitimate visit and
search, this affords scant comfort to neutral traders.
The broad acceptance of diversion for visit and search has the potential
for significant detriment to neutrals. One way in which the rule’s potential
for harm might be reduced would be to recognize a higher threshold for
visit and search in the first place—a restrictive interpretation of the reasonable suspicion threshold, for example. This seems an unlikely development.
C.

Capture

Neutral merchant vessels are subject to capture if they carry contraband,
refuse or actively resist visit and search, perform unneutral service or
breach a blockade.491 It is not clear whether the law allows for the capture
of neutral vessels which infringe a declared maritime zone. It was concluded above that a maritime zone was a lawful basis for belligerent interference in neutral freedom of navigation, but that the law was not settled as to
the appropriate enforcement measure.492 In many cases, an order to change
course or leave the restricted area will satisfy the belligerent’s need. Logical489. Tucker, supra note 46, at 338–44.
490. The Mim [1947] P. 115, 121 per Hodson J.
491. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.106; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.10; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 285; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25,
at 266; Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture: Part I, supra note 20, at
316; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 146.
492. See supra p. 279.
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ly, though, capture should be an available penalty where simple diversion is
not sufficient or not obeyed.
After capture, toute prise doit etre jugée: all captures must be adjudicated
upon by a prize court. The capturing commander must therefore be able to
show that there is sufficient evidence to found a case. Fitzmaurice put it
this way, “simple seizure in Prize is justified if there appears to be an adequate prima facie case.”493 The “adequate prima facie case” test is not prescribed in any of the national manuals surveyed, although it does reflect
earlier practice in the English and Russian prize courts. 494 While without
doubt this reflects the law, this article has highlighted a number of factors
to show that belligerents will not need to rely on capture in the future, or
will be reluctant to do so. These include the use of navicerts and diversion,
and the growth in international arms control, as well as the logistical difficulties of storing captured vessels and cargos and accommodating captured
crews. Capture is onerous and difficult and it seems likely that belligerent
States will avoid it where possible.
D.

Jus ad Bellum Constraints on Enforcing Maritime Neutrality Law

The UK Manual, in the Introduction to the Maritime Warfare chapter,
makes the following assertion:
[T]he conduct of armed conflict . . . is subject to the limitations imposed
by the UN Charter on all use of force. . . . [E]ven when resort to force is
justified, it should not exceed what is necessary and proportionate to the
achievement of the goal for which force may be used. In a conflict of limited scope, this may mean that a belligerent state is constrained, to a
greater extent than the rules set out in this chapter might suggest, in the
action that it may lawfully take . . . .495

The UK has held this position since at least 1982, when it relied upon the
jus ad bellum to justify specific military actions in the Falklands War rather

493. Fitzmaurice, supra note 145, at 74 n.1. The SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶
146.2, expresses this evidentiary threshold justifying seizure in broadly the same terms.
494. The Baron Stjernblad, supra note 193, at 175, per Lord Parker of Waddington. The
Russian Supreme Prize Court adopted a similar approach in The Allanton (1904), reported in
HURST & BRAY VOL. I, supra note 194, at 1.
495. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.3.
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than purely the jus in bello.496 The ICJ, in dicta, supports this position in the
Oil Platforms decision.497
The British government’s position has been criticized by some scholars.
Heintschel von Heinegg considers that:
[E]fforts to limit the in bello legality in the light of the jus ad bellum have
been futile and cannot be considered as reflecting the general consensus
of states. Hence, if, during an international armed conflict, a blockade is
in compliance with the rules and principles of the law of air or naval warfare, its legality may not be doubted.498

It is certainly true that the UK view is unique among the national manuals
surveyed. On one view, the UK position is sensible as a matter of lex ferenda. It should ensure that all military operations within an armed conflict are
properly addressed to the specific aims and objectives of the conflict. On
the other, it might be dangerous in that it might place unnecessary constraints (dressed as legal constraints) upon commanders in their planning
and conduct of operations. This debate is pertinent insofar as it relates to
the conduct of operations against the enemy without impact on neutral
States. However, if a belligerent takes military action which involves the
vessels or territory of neutral States, it is far harder to argue that the belligerent’s U.N. Charter obligations to the neutral State are not in play.
Two examples illustrate the point. The first is of a neutral-flagged vessel which makes itself a legitimate military objective by some form of unneutral service to the enemy, thus rendering itself a lawful target for attack
under the jus in bello. Whether a belligerent attack in such instances amounts
to a use of force contrary to Article 2(4), requiring separate justification
under Article 51, was discussed above.499 Whether it did or did not depended on the context; what was not in doubt, however, was that Charter
norms applied. Just because an armed conflict exists between States A and

496. See the British government’s statements on the sinking of the General Belgrano as
discussed in POLITAKIS, supra note 233, at 86–89.
497. Oil Platforms, supra note 91, at 186–87.
498. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockades and Interdictions, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marc Weller ed., forthcoming 2014). See also Laurie R. Blank, Ukraine: How Jus ad Bellum and Jus In Bello Operate
in the Same Space, LAW TODAY (31 Mar. 2014), http://today.law.utah.edu/projects/
ukraine-how-jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-in-bello-operate-in-the-same-space/.
499. See supra p. 283.
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B does not ipso facto justify State A or B in using force against neutral State
C unless there is a basis in the jus ad bellum.
The second example is where a belligerent sinks an enemy warship
which is using neutral territorial sea as a sanctuary because the neutral State
in question is unwilling or unable to evict the guilty warship. It cannot be
doubted that the warship is a lawful target under the jus in bello. But the attack probably also amounts to a use of force against the territorial integrity
of the hapless or unwilling neutral State, contrary to Article 2(4).500 Once
again, it cannot be doubted that Charter norms apply; what is in question is
the scope of Article 2(4) in each case. Accordingly, before taking military
action against a neutral vessel or a belligerent vessel unlawfully present in
neutral territorial sea, a belligerent State will need to ensure that its action
complies with the jus ad bellum, as well as the specific rules of maritime neutrality.
CONCLUSION
This article has considered all aspects of maritime neutrality law, ranging
from passage rights in territorial seas to the circumstances in which belligerents can attack neutral merchant vessels. This Conclusion will draw together the specific conclusions from each Part, before making some more
general observations.
Belligerent warships and auxiliaries do not enjoy the right of innocent
passage in neutral territorial waters. They may, however, avail themselves
of the right of mere passage when not prohibited or restricted by the
coastal State. Mere and innocent passage appear very similar, but the key
difference between the two is the greater discretion afforded to coastal
States in respect of mere passage, both in permitting it in the first place and
regulating it if they choose to permit it.
Belligerents continue to enjoy the non-suspendable passage rights provided for in customary international law and/or UNCLOS. Transit passage, a creature of UNCLOS, is strictly applicable only where the belligerent and the neutral coastal State are parties to UNCLOS. The enjoyment of
any passage right by a belligerent in neutral territorial sea is subject to the
twenty-four hour rule and the prohibitions on seeking sanctuary or basing
operations in neutral waters.

500. UNCLOS, supra note 32, art 2.
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Belligerents may, subject to the neutral State’s consent, use neutral
ports for refueling, revictualing and repair. Neutral States must make their
port facilities available to each belligerent on an impartial basis. While the
state of the law on how much fuel or victuals belligerents may take on
board is uncertain, this article recommends that belligerents should be able
to top up both, but subject to a prohibition on resupply from ports of the
same neutral State within three months. As to repairs, this article favors the
view that battle damage repairs in neutral ports ought to be forbidden by
the law.
In the area of belligerent control of trade, States, in their manuals, have
preserved for themselves the traditional law rules on contraband. Much of
the law and State practice in this area predates the Second World War; indeed, much of it is drawn from European practice during the Napoleonic
Wars. Predicting how contraband measures might be enforced in future
conflicts is, therefore, difficult. This article concludes that belligerent States
which wish to rely on contraband controls must still publish affirmative
contraband lists. Other than the stipulated free goods, which are widely
accepted, it is conceded that States’ lists may be long and wide-ranging.
However, the requirement to publish them at least provides neutral States
with the opportunity to protest. The distinction between absolute and conditional contraband has almost certainly fallen into desuetude. It has been
replaced by an evidentiary question—is there sufficient evidence, on the
balance of probabilities, that the goods in question will be used to sustain
the enemy’s war effort? The enemy destination requirement for contraband
is similarly a question of fact determined upon available evidence and any
evidentiary presumptions provided for by the domestic prize law of the
belligerent State. Practice in previous conflicts, although hardly recent, suggests that prize courts often find and use any evidence at all in favor of the
belligerent captors. Second World War developments indicate that, in the
future, these evidentiary questions (use and destination) will be in the
hands not of prize courts, but executive officials administering a navicert
regime. The advent of navicerts, coupled with the development of the belligerent ability to divert rather than capture shipping suspected of carrying
contraband, is likely to spell the end of prize proceedings dealing with contraband carriage.
Unlike contraband, blockade has been recently practiced. Its employment by Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, the response of States to its use and
the findings of the Turkish, Turkel and Palmer reports reinforced much of
the traditional law of blockade. This article has suggested that blockades
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should no longer be required to be enforced impartially. Focused, discretionary enforcement of a blockade would allow blockades to be effectively
maintained, but with probably lesser impact on neutral traders and the
population of the blockaded territory. Like contraband, the belligerent’s
capacity to divert shipping which would otherwise be in breach of the
blockade reduces the necessity for capture. Fewer captures mean fewer
prize proceedings. Indeed, even where captures are effected, the Israeli action against the Gaza flotilla shows that prize proceedings need not necessarily follow—vessels, cargos and crews may simply be repatriated rather
than confiscated or detained. Prize proceedings in the context of blockade
are as unlikely these days as they are in respect of contraband.
Maritime zones are a relatively new yet, in the view of this author, wellestablished belligerent right. The requirement that they take account of
neutral interests, coupled with the absence of a rule that they be enforced
impartially, mitigates to some degree their potential for harm to neutral
freedom of trade and navigation. While this article postulates that capture
ought to be an available mode of enforcement of maritime zones as much
as in any other area of maritime neutrality, belligerent reluctance to effect
captures for breach or suspected breach of other rules means capture remains an unlikely mode of enforcement in practice. Zones are more likely
to be enforced by diversions.
Unneutral service, the means by which neutral vessels might act partially to one belligerent over another, should be considered to be divided into
two categories. In the first, unneutral service which results in liability to
attack, are offending neutral vessels that become legitimate military targets
and may be dealt with under the law of naval warfare. Whether an attack by
a belligerent on a neutral merchant vessel amounts to a use of force against
the neutral flag State is a complex question which will ultimately be determined by the facts of each case. Where it does, the belligerent State must
comply not only with the law of naval warfare, but also with the jus ad bellum. The second category, unneutral service which results in liability to capture, is unashamedly a catch-all category of means by which neutral vessels
might support one belligerent’s cause over the other’s, yet is conduct falling
short of the high threshold for rendering themselves a lawful target for attack. Examples might be Internet hacking activity or complicity in some
form of cyber operation. Once again, just because this sort of activity renders a vessel liable for capture, does not oblige the wronged belligerent to
enforce its rights by capture—a diversion or an order to desist might be
sufficient.
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More generally, this article shows that many of the substantive rules of
maritime neutrality have remained fundamentally unaltered since the 1909
Declaration of London. Of course, there have been some changes. The
advent of the doctrine of maritime zones is the most significant. But States
continue to preserve the traditional law of contraband in their manuals, and
blockade has recently been employed in its classic terms. The concept of
unneutral service remains recognized.
On the other hand, the means of enforcing rules of maritime neutrality
by belligerents is likely to be significantly different in the future. Visit and
search has remained a stubbornly effective method of warfare, despite predictions to the contrary. Navicerts would reduce the need for visit and
search in contraband enforcement, although they would still require residual visit and search enforcement. Subject to the development of cyber
means of enforcement, maritime zones, blockades and unneutral service all
rely to some extent on visit and search to be effective. While visit and
search is likely to be employed for some time to come, capture of suspect
vessels has been shown to be all but moribund. Capturing vessels found in
breach of rules is difficult, onerous and resource intensive. While Israel did
capture the Mavi Marmara and the other vessels of the Gaza flotilla, the
Gaza blockade was most often enforced by warnings and diversions.
The existence of diversion simpliciter as a lawful mode of enforcement
greatly reduces the need for captures. This article does not subscribe to the
view that such diversions may only be with the consent of the neutral master, especially as diversion for the purpose of visit and search is widely regarded as a lawful, nonconsensual penalty. Indeed, the latter mode of enforcement ought to be of graver concern to neutral traders. Diversion for
visit and search may be ordered whenever there is grounds for visit and
search and to conduct it at sea would be impossible or unsafe—a determination in the hands of the belligerent. The belligerent State therefore enjoys
a broad discretion to divert neutral shipping to a port within its domestic
jurisdiction, subjecting them to its domestic laws. The only solution to this
conundrum is to impose a higher threshold for visit and search operations,
which is an unlikely development.
The last observation to make is that the growth of the view that the jus
ad bellum continues to govern belligerent activity during an armed conflict,
both between the belligerents and their interaction with neutral States, suggests the type of conflict in which interference with neutral shipping might
legitimately be conducted is more tightly constrained than ever before. The
UK’s limited war in the Falklands in 1982 demonstrated no necessity to
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interdict Argentinian trade. The UK view at the time was that all belligerent
activity against Argentina fell to be judged under Article 51 of the Charter,
as well as the rules of naval warfare. Belligerent activity, lawful under the
law of naval warfare or the traditional law of neutrality, would be rendered
unlawful under Article 51 of the Charter if it was not necessary or proportionate to the limited aim of the conflict. If this view took hold more
broadly, then enforcement of maritime neutrality rules will be a feature only of the most serious of conflicts.
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